This is a pretty silly deterrent in an actual nuclear standoff scenario. If you have Nation A and Nation B, and Nation A chooses to implement this "leader must

This is a pretty silly deterrent in an actual nuclear standoff scenario. If you have Nation A and Nation B, and Nation A chooses to implement this "leader must personally kill to launch the nukes" plan, then what happens if/when Nation B finds out about this? Nation B is able to more strongly bully Nation A because the leader of Nation A is less willing to actually make the call that would lead to a personal death. In contrast, the "hostage" approach described in the linked-to article (http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/09/19/the-heart-of-deterrence/ http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/09/19/the-heart-of-deter...) is better, and, as one of the commenters mentions, was something in use historically: >The fundemental logic of ‘family hostages’ is not that different from how many of the monarchies achieved various alliances with other nations through the use of marriage.