11 ms·

Reminds me of the old Tempest project. Some say they could read the information going through a monitor cable for over a kilometer away already in the fifties.

Reminds me of the old Tempest project. Some say they could read the information going through a monitor cable for over a kilometer away already in the fifties. http://cryptome.org/nsa-tempest.htm http://cryptome.org/nsa-tempest.htm

bediger4000 11y ago
I thought it was the monitor itself, rather than the cable, that leaked enough EM radiation to reconstruct images. Also: do LCD monitor leak so that someone can recreate the image on them some distance away?
- rjsw 11y ago
  The flexible connector between the LCD panel and whatever PCB is in the system will leak.
- trimble-alum 11y ago
  There are optical-domain attacks for CRT monitors (including diffuse reflections off walls from the "blue glow"), likely similar for LCDs. And there are Van Eck attacks on CRTs and LCDs. Cables don't usually leak by definition of twisted pair and coaxial being solenoids (the ideal model of solenoids emanate zero net EM flux at distance and immune to external EM fields), but connectors, unshielded traces, straight wires, untwisted ends of twisted pair and component joints tend to be the usual suspects. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ieee02-optical.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ieee02-optical.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf http://www.hack247.co.uk/blogpost/van-eck-phreaking/ http://www.hack247.co.uk/blogpost/van-eck-phreaking/ (unscientific/not peer-reviewed)
nickpsecurity 11y ago
TEMPEST is the security standard for Emanation Security (EMSEC). They keep most of the details classified because they use emanation attacks in the field and they don't want shielding spreading too far. Yet, you can see what these systems look like on the web sites: List of certified companies https://www.nsa.gov/applications/ia/tempest/tempestPOCsCertified.cfm https://www.nsa.gov/applications/ia/tempest/tempestPOCsCerti... CIS Secure Computing TEMPEST gear http://cissecure.com/products/ http://cissecure.com/products/ Advanced Programs Inc TEMPEST gear http://advprograms.com/ http://advprograms.com/

bediger4000 11y ago

I thought it was the monitor itself, rather than the cable, that leaked enough EM radiation to reconstruct images. Also: do LCD monitor leak so that someone can recreate the image on them some distance away?

rjsw 11y ago
The flexible connector between the LCD panel and whatever PCB is in the system will leak.
trimble-alum 11y ago
There are optical-domain attacks for CRT monitors (including diffuse reflections off walls from the "blue glow"), likely similar for LCDs. And there are Van Eck attacks on CRTs and LCDs. Cables don't usually leak by definition of twisted pair and coaxial being solenoids (the ideal model of solenoids emanate zero net EM flux at distance and immune to external EM fields), but connectors, unshielded traces, straight wires, untwisted ends of twisted pair and component joints tend to be the usual suspects. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ieee02-optical.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ieee02-optical.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf http://www.hack247.co.uk/blogpost/van-eck-phreaking/ http://www.hack247.co.uk/blogpost/van-eck-phreaking/ (unscientific/not peer-reviewed)

nickpsecurity 11y ago

TEMPEST is the security standard for Emanation Security (EMSEC). They keep most of the details classified because they use emanation attacks in the field and they don't want shielding spreading too far. Yet, you can see what these systems look like on the web sites: List of certified companies https://www.nsa.gov/applications/ia/tempest/tempestPOCsCertified.cfm https://www.nsa.gov/applications/ia/tempest/tempestPOCsCerti... CIS Secure Computing TEMPEST gear http://cissecure.com/products/ http://cissecure.com/products/ Advanced Programs Inc TEMPEST gear http://advprograms.com/ http://advprograms.com/