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BIOS is not the sum total of all firmware on a computer - for example you can write a rootkit that lives in the southbridge controller [1] [2] and [article]. A
by paulmd 11y ago
BIOS is not the sum total of all firmware on a computer - for example you can write a rootkit that lives in the southbridge controller [1] [2] and [article]. And you're correct, as you note - unless you're plugged into the JTAG how do you know you actually reflashed with a clean firmware/BIOS?
It's important not to mix the sensational reporting with what Dragos actually claimed - he only claimed an audio sidechannel as an airgap jumper and/or stay-behind re-loader mechanism on previously-infected systems. Which is actually perfectly possible, especially given that many audio chipsets still have native soft-modem capability built in. Could you write a "loader" firmware virus that re-downloads a more substantial rootkit via soft-modem with an ultrasonic carrier? Well, it's not impossible...
That's generally the problem with the BadBios tale - he's a security researcher so his claim was just at the edge of possibility, but it would have to be an very sophisticated piece of work. It's more likely that the guy was jumping at shadows, but then you read stuff like the [article], which I read as implying that BIOS/firmware-level malware is starting to trickle down to small-scale private actors.
[1] https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Heasman/Presentation/bh-usa-07-heasman.pdf https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Heasman/Pre...
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-07/Heasman/Paper/bh-dc-07-Heasman-WP.pdf https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-07/Heasman/Pape...
- pgeorgi 11y ago> for example you can write a rootkit that lives in the southbridge controller Those two slides sets don't claim to have a rootkit 'in the southbridge controller'. The second speaks about Option ROMs, which are a well-known attack vector (see practically half the Thunderbolt attack concepts, the other half aiming for the DMA capabilities). Option ROMs exist on plugin cards (which aren't southbridges) or, for built-in devices like on-board NICs, in the flash part that also hosts the PC firmware (BIOS, UEFI, coreboot, ...) - which sits behind the southbridge, not on the southbridge itself. There's also firmware for auxiliary processors (eg. IMC or SMU in AMD chipsets), but that also sits in the main firmware flash. The "security" processors (ME on Intel, PSP on AMD) also fetch their firmware from the main firmware flash (shared with the CPU firmware). The location of various firmware items is pretty well-known. I'd be more worried about some extra chip (such as a discrete audio codec chip ;-) ) coming with its own rewritable flash memory. But that's unlikely for cost reasons and also not part of the discussion in security research papers, at least as far as I have seen.