I don't think I can argue better than Obergefell v. Hodges itself where they cite Loving as precedent: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.p

I don't think I can argue better than Obergefell v. Hodges itself where they cite Loving as precedent: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf >Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Loving v. Virginia , 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invali - dated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail , 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978), which held the right to marry was bur - dened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley , 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, th e Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J. , 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur , 414 U. S. 632, 639–640 (1974); Griswold , supra , at 486; Skinner v. Okla - homa ex rel. Williamson , 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). >A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding con - nection between marriage and liberty is why Loving inval - idated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki , supra, at 384 (observing Loving held “the right to marry is of fun - damental importance for all individuals”). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procrea - tion, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Law - rence , supra , at 574. >ee App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed , O. T. 1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men in marriage). These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. One State’s law, for example, pro- vided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately, either for he r own protection, or for her benefit.” Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935). Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection prin - ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra , 450 U. S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co. , 446 U. S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott , 443 U. S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr , 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb , 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld , 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Like Loving and Zablocki , these precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.