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Appreciate the details. I knew it was a demo but not that it was that budget. The use was a guard for communications or mail, wasn't it? re abstract vs impleme
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Appreciate the details. I knew it was a demo but not that it was that budget. The use was a guard for communications or mail, wasn't it?
re abstract vs implementation
More evidence for the claim by many lesson learned papers in formal methods: people doing specs/proofs should work closely with implementers and in parallel where possible. That way issues spotted one place get to the other quickly. Better compromises, too. Neat that it helped with the file system, too.
re verification tools
Yeah, that sounds as painful as I expected. The only one I read on in that time was Gypsy and attempts to convert it to Ada. The proofs were done by hand in most. Every paper had researchers griping about the tools. Main benefit those tools gave, per users, was making verification easier just because the prover's needs (and weaknesses) forced simplification of specs. Did your projects see at least that benefit?
re DARPA
That's my impression. The consensus at the time was on a security kernel approach. It's what all the A1 and B3 systems used. They learned a lot from their endless Mach-related projects but the drawbacks (esp performance) were too great. Personally, I think it was the hardware context-switch performance & message passing overhead holding them back. Users wanted power, performance, and price without much worry for security. Naturally, they built on BSD.
And now one of DARPA's best, CheriBSD, is a port of FreeBSD to the capability-secure CHERI processor. They finally learned to be practical, eh? ;)