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>If only the Chicago and Austrian schools would change their minds when data supporting their propositions are weak or of low confidence. Many classical and ne

>If only the Chicago and Austrian schools would change their minds when data supporting their propositions are weak or of low confidence. Many classical and neoclassical economic propositions are of a fundamentally epistemological nature, not strictly positivist. Such as the reasoning that, if without interference person A does action X at time T, X may be taken as the action they most preferred to do at time T, as if it wasn't then why would they have done it? In which case any interference with their taking of action X necessarily produces an inferior outcome in terms of their preferences at time T, as they're forced to take an action other than their most-preferred action. In this sense a person's preference for an action is defined by their taking of that action over all other possible ones when not interfered with, and as a definition its validity is a matter of epistemology, not something subject to empirical analysis. The Austrian school uses this ordinal form of utility as its basis, building upon the idea that interfering with someone's free action is the one thing that can clearly be shown to be undesirable as above. The Chicago school, on the other hand, also incorporates a quantitative form of utility, to allow for interpersonal utility comparisons. This requires some epistemological assumptions, for instance that preferences don't change over time or their rate of change follows a particular mathematical function, or that if someone buys 3 apples for $30 they value each at $10, rather than e.g. the first at $13, the second at $2, and the third at $15. Austrians dispute the validity of any such assumptions, and hence reach different conclusions. These epistemological foundations are matters of logic/philosophy, and hence no more amenable to empirical analysis than a proposition like 'abortion is immoral'. Modern economics tends to ignore epistemological issues, and instead focuses on finding the best way to maximise particular empirical metrics, without going into detailed study of the epistemological and philosophical validity of the metrics in question. So it's important to distinguish between economics as a tool for predicting and assessing the effects of particular phenomena on particular metrics (econometrics) and economics as an epistemological approach.

DanielBMarkham 11y ago
This is a hugely important point, and couched as it is in somewhat difficult terminology it may not reach the audience it should. Polemicists have the job of explaining meaning to others while persuading them. I will show you various pieces of data supporting my thesis and my thesis will give you understanding of how and why things work. If you write an opinion column, this is your job. This is not the same at all as trying to minimize assumptions and simply show relationships.
bcg1 11y ago
Most thoughtful, intelligent, and logical response I've seen on an economics thread on this forum. Thank you
cromwellian 11y ago
>Such as the reasoning that, if without interference person A does action X at time T, X may be taken as the action they most preferred to do at time T, as if it wasn't then why would they have done it? I'm well aware of the differences between the Chicago and Austrian schools, but I think this quote is a dubious assumption because it assumes human beings are primarily rational creates that act according to rules and reason. It's actually possible for people to take actions which they don't prefer to take. Praxeology IMHO is thoroughly unscientific, contradicts modern neuroscience and psychology with many of its assumptions about people, and a dubious exercise, and its use by Austrians to argue against public policy actions extremely weak. To me the purpose of economics is to study the real world as close as you can, and make predictions that can be used to not only understand our condition or future problems, but to make adjustments so as to create better outcomes. It is not to provide an ideological, philosophical basis for those actions, or for no actions at all. It's the difference between Medicine and Bioethics. Both the Chicago school and the Austrian school start out with assuming the outcomes -- a free market s what's desired, and produced the best outcomes. They they work backwards using different methods to justify their conclusions. I prefer not making the assumption that the unfettered free market produces the best outcome always. For example, when externalities are not priced in for things human beings care about in the abstract but not in their day to day preferences, like the long term ecosystem, or the health and welfare of future generations, I prefer a system of economics that works on a case by case basis, looking at problems, and figuring out experiments to run or course corrections. If economics is unpredictable, or the consequences of actions unknowable it also means the consequences of inaction or the 'free market' are unknowable, but that's no basis for siding against government action. We live in a complex evolutionary system, and it may be the only way to get out of local optima is to run lots of experiments that fail, including government intervention. That's why I think a mixed economy is a more evolutionary stable strategy than a pure free market or marxist one. I also think it's more moral than either of those.
- xixi77 11y ago
  "It's actually possible for people to take actions which they don't prefer to take." -- ??!! Perhaps you might mean that a person's preferences might change over time and depending on the situation (e.g. I might prefer today that I save more money tomorrow than I would actually feel like saving tomorrow, or I would prefer not to become a heroin addict, etc.) -- but I can't see how a person can take a decision that is not preferred at the moment s/he is taking it (except perhaps in the case of being indifferent and picking a decision at random)?
qu4z-2 11y ago
I haven't studied economics, so forgive me a naive question: What if the "interference" with action X is introducing a new alternative at time T that person A prefers over the original? (Perhaps that's not strictly within the definition of "interference" in this case?)
- logicchains 11y ago
  Interference is generally defined as physical interference of some sort, using violence or the threat thereof to prevent the action. If action X introduced a new alternative that person A preferred, then it wouldn't require violence as person A would consent to it if they viewed it as better than the alternative.

