5 ms·

It's really hard to find the correct middle-ground. Would you prefer if Windows worked like iOS where there are serious limitations on what apps can do in the b

by pilif 11y ago

It's really hard to find the correct middle-ground. Would you prefer if Windows worked like iOS where there are serious limitations on what apps can do in the background and where every application has to go through a central authority for vetting? Or do you propose a solution that gives both freedom to the user while also not allowing something like this to happen? Yes, there are whitelisting solutions (built into the OS by MS, btw), but they are a real pain in the ass to use - there's just too much stuff running on your machine at any given time.

ninkendo 11y ago
> Would you prefer if Windows worked like iOS where there are serious limitations on what apps can do in the background and where every application has to go through a central authority for vetting? I've thought about this for a while, and honestly, for desktops/notebooks/tablets? Yes. Maybe not just one App Store like iOS, but at least sandbox all possible non-os code similarly to ChromeOS, in a way that's on by default and requires a boot-time flag to disable (and users should be allowed to do this, but OEMs shouldn't.) Recently my dad bought a new $300 toshiba laptop because his old machine was just "slow", as in he had so much spyware on his computer that it was easier to just buy a new one than going through the hassle of cleaning up his old one. Even though his old laptop was perfectly good and of a recent hardware generation. I'm 100% positive he's going to have the same issues on his new laptop, and his response was that he uses his iPad so much that it doesn't matter anyway. The role of the modern day OS has changed immensely over the years. Nowadays there's simply no reason for legitimate applications to have the level of access to the underlying system that they used to have. Apps really don't need arbitrary filesystem access. They don't need to be able to overwrite core system files. They should be run in a sandbox or a container with as restricted of a set of permissions as possible. For servers and development workstations the story is a little bit different, but those are exceptions to the rule, and with the proper release hatches like boot-time enabling of un-sandboxed code it's a good tradeoff IMO.
- geon 11y ago
  I like the way OS X handles it. Unsigned software won't run by default, but the user can override the limitation.
  - daemin 11y ago
    Yes, you can do this on Windows too, but the problem is this update disabler executable was signed, so it would have run anyway.
    - reacweb 11y ago
      There are two problems: how on earth samsung may have the idea to produce this kind of software and who is signing software without giving a look at what he is signing. A problem of software development mentality (on windows) and a problem of responsability.
      - tallanvor 11y ago
        Samsung signed the software, of course. Who else would?
      - zamalek 11y ago
        > who is signing software without giving a look at what he is signing. Versign would by proxy, as one example. A certificate authorized to sign code was purchased from them. Samsung would directly, to prove that this shit software came from them. Just like SSL/TLS. I could set up an SSL website that performs drive-by attacks, would Verisign sign that? Yes, yes they would. Vericode isn't an gate keeper like Macs certificates are. It's designed to improve security: if I download a Samsung installer Windows will tell me that it is indeed from Samsung (during the UAC elevation) because the signature checks out. This means that I can be certain that unbeknownst malware won't be installed on my PC alongside the Samsung malware. The story is different with WHDL (drivers), those are signed by Microsoft (in addition to yourself, I think).
      - throwaway2048 11y ago
        when you are asking for companies to verify all the software that is signed by their certs, im quite certain you are not at all considering the consequences.
- bad_user 11y ago
  Right, so because Windows has been historically shitty creating this problem in the first place, we now willingly want Trusted Computing and thus losing control and ownership of our own devices, with the grandma reason given as rationale. Well, when this relationship with the likes of Apple and Microsoft goes toxic, and it's only a matter of time, I'll be one of those that will enjoy it, as I'll consider it a sort of social justice, as a lot of people told you so and you wouldn't listen.
  - matthewmacleod 11y ago
    Instead of this sanctimonious sermon, we would be better served attempting to solve the problem that locked-down platforms do, but in a more open way. Because the fact remains - computers have been a difficult thing for many people to use and maintain reliably. The "Windows has been historically shitty" point might be a reason this problem has been worse than it needed to, but it's hardly a compelling excuse. When people—and not just Grandma—point out that their iPads don't have the same problem, then we should take that on board, rather than telling them that they're stupid for not listening.
    - bad_user 11y ago
