Note that recent .gov data breaches now show in public what we already knew, that once someone has your private data (like private key) then everyone has it eve

Note that recent .gov data breaches now show in public what we already knew, that once someone has your private data (like private key) then everyone has it eventually, except perhaps for the general public, for a limited time. This insight factors into another criticism of ops list of problems. IF we lived in a world where all data wasn't shared and merged, then this could be used as a tool to help FB and twitter and .gov do a merge. But we can assume the merge has already happened and the data is near perfect. Therefore the sole remaining benefit of not putting PII into social media etc is the general public / private citizens have no idea who I am so they can't send me secure email. This sounds fairly useless, if every .gov and .com and criminal with a copy of breached data know exactly who I am and who my accounts are. You see there's been an inversion in security, that some people can see and some people cannot yet see, future being unevenly distributed and all that. If we didn't live in a total surveillance Orwell society, then a tool to make it microscopically easier to connect the dots would be bad despite its good parts, but given Big Brother's infallibility, eliminating the tool because it might help (infallible) Big Brother in a very small way that BB doesn't need anyway, only eliminates the small amount of known positive that the tool does provide. I have a keybase account and its pretty awesome and well implemented. Cool! I never use it because the use case of randomly sending encrypted stuff to people I don't already know doesn't come up very often. But if I had to, it is pretty slick...