DanielBMarkham 11y ago

This is a hugely important point, and couched as it is in somewhat difficult terminology it may not reach the audience it should. Polemicists have the job of explaining meaning to others while persuading them. I will show you various pieces of data supporting my thesis and my thesis will give you understanding of how and why things work. If you write an opinion column, this is your job. This is not the same at all as trying to minimize assumptions and simply show relationships.

bcg1 11y ago

Most thoughtful, intelligent, and logical response I've seen on an economics thread on this forum. Thank you

cromwellian 11y ago

>Such as the reasoning that, if without interference person A does action X at time T, X may be taken as the action they most preferred to do at time T, as if it wasn't then why would they have done it? I'm well aware of the differences between the Chicago and Austrian schools, but I think this quote is a dubious assumption because it assumes human beings are primarily rational creates that act according to rules and reason. It's actually possible for people to take actions which they don't prefer to take. Praxeology IMHO is thoroughly unscientific, contradicts modern neuroscience and psychology with many of its assumptions about people, and a dubious exercise, and its use by Austrians to argue against public policy actions extremely weak. To me the purpose of economics is to study the real world as close as you can, and make predictions that can be used to not only understand our condition or future problems, but to make adjustments so as to create better outcomes. It is not to provide an ideological, philosophical basis for those actions, or for no actions at all. It's the difference between Medicine and Bioethics. Both the Chicago school and the Austrian school start out with assuming the outcomes -- a free market s what's desired, and produced the best outcomes. They they work backwards using different methods to justify their conclusions. I prefer not making the assumption that the unfettered free market produces the best outcome always. For example, when externalities are not priced in for things human beings care about in the abstract but not in their day to day preferences, like the long term ecosystem, or the health and welfare of future generations, I prefer a system of economics that works on a case by case basis, looking at problems, and figuring out experiments to run or course corrections. If economics is unpredictable, or the consequences of actions unknowable it also means the consequences of inaction or the 'free market' are unknowable, but that's no basis for siding against government action. We live in a complex evolutionary system, and it may be the only way to get out of local optima is to run lots of experiments that fail, including government intervention. That's why I think a mixed economy is a more evolutionary stable strategy than a pure free market or marxist one. I also think it's more moral than either of those.

xixi77 11y ago
"It's actually possible for people to take actions which they don't prefer to take." -- ??!! Perhaps you might mean that a person's preferences might change over time and depending on the situation (e.g. I might prefer today that I save more money tomorrow than I would actually feel like saving tomorrow, or I would prefer not to become a heroin addict, etc.) -- but I can't see how a person can take a decision that is not preferred at the moment s/he is taking it (except perhaps in the case of being indifferent and picking a decision at random)?

qu4z-2 11y ago

I haven't studied economics, so forgive me a naive question: What if the "interference" with action X is introducing a new alternative at time T that person A prefers over the original? (Perhaps that's not strictly within the definition of "interference" in this case?)

logicchains 11y ago
Interference is generally defined as physical interference of some sort, using violence or the threat thereof to prevent the action. If action X introduced a new alternative that person A preferred, then it wouldn't require violence as person A would consent to it if they viewed it as better than the alternative.