      So I'm all for solving current problems, however if I'm sure of anything, I'm sure that companies like Microsoft or Apple won't deliver a solution that solves these problems without locking-in users into a trap which is worse than the problem that it's solving. And on Windows, this is the oldest trick in the book - in order to sell something people don't want, you first need to create the demand for it.
- cnvogel 11y ago
  > he had so much spyware on his computer that it was easier > to just buy a new one than going through the hassle of > cleaning up his old one... I don't understand. Why not just reinstall the operating system from blank media? If you get a new machine, you'll have to reinstall your user-applications and data anyway?
  - pjc50 11y ago
    It's not something most people know how to do, and you have to pay for a blank media set. There is usually a "recovery partition" instead, but how well do those work?
    - cnvogel 11y ago
      You can download windows install files from Microsoft nowadays. There's a downloader that also includes functionality to burn a DVD image or create a bootable USB stick. http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/create-reset-refresh-media http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/create-reset-re... As for the "it's not something most people know how to do": Buying a new computer also requires you to transfer files from the old to the new computer. And requires you to install your software. I'd say that both tasks aren't significantly harder to perform than clicking "next" on the Windows install dvd.
- xg15 11y ago
  > Nowadays there's simply no reason for legitimate applications to have the level of access to the underlying system that they used to have I'm hearing this argument from time to time. But I'd like to know what exactly changed. I can think of a dozen use-cases for which a shared, system-wide filesystem would be absolutely necessary (yes, especially with computer-illiterate friends and relatives, as "files" is pretty much the only abstraction besides "web" that is widely understood even outside of "geek"/"power user" circles). So, what exactly has changed between then and now that made those use-cases legitimate in the bast but not anymore now?
  - pjmlp 11y ago
    People neglected the fact that having $HOME access was already bad enough and lived in the illusion that running applications as normal user was safe.
    - xg15 11y ago
      Why is having a home directory bad?
      - pjmlp 11y ago
        Any application running under the user id has full access to his private data. Add the capability to do network communication and suddenly the all wolrd has access to $ HOME. This is why in the container model of mobile OS and Windows/Mac OS X sandboxes, applications only get to see file handles to files choosen by the user.
developer1 11y ago
Or you know, place the ability to disable Windows Update behind policy restrictions and UAC rather than being openly editable in the registry? With policy restrictions, corporate installations could deny all attempts to disable the service. In non-corporate environments, this should at least require a UAC prompt. While too many users would likely click through without understanding, at least knowledgeable users would understand and be able to deny the change. Windows Update is a serious security requirement for any Windows install. Disabling it should clearly require explicit consent from the user.
- pilif 11y ago
  Changing the windows update policy requires admin rights and UAC prompting. The Samsung installer would also run as admin (either started from a service running as admin and deployed by the samsung initial image, or by the user allowing UAC when launching the samsung installer), so it can change the registry.
  - developer1 11y ago
    True. To be more specific: while UAC is great for requiring admin privileges, it would be nice if UAC prompts would enumerate the permissions being asked for. The prompt should be asking you if you wish to allow the program to disable Windows Update as opposed to "admin privileges to do anything whatsoever with your operating system". That said, it's a difficult system to implement properly. Android went that route, and it almost works - almost. Android's available permissions are too plentiful, and yet certain permissions are too broad in scope. I wouldn't want a desktop application to have to ask for separate privileges for every little piece of functionality, but for certain critical actions it would be nice to have some clue as to what is going on. Perhaps in another 20 years someone will finally invent a privilege escalation system that somehow manages to be both very specific and yet not time consuming for the customer to manage. What a dream. :)
pjc50 11y ago
In the early days of multi-user OS security, applications were trusted because they were installed by the admin and users were untrusted. Today, we have systems which are mostly single-user, but where the applications are incredibly untrustworthy. Hence the popularity of jails and app-store systems. You can't easily retrofit this on Windows because there is very little security between windows running on the same desktop, but what I think we'll end up with is each application having its own SID and a default-restricted view of the user profile. But in this case it's a hostile OEM, and there really isn't much that can be done in software against that.
- pjmlp 11y ago
  This is the direction with app containers in WinRT model.

