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A classic. Bell's Looking Back Addendum [1] also traces the beginning of high assurance security market (their solution) and how DOD/NSA totally killed it. I sp
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
A classic. Bell's Looking Back Addendum [1] also traces the beginning of high assurance security market (their solution) and how DOD/NSA totally killed it. I specialized in extending such high assurance systems or approaches to handle modern problems. That market is gone, though, thanks to DOD/NSA policies to use low assurance systems and even pushing them. Post-Snowden, it's fair to wonder if it was mismanagement or intentional that they marketed low assurance alternatives (eg DTW, MDDS) to the kinds of OS's and guards they couldn't beat with 2-5 years of pentesting (esp Boeing SNS Server).
Yet, I think I can say we all focused too much on the OS and software security side of things despite what we accomplished. As Brian Snow noted, we're really just trying to implement forms of isolation on machines designed for pervasive sharing (read: insecurity). It's why I counterpointed Geer here [2] saying our software security crisis isn't inevitable: we just need to use hardware and tools that make secure software easier to write. I gave examples from the past of many security-improving features systems had, including immunity to code injection via app attack. Fortunately, at least a few groups (esp DARPA/NSF sponsored) took notice and are working on such architectures today.
[1] http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-Back-Addendum.pdf http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-B...
[2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/dan_geer_on_hea.html#c5598568 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/dan_geer_on_h...
- dfc 11y agoWhat are DTW and MDDS?
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThey're in the Bell link. One is an MLS workstation and one streams information out to many nodes. Both demand high security given their use case. Both are EAL4 garbage despite high assurance components available. He goes into more detail.
- Animats 11y agoI used to work in that area back in the 1980s, and worked on one of the early high-security operating systems (KSOS for the PDP-11, written in Modula I. It was really slow; trying to cram it in 64K 16 words of code just didn't work.) NSA has an attack side and a defense side. The defense side builds the US military's security systems. The attack side has more prestige within NSA. The defense side does things like evaluate filing cabinet locks. The NSA Orange Book criteria for OS evaluation (which was actually Grace Nibaldi's master's thesis) set out tough criteria. NSA set up an evaluation operation at NSA's Friendship Annex (named for Friendship Airport, which is now Baltimore Washington International). There was heavy industry opposition to NSA's secure OS efforts. The evaluation procedure was borrowed from the safe and lock evaluation operation - a vendor could submit a product for evaluation, and if it failed, they'd get a report on the flaws found. They could then resubmit the product one more time. If it failed on the second try, the product was rejected, just like they did with padlocks. Acceptance and rejection were public. So an OS could be officially be stamped insecure. A few OSs passed those tests. Most of them are forgotten. Wang, the word processor company, had a secure OS. Multics is at least remembered. There was a secure version of IBM VM. But most commercial OSs could not pass. The industry fought those tough standards, resulting in the "Common Criteria" for security evaluation. The Common Criteria were much weaker. Instead of NSA doing the evaluations, they were done by private testing labs paid by the OS vendor. Vendors could try over and over again to pass. Failures were not publicized. Microsoft was able to meet those new lower hurdles, as were other vendors. This was all pre mass market Internet (the academic and DoD communities had Internet connections from about 1983, but the Internet world wasn't that big.) and the security criteria were very single-system oriented. Also, the internal use of cryptography within computer systems was very rare, and not trusted within DoD. NSA took the position that crypto could only be done by special-purpose secured boxes. (For high security, they're right.)
- nickpsecurity 11y agoYou're one of only two people I've met that worked on one of the exemplar systems. I appreciate you sharing a few pieces of the puzzle. For instance, I have KSOS's architecture but didn't know it was written in Modula. I have papers on most of the others (incl little known ASOS). Also, confirming that NSA preferred crypto on dedicated boxes (eg LOCK's SIDEARM). Two issues, though. One, the NSA rarely builds any secure product: they contract them out instead while providing security engineering assistance. That includes most Type 1 products, guards, and even most components of EKMS. There's very few things in high security market that they built themselves. Worse, many like "High Assurance" Platform aren't high assurance by a long shot. This brings me to two. Bell pointed out that what made high assurance market successful was a clear set of standards plus an expected return on investment. Companies lined up to build secure versions of everything. He claimed that changed when NSA started competing with vendors directly under MISSI on top of export issues. An already risky market turned into almost total risk and no reward. So, it imploded with the entrenched defense contractors and their few products being all that's left. So NSA and DOD policy are as much to blame as the market given they (a) are only one with power to force market to build secure stuff and (b) made sure it went away. I think the biggest failure, though, was not focusing on hardware. DARPA is focusing on it this time. I think the best thing we can do is find, like with CHERI or hardware Control-flow Integrity, a technology that stops most critical attacks with low overhead and compatibility with legacy software. The government can give taxpayer grants to hardware companies like Intel/AMD, legacy software vendors such as Microsoft/Oracle, and mainframe builders (esp IBM & Unisys) to incorporate the stuff into their hardware and software. If done right, most of the software just needs a recompile with only the assembler or lowest level things needing to be changed by hand. This seems to be the most promising approach given the market will not spontaneously do high security or give up backward compatibility. In parallel, we do clean-slate architectures like SAFE that inherently and efficiently enforce arbitrary security policies at the word level. Like old LISP or Burroughs machines, might target a language like Java or C# to them where all software can be written in same high-level language executed natively. New deployments and security appliances build on these types of systems. Careful interfaces between the legacy-supporting and clean-slate systems make up the overall IT infrastructure.
- 11y ago