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The argument is that Bayesian statistics are less subjective because while we won't come to the same conclusion, we will perform the same update to our prior pr
by yummyfajitas 17y ago
The argument is that Bayesian statistics are less subjective because while we won't come to the same conclusion, we will perform the same update to our prior probabilities.
An example: consider a medical diagnostic test with a 1% false positive rate and no false negatives.
If I understand him correctly, Eliezer is arguing that the scientist (i.e. the lab running the test) should present an update rule, not the posterior probability. I.e., the lab report should say: "Whatever your prior estimate of P(sick) is, your posterior should now be P(sick)/(0.01 P(not sick) + P(sick))" instead of saying "the patient has an x% chance of being sick".
Suppose before the test I believe the odds the patient is sick are 1% and you think they are 10%. Once the test comes out positive, I've updated my probability estimate to 50%, you to 92%.
The update rule provided by Bayesian statistics is objective, even if the posterior is subjective. The frequentists have nothing comparable which is objective.
See also this link:
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/02/share-likelihood-ratios-not-posterior-beliefs.html http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/02/share-likelihood-ratio...
- smanek 17y agoAh, that makes sense - thanks.