by pilif 11y ago

ninkendo 11y ago

> Would you prefer if Windows worked like iOS where there are serious limitations on what apps can do in the background and where every application has to go through a central authority for vetting? I've thought about this for a while, and honestly, for desktops/notebooks/tablets? Yes. Maybe not just one App Store like iOS, but at least sandbox all possible non-os code similarly to ChromeOS, in a way that's on by default and requires a boot-time flag to disable (and users should be allowed to do this, but OEMs shouldn't.) Recently my dad bought a new $300 toshiba laptop because his old machine was just "slow", as in he had so much spyware on his computer that it was easier to just buy a new one than going through the hassle of cleaning up his old one. Even though his old laptop was perfectly good and of a recent hardware generation. I'm 100% positive he's going to have the same issues on his new laptop, and his response was that he uses his iPad so much that it doesn't matter anyway. The role of the modern day OS has changed immensely over the years. Nowadays there's simply no reason for legitimate applications to have the level of access to the underlying system that they used to have. Apps really don't need arbitrary filesystem access. They don't need to be able to overwrite core system files. They should be run in a sandbox or a container with as restricted of a set of permissions as possible. For servers and development workstations the story is a little bit different, but those are exceptions to the rule, and with the proper release hatches like boot-time enabling of un-sandboxed code it's a good tradeoff IMO.

geon 11y ago
I like the way OS X handles it. Unsigned software won't run by default, but the user can override the limitation.
- daemin 11y ago
  Yes, you can do this on Windows too, but the problem is this update disabler executable was signed, so it would have run anyway.
  - reacweb 11y ago
    There are two problems: how on earth samsung may have the idea to produce this kind of software and who is signing software without giving a look at what he is signing. A problem of software development mentality (on windows) and a problem of responsability.
    - tallanvor 11y ago
      Samsung signed the software, of course. Who else would?
    - zamalek 11y ago
      > who is signing software without giving a look at what he is signing. Versign would by proxy, as one example. A certificate authorized to sign code was purchased from them. Samsung would directly, to prove that this shit software came from them. Just like SSL/TLS. I could set up an SSL website that performs drive-by attacks, would Verisign sign that? Yes, yes they would. Vericode isn't an gate keeper like Macs certificates are. It's designed to improve security: if I download a Samsung installer Windows will tell me that it is indeed from Samsung (during the UAC elevation) because the signature checks out. This means that I can be certain that unbeknownst malware won't be installed on my PC alongside the Samsung malware. The story is different with WHDL (drivers), those are signed by Microsoft (in addition to yourself, I think).
    - throwaway2048 11y ago
      when you are asking for companies to verify all the software that is signed by their certs, im quite certain you are not at all considering the consequences.
bad_user 11y ago
Right, so because Windows has been historically shitty creating this problem in the first place, we now willingly want Trusted Computing and thus losing control and ownership of our own devices, with the grandma reason given as rationale. Well, when this relationship with the likes of Apple and Microsoft goes toxic, and it's only a matter of time, I'll be one of those that will enjoy it, as I'll consider it a sort of social justice, as a lot of people told you so and you wouldn't listen.
- matthewmacleod 11y ago
  Instead of this sanctimonious sermon, we would be better served attempting to solve the problem that locked-down platforms do, but in a more open way. Because the fact remains - computers have been a difficult thing for many people to use and maintain reliably. The "Windows has been historically shitty" point might be a reason this problem has been worse than it needed to, but it's hardly a compelling excuse. When people—and not just Grandma—point out that their iPads don't have the same problem, then we should take that on board, rather than telling them that they're stupid for not listening.
  - bad_user 11y ago
    So I'm all for solving current problems, however if I'm sure of anything, I'm sure that companies like Microsoft or Apple won't deliver a solution that solves these problems without locking-in users into a trap which is worse than the problem that it's solving. And on Windows, this is the oldest trick in the book - in order to sell something people don't want, you first need to create the demand for it.
cnvogel 11y ago
> he had so much spyware on his computer that it was easier > to just buy a new one than going through the hassle of > cleaning up his old one... I don't understand. Why not just reinstall the operating system from blank media? If you get a new machine, you'll have to reinstall your user-applications and data anyway?
- pjc50 11y ago
  It's not something most people know how to do, and you have to pay for a blank media set. There is usually a "recovery partition" instead, but how well do those work?
  - cnvogel 11y ago
    You can download windows install files from Microsoft nowadays. There's a downloader that also includes functionality to burn a DVD image or create a bootable USB stick. http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/create-reset-refresh-media http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-8/create-reset-re... As for the "it's not something most people know how to do": Buying a new computer also requires you to transfer files from the old to the new computer. And requires you to install your software. I'd say that both tasks aren't significantly harder to perform than clicking "next" on the Windows install dvd.
xg15 11y ago
> Nowadays there's simply no reason for legitimate applications to have the level of access to the underlying system that they used to have I'm hearing this argument from time to time. But I'd like to know what exactly changed. I can think of a dozen use-cases for which a shared, system-wide filesystem would be absolutely necessary (yes, especially with computer-illiterate friends and relatives, as "files" is pretty much the only abstraction besides "web" that is widely understood even outside of "geek"/"power user" circles). So, what exactly has changed between then and now that made those use-cases legitimate in the bast but not anymore now?
- pjmlp 11y ago
  People neglected the fact that having $HOME access was already bad enough and lived in the illusion that running applications as normal user was safe.
  - xg15 11y ago
    Why is having a home directory bad?
    - pjmlp 11y ago
      Any application running under the user id has full access to his private data. Add the capability to do network communication and suddenly the all wolrd has access to $ HOME. This is why in the container model of mobile OS and Windows/Mac OS X sandboxes, applications only get to see file handles to files choosen by the user.

