2 ms·
> The victims are the customers of the company, whose data has been lost to the wilds. Yes, but the article points out two complications: 1. We only know abou
by geofft 11y ago
> The victims are the customers of the company, whose data has been lost to the wilds.
Yes, but the article points out two complications:
1. We only know about those cases where the company has publicly disclosed their breach. There may be lots of victims, and just caring about the publicly-known ones seems misplaced.
2. In many cases, the data has not been lost. "Servers compromised, encrypted data stolen, decrypted keys not stolen" is generally more-or-less fine under a threat model. Victims of the LastPass attack last month are much less at risk than, say, victims of the 2013 Adobe attack.
It's important that we build a world in which prospective password-managing companies are incentivized to act like LastPass and not like Adobe, and I'm worried that LastPass is only acting like it is because they're good people (leaving room for a smooth-talking amoral competitor to undercut them). My general impression is that the companies that don't care about security are being very rational about it: getting it right is expensive, you're at risk either way, and the PR blowback is not well-correlated with how good your security design was. So you might as well not care, and as long as nobody cares, you can just write "industry-standard security measures" in your blog post once you're hacked.