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From the article: ...will prevent the economic meltdown we are in the middle of from ever happening again..by making it impossible for those banks with access t
by yummyfajitas 17y ago
From the article: ...will prevent the economic meltdown we are in the middle of from ever happening again..by making it impossible for those banks with access to the sovereign's fractional reserve privilege to speculate with it.
The author doesn't seem to realize that Glass-Steagall won't prevent commercial banks from making bad home loans.
From the article: Lending went to finance productive assets (e.g. factories, machines, tractors, combines, etc) instead of financial speculation as it had in the 1920s.
Instead of speculating in "finance", lending went to speculate in "productive assets" like equities and bonds.
Seriously, what is this tripe doing on HN?
- karzeem 17y agoI think the difference between equity speculation and bond speculation is important. Debt bubbles are much more catastrophic than equity bubbles.
- mattmaroon 17y agoRight, the problem wasn't as much the home loans as all of the side-wagering. Nobody really knows the exact extent, but the credit default swaps are believed to be one to two orders of magnitude more money than the CDOs they were based on. Lehman and AIG in particular were destroyed by them.
- yummyfajitas 17y agoLehman was not destroyed by swaps. They just took a large position in subprime loans and held many of the riskier tranches. This is exactly what the article advocates forcing commercial banks to do. Of course, the article doesn't make any distinctions that either matt or karzeem make, such as debt vs equity or CDO vs CDS.
- mattmaroon 17y agoActually you're right, they had $150b in CDOs against which over $400b in CDS were written. Still illustrates the point handily.
- yummyfajitas 17y agoWhile there might have been $400b in CDS written against their CDOs, many of those CDS had mutually exclusive triggers, or were used to hedge against each other. For example, say I make a $200 bet with you that a coin comes up heads, and a $200 bet with pg thatit comes up tails. I've made $400 in bets, but I have only $200 in liabilities. Or I might buy a long position in apple, thinking it will go up. Then I think Steve Jobs might die, so I buy a short position. I now hold twice as many contracts, but my liability is completely covered. $400b in CDS is a meaningless number until we know how much of it was a liability.
- karzeem 17y agoI don't really know how to get around the problem of people placing bets with money they possess probabilistically. Clearly, if enough people are doing it, and enough of them make the same bad, massive bet, we all get screwed. But at the same, everyone in finance — even the most vanilla, small-town, we-just-take-deposits-and-make-safe-loans banks — works with money that has some nonzero chance of shrinking. The difference is that some correctly account for their worst-case scenario and others don't. Not sure where I'm going with that except to wonder whether there's some system that allows for speculation (i.e. opportunities to make money by making the right bet where someone else made the wrong one) while not tolerating a nonzero chance of a 2008-style meltdown.
- anamax 17y ago> Right, the problem wasn't as much the home loans as all of the side-wagering. Not so fast. US banks were basically required to own Fannie and Freddie stock plus if they didn't make "enough" loans to people who realistically couldn't pay them back, they got dinged by regulators. (Wells Fargo was getting hammered over this.) The stock holding is what pushed many of them into technical insolvency when Fannie and Freddie cratered. Combine that with regulators pushing mortgage-backed securities and you've covered the bulk of the problem. Throw in some govt officials who decided to pay off Goldman et al with taxpayer money instead of letting them rely on the "insurance" and collateral that they'd arranged, and the rest is a minor blip.
- hristov 17y agoGlass-Steagall will definitely prevent what happened in the current housing crisis. The bubble happened because banks were lending money for homes but were not keeping the loans. Instead they were packaging the loans as securities and selling the securities to third party investors. Thus, the banks did not need to worry that the loans were good, they just needed to worry the loans looked ok to the rating agencies at the time of sale of the securities. The third party investors had no idea who the borrowers were or how trustworthy they were, they just trusted the rating agencies. And the rating agencies turned out to be either stupid or corrupt or both. This would not have been possible with Glass-Steagall in force. Banks can still make loans but they could not securitize or sell the loans. They had to keep the loans on their books. This means the institutions and even individual people that made the loans would be responsible that they got paid back. Furthermore, all loans that are on the books would be regularly examined by banking examiners from the FDIC. When securitizing the loans, banks mostly avoided examination, on the grounds that they got their money for the loans so it does not matter much whether the loans perform or not. Now it cannot be guaranteed that Glass-Steagall will prevent bubbles in general, but it is certain that what happened last time could not possibly happen with Glass Steagall in effect. Regarding your second statement, I think you are confused about it again. When Glass Steagall was in effect regular commercial banks were rather limited as to the securities they could purchase. I believe they were allowed to make only 10 percent of their income from securities. They had to make most of their money by making loans directly to borrowers, instead of trading securities. That is what the article is referring to.
- byrneseyeview 17y agoGlass-Steagall will definitely prevent what happened in the current housing crisis. The bubble happened because banks were lending money for homes but were not keeping the loans. Instead they were packaging the loans as securities and selling the securities to third party investors. Thus, the banks did not need to worry that the loans were good, they just needed to worry the loans looked ok to the rating agencies at the time of sale of the securities. The third party investors had no idea who the borrowers were or how trustworthy they were, they just trusted the rating agencies. And the rating agencies turned out to be either stupid or corrupt or both. That is how securities markets work. Exactly the same forces affect, say, the CEO who owns .1% of his company's outstanding stock. Not an ideal situation, but not one that should be banned. I believe they were allowed to make only 10 percent of their income from securities. They had to make most of their money by making loans directly to borrowers, instead of trading securities. That is what the article is referring to. You're probably talking about the time before S&L deregulation, when, at one point, savings and loans had an aggregate negative net worth because they could only make long-term loans (mortgages and treasuries) and thus got buried when rates went up. Despite our current problems, I don't believe the US's financial sector has had a negative net worth since then. It should be pretty compelling to you that despite higher leverage, intertwined derivatives, the disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie, etc., our less regulated system is still less of a disaster than what came before it.