3 ms·
Remote frame injection PoC by exploiting an A-MPDU vulnerability in 802.11n
- thekaleb 11y agoIt says this is for unencrypted networks, so do most coffee shops use n?
- falcolas 11y agoGiven that this can affect anyone from a web page, any coffee shop which uses "n" is vulnerable. And I know of a few I frequent which use 'n'.
- userbinator 11y agoIf this is 'n'-only, would going down to 'a' or 'g' mitigate it completely? Especially in a coffee shop where the outbound connection is unlikely to be very fast anyway, the bandwidth difference probably won't be noticeable.
- wtallis 11y agoSince 802.11n was the first standard to support packet aggregation, then dropping back to a/g will probably work, unless clients cannot be told by the AP to not treat the network as a mixed a/g/n network.
- cesarb 11y agoVery interesting. It's a fault injection attack causing content from the highest layers to be misinterpreted as coming from the lowest layers, with the "fault injection" part being done by the noisy wireless medium itself! This reminds me of the classic "+++ATH0" attack, where sending that string in for instance an IRC message caused some modems to hang up. One solution is to scramble the data, so parts of it cannot be misinterpreted as lower-level framing, even if a few bits are corrupted. One good way to scramble the data is encryption, so even a trivially encrypted network (for instance, the password being the same as the SSID) would be immune to this attack.
- userbinator 11y agoOne solution is to scramble the data, so parts of it cannot be misinterpreted as lower-level framing Since the scrambling must be reversible, it would still be possible to generate the framing sequence with a different stream of data. It also only reduces the chances of the framing sequence appearing, but doesn't eliminate it completely. The real solution is to ensure that the framing sequence is impossible to produce with normal data, by making it out-of-band with e.g. a different frequency or modulation.