4 ms·
> I think there is consensus (at least among people, philosophers included, in their ordinary lives) on the value of helping more people. There may be consensu
by pron 11y ago
> I think there is consensus (at least among people, philosophers included, in their ordinary lives) on the value of helping more people.
There may be consensus, but the source of the consensus is not some objective fact, but a mere convergence of various simulated worlds.
> If we restrict ourselves to empirical predictions, Gettier's examples cease to be paradoxical.
They're not paradoxical, they simply challenge the meaning of knowledge. But who says we want to restrict ourselves to empirical predictions? The problem in your reasoning is that everything in the real world is mediated for us by the simulated, subjective world. A click on the mouse in the "real world" might have some effect on the world of Minecraft, but the nature of that effect is determined by the rules of the simulated world -- not objective, physical reality. We should limit ourselves to empiricism when we want (subjective) to do stuff that interacts with physical reality, like build an airplane. But what if we want to laugh? Is a joke less real than an airplane?
> whereas people without a humanities education seem to still have the supposed benefits of one.
That is not true. People without humanities education have humanities knowledge comparable to grade-school math. It's more than nothing, sure, but it's far from making one knowledgeable. It is an extreme example, but there's a fascinating fringe group (mostly centered in and about Silicon Valley) called the Dark Enlightenment or neo-reactionism. They are similar in many ways to other historical groups, but different in others. In any case, they are mostly STEM people who have some historical beliefs that are completely erroneous, precisely because they believe what you just said (and that makes the movement all the more interesting).
> All I can say is that in ordinary, everyday life, I suspect you find questions (ordinary everyday questions like "where are my car keys?") to be only as valuable as their answers.
Sure, but why restrict ourselves to ordinary, everyday life? Do you think that human existence lies solely at that level?
> You can construct a whole anti-inductive edifice of beliefs that stand alone, but if they're completely disconnected from anything in real life
Here's that word again: real. Is a joke not real? What makes physical reality any more real than simulated reality? Is euclidean geometry any more real than non-euclidean geometry simply because we find the former in objective physical reality? Is, say, Call of Duty any more real than Minecraft or Super Mario simply because it imitates physical reality better? They're both simulations. Certainly some things are more physical than others, but whether that gives them any more value is completely subjective.
- lmm 11y ago> There may be consensus, but the source of the consensus is not some objective fact, but a mere convergence of various simulated worlds. Is there a difference? > They're not paradoxical, they simply challenge the meaning of knowledge. But the challenge is to the word, not the reality. Wondering whether belief under particular circumstances is "really" knowledge is as meaningless as wondering whether a glider is really an aeroplane - or whether an amusing quote is really a joke. When you get down to empirical predictions (and empirical predictions inside the world of Minecraft are no less empirical) - Will someone predict correctly? Will this object fly? Will my friend laugh at this quote? - the confusion goes away. > People without humanities education have humanities knowledge comparable to grade-school math. It's more than nothing, sure, but it's far from making one knowledgeable. I deliberately didn't say anything about knowledge, because the article doesn't; the article talks about beauty, about wonder, about things that touch the innermost parts of our mind. If that's its defense of the humanities, then it's on those criteria that I will judge a humanities education - and my experience is that humanities graduates are no better at producing those things than those who are not. > In any case, they are mostly STEM people who have some historical beliefs that are completely erroneous What is it that they're erroneous about? Surely not the subjective parts, by definition; it's only on the objective, empirical parts of history - the parts that, in the article's classification, belong on the STEM side of "Humanities vs. STEM" - that one can even have erroneousness (and perhaps indeed knowledge). > Sure, but why restrict ourselves to ordinary, everyday life? Do you think that human existence lies solely at that level? I think that we think more clearly and make better decisions at that level. > Here's that word again: real. Is a joke not real? What makes physical reality any more real than simulated reality? Is euclidean geometry any more real than non-euclidean geometry simply because we find the former in objective physical reality? Is, say, Call of Duty any more real than Minecraft or Super Mario simply because it imitates physical reality better? They're both simulations. Certainly some things are more physical than others, but whether that gives them any more value is completely subjective. And yet, in ordinary, everyday life, no-one finds the word confusing. We know immediately which things are real and which things are not (and sure, we find that some things straddle the borderline - but that only means that language is imprecise, not that we don't understand those things), and we find that there is consensus, that realness is objective.