What you don't understand is that a debt represents a risk to the lender, not a guarantee. If a debt were a guarantee, then there would be no basis for charging

What you don't understand is that a debt represents a risk to the lender, not a guarantee. If a debt were a guarantee, then there would be no basis for charging interest. In a well regulated system, the people who make bad bets are not entitled to retribution. They are "entitled" (read: expected) to go out of business. At the very least, they suffer embarrassing losses that they must explain to their shareholders. "Moral hazard", properly understood, is a term used to describe conditions that encourage reckless lenders. The threat of default is a good thing. That's what keeps otherwise rapacious lenders fearful enough to excercise good judgment and prudent restraint. Indeed, in advanced economies, the power of bankruptcy judges to wipe out debt is seens as an essential component of healthy capital markets. Bad lenders get wiped out, and take the money of their imprudent investors with them. That's what should have happened to the private lenders who originated the Greek debt. Instead, they got bailed out by EZ members who are following up one bad choice with another in promising their electorates that they can collect from a nation manifestly unable to pay.