developer1 11y ago

Or you know, place the ability to disable Windows Update behind policy restrictions and UAC rather than being openly editable in the registry? With policy restrictions, corporate installations could deny all attempts to disable the service. In non-corporate environments, this should at least require a UAC prompt. While too many users would likely click through without understanding, at least knowledgeable users would understand and be able to deny the change. Windows Update is a serious security requirement for any Windows install. Disabling it should clearly require explicit consent from the user.

pilif 11y ago
Changing the windows update policy requires admin rights and UAC prompting. The Samsung installer would also run as admin (either started from a service running as admin and deployed by the samsung initial image, or by the user allowing UAC when launching the samsung installer), so it can change the registry.
- developer1 11y ago
  True. To be more specific: while UAC is great for requiring admin privileges, it would be nice if UAC prompts would enumerate the permissions being asked for. The prompt should be asking you if you wish to allow the program to disable Windows Update as opposed to "admin privileges to do anything whatsoever with your operating system". That said, it's a difficult system to implement properly. Android went that route, and it almost works - almost. Android's available permissions are too plentiful, and yet certain permissions are too broad in scope. I wouldn't want a desktop application to have to ask for separate privileges for every little piece of functionality, but for certain critical actions it would be nice to have some clue as to what is going on. Perhaps in another 20 years someone will finally invent a privilege escalation system that somehow manages to be both very specific and yet not time consuming for the customer to manage. What a dream. :)

pjc50 11y ago

In the early days of multi-user OS security, applications were trusted because they were installed by the admin and users were untrusted. Today, we have systems which are mostly single-user, but where the applications are incredibly untrustworthy. Hence the popularity of jails and app-store systems. You can't easily retrofit this on Windows because there is very little security between windows running on the same desktop, but what I think we'll end up with is each application having its own SID and a default-restricted view of the user profile. But in this case it's a hostile OEM, and there really isn't much that can be done in software against that.

pjmlp 11y ago
This is the direction with app containers in WinRT model.