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Argentina's voting machine system leaked?
- dysoco 11y agoThere has been a lot of discussion over the past few months about this. The voting machines were created by a private company (MSA). The code was supposedly "open" but it was nowhere to be seen. The machines basically print an electronic voting bill, that has an RFID chip which is reportedly vulnerable.
- pera 11y agohttp://www.vialibre.org.ar/2015/06/16/argentina-el-sistema-de-votacion-en-debate/ http://www.vialibre.org.ar/2015/06/16/argentina-el-sistema-d...
- speeder 11y agoStill, this can be considered better than Brazil system: The code cannot be read by the population, the machine itself has secret proprietary components, testing its security is not truly allowed (the government claims to allow testing, but the test has rules to make true testing impossible, and the allowed tests pointless), and... the machine prints nothing, you are supposed to trust whatever it says the vote count is, without even being able to see if there are bugs or not in the vote counter (what if it has a loop with a > instead of >= for example, that causes 1 less vote per machine?)
- CountSessine 11y agoThat's not a voting machine - that's a secret coup d'état.
- wslh 11y agoSecurity guys in Argentina are working hard on Friday. Shell command injection in the code: http://pastebin.com/KNNjAyzP http://pastebin.com/KNNjAyzP It is important to note that the computer security and bitcoin scene are very strong in Argentina. See http://www.ekoparty.org/eng/index.php http://www.ekoparty.org/eng/index.php
- aortega 11y agoThat exploit won't work.
- r0naa 11y agoWow. I find it stunning that in 2015,there is still engineers who execute user inputs without any kind of sanitization.
- fisadev 11y agoThe input is sanitized: https://github.com/prometheus-ar/vot.ar/blob/master/msa/voto/gui/templates/pantallas/ingresodatos/datos_personales.html#L14 https://github.com/prometheus-ar/vot.ar/blob/master/msa/voto... It's just that people are too eager to scream "vulnerability!" without properly checking it before.
- r0naa 11y agoCorrect me if I am wrong but client side sanitization does not really count. It is really easy to bypass that check (send packets directly to the backend or use dev tools for example)
- fisadev 11y agoNo, because it's not a website with a network between the backend and frontend. It's a desktop app, with no network connection, just using html for the gui. Nobody can send packages to it.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- wslh 11y agoNo, in general developers in Argentina also comment in English.
- jkldotio 11y agoI've never seen the need for voting machines, even if they were open source and not plagued by scandals constantly. Counting votes can be done mostly in parallel. If you can't get enough volunteers and auditors to watch them then you have other problems a machine would likely make worse. In Australia we rarely have to wait long for the result and our Senate voting is fairly complex. It's even crazier when people try to push the speed benefits for things like the US presidential election where those elected don't even take office for weeks after the polling day. Although the ancient Athenians were not Luddites - they had an elegant machine to randomise a large stratified sample of the population for jury duty and water clocks to time speeches - for the actual votes they just used pebbles or pieces of metal. That's because counting something up is simply not that complex and shouldn't be made complex unnecessarily just to pad the CV of some electoral commissioner or pad the wallet of the company making the machines.
- serge2k 11y agoaccuracy is one reason. Would voting machines have solves Florida in 2000? You could (in theory) also get better accounting of votes and detect oddities.
- ajdlinux 11y agoDidn't (mechanical) voting machines cause the Florida 2000 debacle?
- speeder 11y agoI am from Brazil... Here voting machines don't print the votes, only the machines can "count", and the source and hardware are not open to inspection. Also, recently the government started to rollout a system where you can only vote by using a biometric fingerprint scanner on the machine. To me the machine has a very clear purpose: do nefarious stuff, and NOT help the elections (Brazil electoral court always makes a point of expending money to PR about how great it is that we can count 99% of presidential election votes in 40 minutes after the end of the elections... but that is useless, here the elections, for all elected positions, happen MONTHS before anyone take office).
