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Actually, I looked into things as promised. The Wikipedia links and whatever popped up in my Google searches. Turns out the only citation you had, a HN news com
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Actually, I looked into things as promised. The Wikipedia links and whatever popped up in my Google searches. Turns out the only citation you had, a HN news commenter, was just repeating the claims of a MS spokesperson with some added opinions. I found a more interesting source which has similar claims:
http://cryptome.org/nsakey-ms-dc.htm http://cryptome.org/nsakey-ms-dc.htm
On the surface, it seems believable. However, like Duncan, I'm seeing glaring problems with these responses. It boils down to this: the Microsoft rep claimed they came up with all details (including the key & its name) on their own without NSA intervention, generated/control both keys themselves, submitted the design for review, and got NSA approval. Yet, without NSA's involvement, a developer named their key NSAKEY and when decrypted its email was "postmaster@nsa.gov." Also, as Duncan noted & my HSM guy as well, it's standard for HSM's to let you export keys for backing them up or multi-site usage.
So, their claims are highly unusual, suspect, and weak. The evasive behavior that led up to this isn't typical of even Microsoft. They usually come up with some CYA BS rather quickly. Also, the odds of a Microsoft-controlled key they made entirely on their own being called NSAKEY with NSA's email on it without NSA participation are low albeit possible (dev joke).
Far from Alex Jones stuff, there's actual substance to worries over what NSAKEY did or does. I agree with critiques that it's a lower concern given all the attack angles on Windows from outside or inside perspective. Yet, dozens of reports didn't show anything along lines of "comprehensively debunked." Instead, we had a series of weak stories from Microsoft that raised more questions than answers with plenty of evasion on their part. And they're known to work with NSA. So, people should still not trust that and use the steps that one person published to replace the key with their own.
Solves the problem with minimal fuss, eh?
- tptacek 11y agoThis is a very long source from 2000 that says in 6500 words what 'geofft said in just ~300: that this is a code signing key for crypto libraries. If Microsoft wanted to backdoor your Windows machine, they already have complete control over Windows code signing. They do not need a special key literally labeled "NSA_KEY" to do that. It's not "lower concern". It's not a concern at all. Microsoft's code is comprehensively reverse engineered. People have reversed the most boring, tedious libraries on the system looking for memory corruption bugs. You posit that maybe they just forgot to look into this "NSA_KEY" business. For a software security professional, you really come loaded for bear with a lot of weird advice: * Avoid elliptic curve and use conventional Diffie Hellman and RSA because the NSA controls the ECC patents (?!). * Use Blowfish because it has a long security track record (?!). * Watch out for Google because they don't understand endpoint security (?!). * NSAKEY isn't a high-priority issue but it's something that people should be concerned about (?!). * Here's an unencrypted HTTP website that you can cut-and-paste GPG commands from instead of reading the manual (?!). * Firewalls are just some made-up crap that don't actually provide any security (?!). * Use MatrixSSL and PolarSSL instead of OpenSSL because OpenSSL's code quality is crap (?!). I get the feeling that we do very different kinds of security. You talk a bit about formal verification and EAL levels. I had the misfortune of losing a couple months of my life in the early 2000s to Common Criteria work. If you're coming from a CCTL background, some of the very weird perspectives you have on this stuff start to make sense to me.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThey forgot to look into the subversion, BIOS, peripheral firmware, and covert channel risk despite me repeating those on forums all over going back years. Then the shit ended up in TAO's catalog (including my "amplifying cable" concept aka RAGEMASTER) & most stuff was weak to it. Same argument could applied to widespread open source software that people find "previously unknown" bugs in despite that code existing for years and "widely reviewed." So, I don't have to posit anything given the horrid state of INFOSEC and app review going back years: they should instead prove they did better than usual in the security analysis and show what they found for independent review. This is, coincidentally, a part of the scientific method as well. You instead could've settled this argument if you linked to a group that reversed engineered all of that, found that it did exactly what they said, and had no conflict of interest with U.S. government. You say you know these exist but still haven't produced them. You instead expected people to take your word for it or comb the Internet looking for the proof you allege. Both a tall order. Those of us in INFOSEC against highly subversive opponents don't deal in pure faith [esp in similarly evil organizations]. So, where is this evidence that it was totally reverse engineered and proven to be functionally equivalent to claims? I'd like to read it, determine its credibility, pass it onto peer review, and share it widespread if it passes enough of that. As promised, I'll even add it to the Wikipedia article that tops search to this day. Waiting on you and your evidence.
- tptacek 11y agoNo part of this comment addresses anything that I said. This is a pattern with our interactions: I bring up something specific, and you change the subject, usually to a flurry of Snowden jargon (this time it's the spy-mall catalog). We were talking about the transparency of the Windows kernel. It's a little funny that you feel like you need proof that the code has been reverse engineered, as if there were like 4 people in the world who could do it, one of whom is in a mental institution, 2 of whom are in Russia, and the last is hiding in a monastery in Tibet. You know, as opposed to something you could literally learn from a book that was on the shelf at Borders, back when they still sold books retail.
- 11y ago