>imagine you have a person that acts just the same as any other, except somehow their neurons in addition to carrying simple signals each have human intelligenc

>imagine you have a person that acts just the same as any other, except somehow their neurons in addition to carrying simple signals each have human intelligence and awareness and rich inner lives that they mostly keep private, but when you ask the person if they're conscious, their neurons stir from their own thoughts at hearing a familiar word and break protocol by answering individually instead of following their proper neural behaviors to allow the person to answer the question themselves. This, actually my other objection to the paper. It seems like centrality is important for the concept of consciousness (I agree that it means a hundred different things but it's convineient to talk about as a single thing). Most people would identify as the person behind the eyes (or generally in the head). And the fact that all experiences of the body is experienced in that central place makes it quite hard to imagine that the individual parts can also experience things on their own. Let alone, be able to disagree with the central thing.