2 ms·
They forgot to look into the subversion, BIOS, peripheral firmware, and covert channel risk despite me repeating those on forums all over going back years. Then
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
They forgot to look into the subversion, BIOS, peripheral firmware, and covert channel risk despite me repeating those on forums all over going back years. Then the shit ended up in TAO's catalog (including my "amplifying cable" concept aka RAGEMASTER) & most stuff was weak to it. Same argument could applied to widespread open source software that people find "previously unknown" bugs in despite that code existing for years and "widely reviewed." So, I don't have to posit anything given the horrid state of INFOSEC and app review going back years: they should instead prove they did better than usual in the security analysis and show what they found for independent review. This is, coincidentally, a part of the scientific method as well.
You instead could've settled this argument if you linked to a group that reversed engineered all of that, found that it did exactly what they said, and had no conflict of interest with U.S. government. You say you know these exist but still haven't produced them. You instead expected people to take your word for it or comb the Internet looking for the proof you allege. Both a tall order.
Those of us in INFOSEC against highly subversive opponents don't deal in pure faith [esp in similarly evil organizations]. So, where is this evidence that it was totally reverse engineered and proven to be functionally equivalent to claims? I'd like to read it, determine its credibility, pass it onto peer review, and share it widespread if it passes enough of that. As promised, I'll even add it to the Wikipedia article that tops search to this day.
Waiting on you and your evidence.
- tptacek 11y agoNo part of this comment addresses anything that I said. This is a pattern with our interactions: I bring up something specific, and you change the subject, usually to a flurry of Snowden jargon (this time it's the spy-mall catalog). We were talking about the transparency of the Windows kernel. It's a little funny that you feel like you need proof that the code has been reverse engineered, as if there were like 4 people in the world who could do it, one of whom is in a mental institution, 2 of whom are in Russia, and the last is hiding in a monastery in Tibet. You know, as opposed to something you could literally learn from a book that was on the shelf at Borders, back when they still sold books retail.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoIt's funny that you have hours to talk about your assumption and its implications over many threads without posting any evidence to support it's true. Most of the comment responded to how you implied, like now, that all kinds of people were all over it and would've seen the risk. Yet, despite mine and others warnings, they didn't see shit in all kinds of areas and even talked to us like we were stupid. TAO was using these across the world during our debates. So your assumption that "potential to discover" = "discover" is broken by the Snowden leaks, all the Windows flaws that continue to surface, the age's old UNIX flaws that pop up, the OpenSSL crap, and so on. That doesn't matter. Clearly, it being there doesn't mean people see it or share it. You said it's reverse engineered, I'm guessing dependencies and all, where we can trace the full effect of the code & see it does what they say. I've asked you have a dozen times to produce it. You still haven't. Any day now...