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- edko 11y agoif(citizen.isDead && !citizen.hasVoted){ FPV++; citizen.hasVoted=true }
- molmalo 11y agoThe title can stop being a question. MSA has confirmed that this is their code, but they say its a copy from earlier this year, and that they have been working on it, so it's already old: https://translate.google.com.ar/translate?sl=es&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lanacion.com.ar%2F1803251-filtran-parte-del-codigo-fuente-de-la-boleta-electronica-portena&edit-text=&act=url https://translate.google.com.ar/translate?sl=es&tl=en&u=http...
- wslh 11y agoNew code can share the same bugs and add new ones. The point here is that voting machines must be open source and its hardware completely public to analyze it. This can't be the weakest link in a democracy.
- NickNameNick 11y agoOpen source software is certainly preferable to closed, but it's not sufficient for a voting machine, because there is logically no way for the user to verify that the software on the machine is what it is supposed to be.
- shiggerino 11y agoNor is there a way for the voter to verify that the machine itself is what it's supposed to be. Now, if the hardware instead 1) could be provided by the voters themselves, 2) was easily auditable 3) was used in their daily lives providing a ubiquitous understanding of the technology involved only THEN would it be appropriate for use in elections. So far, only pen and paper fulfils all of those criteria.
- NickNameNick 11y agoIt also needs to be anonymous to prevent people buying or coercing other peoples votes. and if you satisfy all those requirements, and other, congratulations, you've probably just invented the worlds most expensive printer.
- fisadev 11y agoEx-developer of that system here (not working in MSA anymore since 3 years ago). Can answer questions if there aren't hundreds of them.
- aortega 11y agoHi, have a couple... 1) First, I found the complete lack of security puzzling. I mean, they don't even use SSL in their site logins. You use md5 to check firmware...and the coders are obviously capable of using proper cryptography, but they won't. It's like they completely gave up on any kind of security whatsoever. Is this something deliberate? 2) Why the RFID to store the vote? why not a qr-code? it's hard to read? RFID tags are hundreds of times more expensive, they can be unlocked, re-written, must be protected with a weird faraday cage that do not work correctly (Faraday cages must be grounded!) they are a nightmare. I'm sure there must be a good reason.
- fisadev 11y ago1) Here you make a lot of false statements, and then conclude on the lack of security based on them. So let me answer to each of them: > they don't even use SSL in their site logins. Which sites? The only one I can think of having a login is the transmission site, and it not only uses SSL, it even has two way certs validation, so even the client has to have valid SSL certs which the server validates. > You use md5 to check firmware No. They use SHA256, not MD5, and to check the CD software, not firmware (there is no way you can checksum a firmware securely if the firmware wants to lie to you). > and the coders are obviously capable of using proper cryptography, but they won't Yes, they use encryption, where it makes sense, like the double SSL in transmission. But I guess you are referring to the unencrypted chip data. It would be useless to encrypt that. Think for a second: the machine needs to be able to read that chip on the counting step. So you are distributing the unencryption keys in hundreeds of public CDs that very same day. Having the data on the chips encrypted would accomplish nothing, they keys to unencrypt them would be public. It's like puting a padlock in your bike, but leaving the key along the padlock. So no, nobody has given up on security, you just probably have read misleading things. 2) Again, several wrong things, will answer separatedly: > why not a qr-code? it's hard to read? This is the only one I can't answer with full knowledge, but I think it had something to do with them being hard to read because of the quality of the print (thermical fast printing) > they can be unlocked, re-written No, they can't. It's a physical process that burns and cuts connections on the chip, you can't "rebuild" them to unlock it again. The thing you probably saw was people rewriting demo ballots, which are created with the machine configured in demo mode, in which it doesn't burn the chips, to be able to reuse the same in several demos. The people claiming that even published photos of the supposed "real" ballots they where rewritting, and the ballots had in really big letters crossing all the print, the text "DEMOSTRACION USO NO OFICIAL". So, no, they weren't rewriting real ballots, it's obvious those where demo ones. > with a weird faraday cage that do not work correctly Reallity doesn't agree with you, hehe. Even people opposing the system had tried and weren't able to read the chips through the shield. It's simply a shield which has enough mass to absorb the signal that the chip emits.
