4 ms·

I think the main problem is that after 6's creation the Navy had no idea what they really had on their hands. It was unconventional unit for unconventional miss

I think the main problem is that after 6's creation the Navy had no idea what they really had on their hands. It was unconventional unit for unconventional missions. That was problem with the first two SEAL teams in Vietnam too where their potential was wasted. Those units should be given clear mission and wide operational freedom, while it seems that the army top brass prefer to have predictable units with undefined mission (WTF is nation building and why and how should the military do it is prime example). The NYTimes article seems to confirm that - a lot of SEAL 6 one shot missions were stellar, while their conventional ones were messy. I would give Gormly's book a shot though.

crdb 11y ago
Always slightly embarrassing to comment on these things as a civilian (what do I know)... nevertheless... It was worse than that - the failure of Eagle Claw was due precisely to Delta Force's operating with the help of standard branches, and "not special" logistics. We never found out whether Beckwith's plan was any good as none of the men made it to Tehran, after too many of their helicopters literally crashed on each other on the refuel site. Beckwith was, obviously, incensed at having to cancel his first mission due to other people's incompetence, and began the lobbying process that led to the creation of JSOC in 1980. This allowed for the systematic creation of "special" units in many branches, most famously 160th SOAR and the ISA (which is very important - the Selous Scouts built their own Special Branch in part because of Reid-Daly's personality, but mainly because they found the existing one to be lacking or not quite as cooperative as required). At the risk of creating a simplistic narrative: JSOC grew in scope and power, particularly as COIN (Counter-Insurgency - under which your "nation building" falls - see Col. Gian Gentile's book for a fairly famous critique) was making its way into the Pentagon as the new, happy, less (visible) collateral damage, cheaper, conquer countries cleanly doctrine. So special operation forces went from being strange pariahs operating on the fringes and occasionally shunned by more traditional minded commanders (including, allegedly, Norman Schwartzkopf), to (today) a desirable career passage if one is aiming to collect stars on the collar (McChrystal is a famous example). It's important because it has changed US foreign policy. There is a large, thriving JSOC with direct contact with the President and wars have been renamed "low intensity operations", offering low cost high impact war in neat PowerPoint format. So, gradually, EO 12333, EO 12036 and EO 11905 (respective executive orders by Reagan, Carter and Ford prohibiting assassinations) were selectively relaxed starting in the late 90s. The extent to which this has impacted foreign policy is fuzzy, because anything written recently is of dubious accuracy due to operational security being maintained (should really get on to reading WikiLeaks some day). But I wouldn't be surprised to hear that the Green Berets had been resurrected into JSOC as a "grow a cancer in the enemy's land" type force, except more deniable than SOG or the Contras ever were.

crdb 11y ago

Always slightly embarrassing to comment on these things as a civilian (what do I know)... nevertheless... It was worse than that - the failure of Eagle Claw was due precisely to Delta Force's operating with the help of standard branches, and "not special" logistics. We never found out whether Beckwith's plan was any good as none of the men made it to Tehran, after too many of their helicopters literally crashed on each other on the refuel site. Beckwith was, obviously, incensed at having to cancel his first mission due to other people's incompetence, and began the lobbying process that led to the creation of JSOC in 1980. This allowed for the systematic creation of "special" units in many branches, most famously 160th SOAR and the ISA (which is very important - the Selous Scouts built their own Special Branch in part because of Reid-Daly's personality, but mainly because they found the existing one to be lacking or not quite as cooperative as required). At the risk of creating a simplistic narrative: JSOC grew in scope and power, particularly as COIN (Counter-Insurgency - under which your "nation building" falls - see Col. Gian Gentile's book for a fairly famous critique) was making its way into the Pentagon as the new, happy, less (visible) collateral damage, cheaper, conquer countries cleanly doctrine. So special operation forces went from being strange pariahs operating on the fringes and occasionally shunned by more traditional minded commanders (including, allegedly, Norman Schwartzkopf), to (today) a desirable career passage if one is aiming to collect stars on the collar (McChrystal is a famous example). It's important because it has changed US foreign policy. There is a large, thriving JSOC with direct contact with the President and wars have been renamed "low intensity operations", offering low cost high impact war in neat PowerPoint format. So, gradually, EO 12333, EO 12036 and EO 11905 (respective executive orders by Reagan, Carter and Ford prohibiting assassinations) were selectively relaxed starting in the late 90s. The extent to which this has impacted foreign policy is fuzzy, because anything written recently is of dubious accuracy due to operational security being maintained (should really get on to reading WikiLeaks some day). But I wouldn't be surprised to hear that the Green Berets had been resurrected into JSOC as a "grow a cancer in the enemy's land" type force, except more deniable than SOG or the Contras ever were.