From the article: >1.All events have the properties of past, present and future, at the same time. >2.That these A-properties are incompatible (or mutually-exc

From the article: >1.All events have the properties of past, present and future, at the same time. >2.That these A-properties are incompatible (or mutually-exclusive) with one another. >A person may object to the first premise, accusing McTaggart of assuming that all events have these properties at the same time. It is in assuming that all events start out with a contradiction that requires tensing that creates the regress, but once we reject this, the contradiction does not even take off. An event is said to be past, but is not also present nor future, and as well, an event is said to be present, but not past and future. >He concludes these arguments by stating that "Our ground for rejecting time, it may be said, is that time cannot be explained without assuming time." He's saying that any event was at one point in the future, at some point was in the present, and eventually went into the past. This makes sense, right? However, to judge where the event is at some point in time (past, present, or future), you need another point in time by which to reference it. For a concrete example, on "Monday July 13th, 2015", "Wednesday July 15th, 2015" was in the future. On "Wednesday July 15th, 2015", "Wednesday July 15th, 2015" was in the present, and by "Thursday July 16th, 2015", "Wednesday July 15th, 2015" is in the past. Without a specific reference point, any point in time is just a point in time and exists in all three states at once (because it is the future for any time before it, present for any time during it, and past for any time after it). Like most philosophical works... I can't really see why it's right, but I can't obviously point out why it's wrong; it won't affect my day to day life, but it's fun to think about.