- Animats 11y agoHere in San Mateo County, we have a good voting machine system, although the knob-based UI is strange. After you've selected all your votes, you press the "done" button, and, behind a transparent window, a printer prints your votes on paper, with the chosen candidates names spelled out fully, followed by a big 2D bar code. You can then accept or cancel your vote. If you reject the printed version, it prints CANCELED and you start over. If you accept, it prints VOTED, and the paper roll winds past the window. The paper is a backup. The votes are also recorded by the software. But the paper can be read by hand if necessary, or by a scanner which reads the bar codes. So recounts are possible and checkable by all parties.
- nileshtrivedi 11y agoIf the paper can be read, political thugs will use bullying and intimidating tactics to get votes. Secret ballot is essential.
- doughj3 11y agoThe paper is behind a window, it is not a receipt and you don't take it with you. It is secret.
- DannyBee 11y agoIt's possible to make verifiable secret systems. Some have even been tested in real elections in the US as part o projects by NIST (for arcane reasons, NIST controls voting technology in the US :P). For example, Takoma park in maryland has used scantegrity a few times (2009, 2011).
- innguest 11y agoIf only we had the perfect voting system, and if only the deck chairs on the Titanic were aligned just so...
- Htsthbjig 11y agoI can't think on a worse idea that electronic voting machines in Argentina or Brazil. Corruption is chronic there. I traveled to Brazil with a friend , he did a mistake(not using common sense) an his camera and the bag we used with several electronic tools was stolen. He went to the police, and was beaten by the police!! We are from Spain and he simply expected a behavior in institutions that does not exist there. In Brazil you are either rich or poor, and police protects the rich(or the highest bidder) with iron fist. They are rude and you better not resist. Argentina by the way has Spanish and Italian "picaresca" on their veins. "Ser un vivo" and fool other people is not only ok, but something to brag around. Electronic voting could work on Switzerland or Denmark, and even there I will only trust it for menial tasks, like what they do in Switzerland asking people opinion on the new street lights(they do it using mail!!) and so on, but never with serious things like who gets in power. Last time I was in Argentina,there were elections, and the politicians were literary buying the vote of poor people with crumbs even renting buses for them.
- plesner 11y agoElectronic voting has been discussed in Denmark and both experts and most politicians are against it. I suspect there's some correlation between how eager countries are to introduce electronic voting and how likely it is to be abused.
- gphilip 11y agoIndia has been successfully using EVMs for elections since the turn of the century [1]. And an Indian General Election is no menial task. In the latest election of 2014, 814.5 million people were eligible to vote, making it the largest-ever election in the world. A total of 8,251 candidates contested for 543 seats in the Indian parliament. The average election turnout was around 66.38% [2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machines https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machines [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_general_election,_2014 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_general_election,_2014
- leandrocp 11y agoI'm from Brazil. What you are describing is the "brazilian way" (jeitinho brasileiro), which indeed happens. Much of people are against eletronic voting machines, but the problem is that we dont have good politicians that represent us to make opposition. And some part of population even know what is happening with the country.
- embarcadero 11y agoThis is a terrible idea. I lived in Argentina for two years and studied the country. It's a cesspool of corruption, with scant separation of powers (see Nisman, Alberto). Even in less corrupt countries, electronic voting is a terrible idea: it's vulnerable to hacking and, because the system is opaque to the average citizen, erodes trust. Richard Stallman has been emphatic on this point: https://stallman.org/evoting.html https://stallman.org/evoting.html The more at stake, the greater the temptation, the greater the likelihood of fraud. Leave online decisions to scheduling problems a la doodle.com People should recognize that sometimes paper is superior to bits.