3 ms·

" Sorry, this statement just isn't true: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia" I'm aware of lovi

" Sorry, this statement just isn't true: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia" I'm aware of loving, which said nothing different? Loving basically said the same thing i did - they need a legitimate state interest. Race based discrimination is not a legitimate state interest. Therefore, Loving falls. That is sane legal theory. But it doesn't change this case? "So you are saying that every social issue must end with a constitutional amendment? The 14th amendment is already there. Why must we repeat the mistakes of the past every time a new issue comes along? Are you suggesting we should go to war to settle same sex marriage?" So what is your view on the 14th amendment. What do you think equal protection means? Because what you've said here essentially implies you think the 14th amendment swallows the rest of the constitution, when instead, the 14th amendment has very specific application. "You have not established this conclusion with anything you said. Nothing in this comment strikes me as from a "lawyer" but what do I know, I'm just an astronaut doctor lawyer in space." You haven't actually refuted any point i've made. If you are arguing i am not a lawyer, that's fairly easy to verify. Past that, why actually listen to a lawyer, when you can cite that great legal authority, wikipedia. If you want to make a legal argument, make one. Simply saying "Loving", does not work, because Loving is different.

chc 11y ago
> I'm aware of loving, which said nothing different? Loving basically said the same thing i did - they need a legitimate state interest. Race based discrimination is not a legitimate state interest. Therefore, this falls. How is sex-based discrimination in marriage a legitimate state interest but not race-based discrimination in marriage? I'm having trouble seeing how Loving — which overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory — can be a good ruling while Obergefell is a bad ruling because it overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory.
- DannyBee 11y ago
  This is easy: Race based discrimination is held to a heightened standard. Sex based discrimination is also. However, the majority in this case did not hold that this was sex based discrimination (despite arguments that it was). That would, in fact, have been valid legal reasoning. Holding that it is sex based discrimination and subject to heightened scrutiny under equal protection would be perfectly reasonable. Instead, they said that the equal protection clause and the substantive due process clause combine in a magical way to give a new right.
- csallen 11y ago
  Disclaimers: I'm not a lawyer, and I am 100% in favor of gay marriage. I read Roberts' dissenting opinion pretty closely, and he discusses Loving several times. His argument doesn't read like a states' right argument at all. His basic point is that, for better or for worse, the definition of marriage has always been a union between a man and a woman, and that the laws were written with this interpretation in mind. (I agree there, as he provides some good primary sources, and Kennedy's majority opinion acknowledges this fact as well.) We'll call this opposite-sex definition "Marriage" with a capital "M". Roberts also demonstrates that Marriage is a guaranteed right. (The majority agrees there, too.) In the cases in question, states sought to restrict some people from Marriage, e.g. interracial couples, convicts, etc. These decisions were struck down by the court, because they violated the right to Marriage as it was guaranteed. The gay marriage issue, however, is different. It does not seek to prevent restrictions on Marriage, but to redefine it to include more people (specifically, opposite genders). Roberts argues that creating rights is not the responsibility of the court, but should instead be handled by the legislative branch. The majority argues that, even though past litigation and legislation only protected opposite-sex Marriage with a capital "M", it is okay to ignore their intentions if they are harmful or misguided. I think the dissenting justices were wary of doing that, because it goes beyond interpreting the law and wades into writing the law. It's not up to the court to determine what the law should be, only to determine what it is. Otherwise, they're usurping the power of the legislative branch, and thus of we, the people, who elect them.
0x5f3759df-i 11y ago
I don't think I can argue better than Obergefell v. Hodges itself where they cite Loving as precedent: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf >Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Loving v. Virginia , 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invali - dated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail , 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978), which held the right to marry was bur - dened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley , 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, th e Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J. , 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur , 414 U. S. 632, 639–640 (1974); Griswold , supra , at 486; Skinner v. Okla - homa ex rel. Williamson , 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). >A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding con - nection between marriage and liberty is why Loving inval - idated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki , supra, at 384 (observing Loving held “the right to marry is of fun - damental importance for all individuals”). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procrea - tion, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Law - rence , supra , at 574. >ee App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed , O. T. 1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men in marriage). These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. One State’s law, for example, pro- vided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately, either for he r own protection, or for her benefit.” Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935). Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection prin - ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra , 450 U. S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co. , 446 U. S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott , 443 U. S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr , 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb , 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld , 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Like Loving and Zablocki , these precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.

chc 11y ago

> I'm aware of loving, which said nothing different? Loving basically said the same thing i did - they need a legitimate state interest. Race based discrimination is not a legitimate state interest. Therefore, this falls. How is sex-based discrimination in marriage a legitimate state interest but not race-based discrimination in marriage? I'm having trouble seeing how Loving — which overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory — can be a good ruling while Obergefell is a bad ruling because it overrode states' control over marriage when it was unnecessarily discriminatory.

DannyBee 11y ago
This is easy: Race based discrimination is held to a heightened standard. Sex based discrimination is also. However, the majority in this case did not hold that this was sex based discrimination (despite arguments that it was). That would, in fact, have been valid legal reasoning. Holding that it is sex based discrimination and subject to heightened scrutiny under equal protection would be perfectly reasonable. Instead, they said that the equal protection clause and the substantive due process clause combine in a magical way to give a new right.
csallen 11y ago
Disclaimers: I'm not a lawyer, and I am 100% in favor of gay marriage. I read Roberts' dissenting opinion pretty closely, and he discusses Loving several times. His argument doesn't read like a states' right argument at all. His basic point is that, for better or for worse, the definition of marriage has always been a union between a man and a woman, and that the laws were written with this interpretation in mind. (I agree there, as he provides some good primary sources, and Kennedy's majority opinion acknowledges this fact as well.) We'll call this opposite-sex definition "Marriage" with a capital "M". Roberts also demonstrates that Marriage is a guaranteed right. (The majority agrees there, too.) In the cases in question, states sought to restrict some people from Marriage, e.g. interracial couples, convicts, etc. These decisions were struck down by the court, because they violated the right to Marriage as it was guaranteed. The gay marriage issue, however, is different. It does not seek to prevent restrictions on Marriage, but to redefine it to include more people (specifically, opposite genders). Roberts argues that creating rights is not the responsibility of the court, but should instead be handled by the legislative branch. The majority argues that, even though past litigation and legislation only protected opposite-sex Marriage with a capital "M", it is okay to ignore their intentions if they are harmful or misguided. I think the dissenting justices were wary of doing that, because it goes beyond interpreting the law and wades into writing the law. It's not up to the court to determine what the law should be, only to determine what it is. Otherwise, they're usurping the power of the legislative branch, and thus of we, the people, who elect them.

0x5f3759df-i 11y ago

I don't think I can argue better than Obergefell v. Hodges itself where they cite Loving as precedent: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf >Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Loving v. Virginia , 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invali - dated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail , 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978), which held the right to marry was bur - dened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied this principle in Turner v. Safley , 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other contexts, th e Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J. , 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur , 414 U. S. 632, 639–640 (1974); Griswold , supra , at 486; Skinner v. Okla - homa ex rel. Williamson , 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). >A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding con - nection between marriage and liberty is why Loving inval - idated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki , supra, at 384 (observing Loving held “the right to marry is of fun - damental importance for all individuals”). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procrea - tion, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Law - rence , supra , at 574. >ee App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed , O. T. 1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men in marriage). These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. One State’s law, for example, pro- vided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately, either for he r own protection, or for her benefit.” Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935). Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection prin - ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra , 450 U. S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co. , 446 U. S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott , 443 U. S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr , 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb , 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld , 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Like Loving and Zablocki , these precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.