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> Not all information needs to be secure, pure and simple It seems most HTTPS proponents across this thread seems to ignore this very thing. Not everything nee
by josteink 11y ago
> Not all information needs to be secure, pure and simple
It seems most HTTPS proponents across this thread seems to ignore this very thing. Not everything needs to be secure. Pure and simple.
Don't argue about what part of TLS does that with what cookie. We're not even listening to this, as it's not interesting to us.
If you want us to listen, you should try to argue why you think we need TLS for everything. We don't. So why are you so hellbent on making our lives more complicated than they need to be?
- mhurron 11y agoWhat is the downside of having it all secured? On top of that, having only data that must be secure makes it very apperent to anyone looking that 'hey this is totally important information.' Having everything encrypted makes all encrypted traffic seem perfectly normal.
- josteink 11y agoHTTPS brings complexity. In lots of cases I dont want that complexity. Sometimes that complexity gives rise to (heartbeat) bugs, problems and stability issues. When it doesn't, it always leads to more work. I want to be able to setup a website, access that website instantly without having to meddle with getting SSL-certs, or creating my own self-signed certs. Sometimes you want consumers to be software, components (IoT thingies) which doesn't always have an up to date crypto-stack or have a crypto-stack at all. Getting them to accept the HTTPS website can result in all kinds of issues (ref wget --no-check-certificate, even on modern Linux systems)... In general, getting HTTPS up and running is about an order of magnitude more work than plain HTTP. And if you don't need it, why should you be forced to put in the effort? The answer is obvious: You shouldn't. Because you don't need HTTPS everywhere. You don't. That's a purely factual statement. I cannot for the life of me see how anyone has a problem accepting that.
- pdkl95 11y agoYou may be ok with the world eavesdropping on some of your communications with third parties. That is your opinion, and you can use whatever protocols you want. What you don't get to do is force the rest of us to make the same choices. What has become very clear in recent years is that far too much usable data can be extracted out of noisy channels. Any amount of identifying bits leaked where an eavesdropper can hear them can effectively remove the privacy you thought you had elsewhere. Also, keep in mind that the ISP itself is often the enemy. Are you cool with Verizon editing ALL of your HTTP to add X-UIDH identifiers? What about if they do the same trick in a side channel, keying to a hash of your HTTP request and IP? The problem here is that the idea that there exists a subset of HTTP requests that do no "need to be secure" is really just a restatement of the "but I"m not a target" fallacy. Targeting presumes a human with intent, when the threat is a computer that builds a database of all the traffic it can see. So yes, data needs to be secured, and that means all that we possibly can. > If you want us to listen If you want US to listen, you will need to wake up to the brave new world of pattern-of-life analysis and stop trying to keep the world in plaintext. I don't like a lot of things about TLS, but it is the crypto we have right now; I would love having better, less complicated options in the future. If you find it complicated, that's your problem. What you apparently see as a technical discussion some of us see as a human rights problem, and stopping the surveillance-as-a-business-model industry (and the occasional overly-ambitious government agency) ranks quite a bit higher than complaints about a few standards becoming a bit more work to implement.