3 ms·
This problem goes back to the STU-III telephone where Soviets said best attack was listening to what was said between opening the line and going secure. The les
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
This problem goes back to the STU-III telephone where Soviets said best attack was listening to what was said between opening the line and going secure. The lesson learned was we have two choices: (a) device is secured the moment you activate it; (b) the interface between trusted and untrusted (Red/Black separation) blocks as much data is needed until the secure link is established then forces everything over it. The latter is the solution here and their recommendations are pretty good.
There's another risk, though: the WiFi layer and TCP/IP stacks themselves. These might be hacked and WiFi is regularly by NSA per leaks. This is why high assurance wireless VPN's they endorse use a dedicated device for secure wifi connections. It works as follows: a device/chip for trusted data with a physical connection to PC; a secure chip in middle for crypto & control logic; a device/chip for untrusted code (esp Wifi driver) and data with connection to antenna. Some use separation kernels instead of different chips these days. The device is programmed to not let "trusted" data through until (a) untrusted chip says wireless is working and (b) VPN is established in middle chip. It can be modified to deal with captive portals although that creates potential covert channels or attacks. Maybe one can tie a sandboxed browser to the untrusted chip for approving the terms. It and the channel are killed the moment Internet is reachable. More work needs to be done in this area.
Regular setups not worried about targeted hacks will probably be fine following the advice in the article. People worried about targeted attacks rarely use Windows anyway haha.