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Even if an operating system were provably secure in the software layer, it might still be vulnerable to hardware backdoors: http://www.eteknix.com/expert-says-

by Cieplak 11y ago

Even if an operating system were provably secure in the software layer, it might still be vulnerable to hardware backdoors: http://www.eteknix.com/expert-says-nsa-have-backdoors-built-into-intel-and-amd-processors/ http://www.eteknix.com/expert-says-nsa-have-backdoors-built-...

naveen99 11y ago
What if you use multiple computers for the hardware and manually control communication between machines. Basically use hardware only for pure functions and store state out of band... Project output to a shared screen. Similar to how manufacturing of parts is split to different untrusted factories. Do the merging step on a breadboard or $10 commodity circuit that you fully control.
- nickpsecurity 11y ago
  Clive Robinson and I came up with the same solution to this problem: running same software on several different hardware with voting protocol. This is used in safety-critical market where you need redundancy. I modified the scheme so that different teams implemented the same spec in a compatible way on hardware that came from different countries. My model is mutually suspicious countries that work against each other too much to cooperate on a backdoor. Secrets might leak to any of them but integrity can at least be protected. Far as plugging leaks, air gap strategies plus high assurance guards built on cheap boards they probably didn't backdoor. Especially old microcontrollers, UNIX servers, gaming systems with Linux ports, and so on. Keep using different stuff with simple, protected interfaces. They can't hit what they can't see.
nickpsecurity 11y ago
This has always been true. It's why they have DOD-certified fabs in country to build plenty of stuff on. The A1 systems also anticipated interdiction by requiring trusted distribution (aka "trusted trucks"). Most of the subversion in the hardware market, though, is tricky ways to disguise what circuitry does for competitive advantage and avoiding patent fees. ;)

by Cieplak 11y ago

naveen99 11y ago

What if you use multiple computers for the hardware and manually control communication between machines. Basically use hardware only for pure functions and store state out of band... Project output to a shared screen. Similar to how manufacturing of parts is split to different untrusted factories. Do the merging step on a breadboard or $10 commodity circuit that you fully control.

nickpsecurity 11y ago
Clive Robinson and I came up with the same solution to this problem: running same software on several different hardware with voting protocol. This is used in safety-critical market where you need redundancy. I modified the scheme so that different teams implemented the same spec in a compatible way on hardware that came from different countries. My model is mutually suspicious countries that work against each other too much to cooperate on a backdoor. Secrets might leak to any of them but integrity can at least be protected. Far as plugging leaks, air gap strategies plus high assurance guards built on cheap boards they probably didn't backdoor. Especially old microcontrollers, UNIX servers, gaming systems with Linux ports, and so on. Keep using different stuff with simple, protected interfaces. They can't hit what they can't see.

nickpsecurity 11y ago

This has always been true. It's why they have DOD-certified fabs in country to build plenty of stuff on. The A1 systems also anticipated interdiction by requiring trusted distribution (aka "trusted trucks"). Most of the subversion in the hardware market, though, is tricky ways to disguise what circuitry does for competitive advantage and avoiding patent fees. ;)