7 ms·
How to build your own public key infrastructure
- helper 11y agoAnyone have any strategies for running online CAs (relatively) securely without an HSM?
- rdl 11y ago1) HSMs are certified, and are relatively robust against individual employees (if configured that way). With anything else, administrators of the system are likely to be able to get access to key material. But a pain to work with, and expensive. 2) Offline key management -- e.g. a laptop in a safe -- was the low end solution for a long time. However, there are a lot of reasons why you want an online CA now 3) Just keeping a key in memory on a machine (doing nothing special) obviously exposes you to several risks: a) Administrator (can be remote; incl compromise of laptop of admin) b) Anyone who gains root on the box c) Application-level security issues (ranging from key leakage to just compromising the application. d) Physical-access cold boot (which can be more exciting in a virtualized environment) There are a bunch of ways to improve #3, although it will remain worse than #1 or #2. a) Simply run the keys in a different process; this protects you against some minimal things, and if you use a PKCS 11 interface, makes upgrading to an HSM later easier. b) Different user, with a defined interface c) Different VM d) Physically separate machines communicating over a bidirectional link (you could do this as two ethernet connections) e) Two one-way links bound to specific programs (e.g. serial); much harder to compromise both this way. You'd need to compromise the "send commands" program, and "receive commands" program, and the "send response" program. They can be very limited in what they do. Limiting admin access to physical-presence, or at the very least via a secure pathway which isn't direct to the machine (e.g. a console server which logs) goes a long way, too.
- rubiquity 11y agoThis is a really great intro to the how and why of TLS PKI as well as showing how to use CloudFare's really awesome looking CFSSL tool. I'm a big fan of DigitalOcean but they don't offer VPCs like AWS does so I always have to create a PKI in order to communicate securely between my droplets. I've always done this with some crappy scripts but I'll definitely give CFSSL a shot for automating this next time. EDIT: One beef I have with cfssl is the csr_ca.json file. Making the keys in the "names" object less obscure would do wonders for readability.
- tocf 11y agoOne of the issues with PKI is ensuring that the public key you're using to communicate with the person is actually the right public key, and that someone hasn't replaced it with their own. I'm curious if you used something like the blockchain (but not bitcoin necessarily) to have a public ledger of published public keys (identities) would that problem be essentially solved? (IE if the keys and any signing for a web of trust be on a distributed public ledger, then you could be reasonably sure that you're dealing with the person really behind that public key?)
- pfraze 11y agoCheck out https://github.com/ssbc/ssb-docs https://github.com/ssbc/ssb-docs. It' should have a beta release this summer.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- schoen 11y agoThere are a lot of ideas in this direction and some of them will probably eventually pan out. A few things to look at (not exhaustive): https://okturtles.com/ https://okturtles.com/ http://www.coniks.org/ http://www.coniks.org/ http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ An important early formulation of this possibility was Aaron Swartz's, in "Squaring Zooko's Triangle": http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/squarezooko http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/squarezooko Everyone has different ideas about how most efficiently and safely to make public records append-only and achieve distributed consensus, and also what kind of records to put in to the system and what rules to use for validating updates. One way in which proposals have diverged is whether to use blockchain-like distributed consensus for storing and distributing keys, or just for adding transparency to trusted authorities' behavior.
- ikeboy 11y agoNo mention of keybase?
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- hellbanner 11y agoIs anyone familiar with the DarkMail key management architecture? re https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWzvXaxR6us https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWzvXaxR6us
- abbot2 11y agoThe most hard part of PKI is omitted completely in the article: how to deal with revocations (CRLs, OCSP and such). Hope that's not because they "forgot" to do that in their actual infrastructure.
- sneak 11y agoWith an online certificate issuance service like the one they describe, certificate expiration times can probably be in the 1-24 hour range, reducing the importance of revocation.