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> “This was classic espionage, just on a scale we’ve never seen before from a traditional adversary,” one senior administration official said. “And it’s not a s
by mirimir 11y ago
> “This was classic espionage, just on a scale we’ve never seen before from a traditional adversary,” one senior administration official said. “And it’s not a satisfactory answer to say, ‘We found it and stopped it,’ when we should have seen it coming years ago.”
Doesn't the NSA doesn't operate at such scales? Or is it just that the US doesn't expect adversaries to be as capable?
>[Ms. Archuleta's] performance in classified briefings also frustrated several lawmakers. “I don’t get the sense at all they understand the problem,” said Representative Jim Langevin, a Rhode Island Democrat, who called for Ms. Archuleta’s resignation. “They seem like deer in the headlights.”
They were arguably asking the wrong person. But it is a bad sign if no security experts report to her.
> At the personnel office, a set of new intrusion tools used on the system set off an alarm in March, Ms. Seymour said. The F.B.I. and the United States Computer Emergency Response Team, which works on network intrusions, found evidence that the hackers had obtained the credentials used by people who run the computer systems.
That's standard procedure for the NSA. No surprise there.
> “They are casting a very wide net,” John Hultquist, a senior manager of cyberespionage threat intelligence at iSight Partners, said of the hackers targeting of Americans’ personal data. “We’re in a new space here and we don’t entirely know what they’re trying to do with it.”
They're looking for vulnerabilities. Again, no surprise.
There's also the fact that most hardware comes from China now. As they get up to speed on firmware exploits, the fit will really be hitting the shan.
- mpyne 11y ago> Doesn't the NSA doesn't operate at such scales? Or is it just that the US doesn't expect adversaries to be as capable? NSA does. And the USG is well-aware that China and Russia and even Iran could do this too. So regarding why things were left way at OPM, your guess is as good as mine... I mean "just don't let China hack in" is pretty unachievable (they even got Google a few years back, after all), but at least structure your networks to make it so that hacking one database doesn't give away the keys to everything, move highly-sensitive material off-network completely, etc. But these things require changes, which requires money (and brainpower), and buy-in from dozens of other government agencies, and probably more things besides. None of this is to excuse OPM--I would expect my government leaders to suck resources from elsewhere if need be, accept temporary degradation to other systems that interfaced to this personnel database, or in short to _do whatever they had to do to pro-actively address the threat they knew was out there_. And they didn't. > That's standard procedure for the NSA. No surprise there. Should be "That's standard procedure for state espionage agencies". I mean, if you're approaching this from the perspective that China is doing this only because NSA is out there you're already misinformed. Half of the reason NSA has been doing this is because Russia and China and friends will be doing things like this anyways. In China's case especially they drastically re-oriented their entire military and geo-strategic outlook following the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. This incident occurred between 1995-1996, and culminated in the U.S. sending 2 full carrier strike groups near Taiwan, one of the groups actually sailed through the Strait of Taiwan, sending a pointed message about who had military supremacy in the South China Sea. The rise in Chinese military power many of spoken of effectively started here... but they didn't limit their buildup to "hard" forms of national power. Indeed, given the reliance on so much of the global electronics supply chain on Chinese factories there's a lot of opportunity for appearances of SHTF...