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You're one of only two people I've met that worked on one of the exemplar systems. I appreciate you sharing a few pieces of the puzzle. For instance, I have KSO
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
You're one of only two people I've met that worked on one of the exemplar systems. I appreciate you sharing a few pieces of the puzzle. For instance, I have KSOS's architecture but didn't know it was written in Modula. I have papers on most of the others (incl little known ASOS). Also, confirming that NSA preferred crypto on dedicated boxes (eg LOCK's SIDEARM). Two issues, though.
One, the NSA rarely builds any secure product: they contract them out instead while providing security engineering assistance. That includes most Type 1 products, guards, and even most components of EKMS. There's very few things in high security market that they built themselves. Worse, many like "High Assurance" Platform aren't high assurance by a long shot.
This brings me to two. Bell pointed out that what made high assurance market successful was a clear set of standards plus an expected return on investment. Companies lined up to build secure versions of everything. He claimed that changed when NSA started competing with vendors directly under MISSI on top of export issues. An already risky market turned into almost total risk and no reward. So, it imploded with the entrenched defense contractors and their few products being all that's left. So NSA and DOD policy are as much to blame as the market given they (a) are only one with power to force market to build secure stuff and (b) made sure it went away.
I think the biggest failure, though, was not focusing on hardware. DARPA is focusing on it this time. I think the best thing we can do is find, like with CHERI or hardware Control-flow Integrity, a technology that stops most critical attacks with low overhead and compatibility with legacy software. The government can give taxpayer grants to hardware companies like Intel/AMD, legacy software vendors such as Microsoft/Oracle, and mainframe builders (esp IBM & Unisys) to incorporate the stuff into their hardware and software. If done right, most of the software just needs a recompile with only the assembler or lowest level things needing to be changed by hand. This seems to be the most promising approach given the market will not spontaneously do high security or give up backward compatibility.
In parallel, we do clean-slate architectures like SAFE that inherently and efficiently enforce arbitrary security policies at the word level. Like old LISP or Burroughs machines, might target a language like Java or C# to them where all software can be written in same high-level language executed natively. New deployments and security appliances build on these types of systems. Careful interfaces between the legacy-supporting and clean-slate systems make up the overall IT infrastructure.
- Animats 11y agoKSOS-11 was done at Ford Aerospace in Palo Alto, CA, from 1978-1982. It wasn't that big a job; it was about 5-8 people. I wrote the file system and all the drivers. We had a PDP 11/45 for debugging and a PDP 11/70 for development. Supervision came from DARPA; they sent out an evaluation team every 6 weeks to review progress. Some NSA people would show up on their team. The project was unclassified but most of the people on it had SECRET clearances. KSOS was only used for one special-purpose secure system; the PDP-11 era was over by the time it was done. Parts of it were specified in SPECIAL, SRI's language for formal specification. That was mostly an API spec, written at SRI. SRI had designed KSOS at an abstract level. We were just implementing it. This didn't work well. The most complex thing we were able to do in SPECIAL was to specify what validity meant for the file system. A "weak invariant" was true at the end of each write, and a "strong invariant" was true when the file system was unmounted. File systems were not well understood back then, and UNIX file systems tended to degenerate into garbage after crashes. We were able to avoid that. We didn't have much in the way of machine proofs, although we tried. We used the Boyer-Moore theorem prover and the Stanford Pascal Verifier, but the tools were not there yet. I later headed the Pascal-F effort, Ford Motor's in-house code verifier for engine control programs. That turned out not to be useful because the Pascal-F compiler team at Ford couldn't get their compiler to generate usable code. We could write small programs and verify them, but could only run them in a slow byte code interpreter. DARPA was trying to get a secure OS. They really wanted a secure microkernel. They pulled the plug on Berkeley BSD because it was too bloated, and put money into Mach at CMU instead. It was a surprise to DARPA when BSD didn't die, but went commercial (with Sun) instead.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoAppreciate the details. I knew it was a demo but not that it was that budget. The use was a guard for communications or mail, wasn't it? re abstract vs implementation More evidence for the claim by many lesson learned papers in formal methods: people doing specs/proofs should work closely with implementers and in parallel where possible. That way issues spotted one place get to the other quickly. Better compromises, too. Neat that it helped with the file system, too. re verification tools Yeah, that sounds as painful as I expected. The only one I read on in that time was Gypsy and attempts to convert it to Ada. The proofs were done by hand in most. Every paper had researchers griping about the tools. Main benefit those tools gave, per users, was making verification easier just because the prover's needs (and weaknesses) forced simplification of specs. Did your projects see at least that benefit? re DARPA That's my impression. The consensus at the time was on a security kernel approach. It's what all the A1 and B3 systems used. They learned a lot from their endless Mach-related projects but the drawbacks (esp performance) were too great. Personally, I think it was the hardware context-switch performance & message passing overhead holding them back. Users wanted power, performance, and price without much worry for security. Naturally, they built on BSD. And now one of DARPA's best, CheriBSD, is a port of FreeBSD to the capability-secure CHERI processor. They finally learned to be practical, eh? ;)