4 ms·

What incentive would they have not to? Our hypothetical government isn't concerned with victimless and/or trivial crimes. Of course, no government can ever be

What incentive would they have not to? Our hypothetical government isn't concerned with victimless and/or trivial crimes. Of course, no government can ever be forced to do anything (that's what makes it the government), but having everything clearly expressed and in the open, and with a tolerant approach to those who are not violent threats to society, is a far better situation than the government conducting surveillance programs in secret with secret scopes, where it may or may not have secret backdoors into commonly-used crypto, and lots of people are left hanging in a legal limbo hoping that the NSA doesn't develop a viable quantum computer before the statute of limitations runs out on their Silk Road drug transactions, etc.

zedadex 11y ago
I agree with the train of thought, but jhallenworld has a point - there's no way to trust the actors sworn-in to uphold such a contract are actually following the contract - nor is there any accountability for such. I believe you're on the right track, but the underlying problem of corruption - at any time, any person trusted to use their position of power as they're "supposed to" instead of skirting their limitations or trying to find ways around them - still exists in the system you described. - What happens when the authority figure decides that actual terrorist threats aren't the only things they should pursue with their unilateral control? - What happens if they take that heroin-snorting secret gay tryst you were in out of context, and blackmail you with it (as happened with the information about intel agencies allegedly knowing about that high level CP ring Britain was involved with)? Once again, I'm happy to see someone besides myself think in terms of how future social contracts should be modified to address the problems our current ones don't; but I think the problem of corruption underlies any potential social contract solution - because at the end of the day, no matter how many rules and limitations you write up, the people who spend their day-to-day living within the contractual system you've created will find (or create) weaknesses to exploit in that system. Anonymous redundancy (multiple people needed to access some data; they don't know who the others are) or internal watchdogs (people who don't have control over the system, but can see how others who do are using their control; watchdogs are also not known so as to limit bribery potential) or something would need to exist as a sort of 'immune system' against the evolution of corruption within the contract.

zedadex 11y ago

I agree with the train of thought, but jhallenworld has a point - there's no way to trust the actors sworn-in to uphold such a contract are actually following the contract - nor is there any accountability for such. I believe you're on the right track, but the underlying problem of corruption - at any time, any person trusted to use their position of power as they're "supposed to" instead of skirting their limitations or trying to find ways around them - still exists in the system you described. - What happens when the authority figure decides that actual terrorist threats aren't the only things they should pursue with their unilateral control? - What happens if they take that heroin-snorting secret gay tryst you were in out of context, and blackmail you with it (as happened with the information about intel agencies allegedly knowing about that high level CP ring Britain was involved with)? Once again, I'm happy to see someone besides myself think in terms of how future social contracts should be modified to address the problems our current ones don't; but I think the problem of corruption underlies any potential social contract solution - because at the end of the day, no matter how many rules and limitations you write up, the people who spend their day-to-day living within the contractual system you've created will find (or create) weaknesses to exploit in that system. Anonymous redundancy (multiple people needed to access some data; they don't know who the others are) or internal watchdogs (people who don't have control over the system, but can see how others who do are using their control; watchdogs are also not known so as to limit bribery potential) or something would need to exist as a sort of 'immune system' against the evolution of corruption within the contract.