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The thing that stuck out to me the most when I was reading this was the notion of 'anti-fragility' -- the business structures resulting from the leveraged buy o
by ryanobjc 11y ago
The thing that stuck out to me the most when I was reading this was the notion of 'anti-fragility' -- the business structures resulting from the leveraged buy out apparently could not handle the shocks of 2008.
The question is, does the architects of LBOs and mergers and business like this have any duty to build more buffer and ability to withstand unpredictable futures? Of course, when faced with a $550m -> $100m decline in their Atlantic City revenues, that is a huge shift in the industry. But still, even as Las Vegas recovers, so too has Caesers hasn't! Too much legacy baggage.
So back to my central thesis, what kind of responsibility do corporate masters have to build anti-fragile and reliable companies? One interesting thing here is the lack of stakeholder lawsuits quotes in the article (although apparently there were some, as a different commenter noted).
In the end, the legal arena is where these matters of 'morality' (in-so-far as it exists in a legal sense for this area) play out and are decided. The only downside is it takes a long time, and costs a lot of money. Not sure if there is any advantages to moving this kind of adjudication farther into regulatory or government divisions. I guess the Nevada Gaming Commission get it's say for the ethics of running the operation.
- caminante 11y agoI found the court costs eye-popping. Knowing next to nothing about bankruptcy court (or any court ;-)), it was interesting to learn about the availability of court-appointed examiners, but man...the costs are extraordinary (i.e. CAE's in the [much larger] Lehman case cost ~$50M/year).