2 ms·
> We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768- and 1024-bit groups. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are in use by millions of TLS, SSH, and VPN
by baby 11y ago
> We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768- and 1024-bit
groups. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are
in use by millions of TLS, SSH, and VPN servers. Perform-
ing precomputations on a few of these groups would allow a
passive eavesdropper to decrypt a large fraction of Internet
traffic. In the 1024-bit case, we estimate that such com-
putations are plausible given nation-state resources, and a
close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency’s
attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such
a break. We conclude that moving to stronger key exchange
methods should be a priority for the Internet community.
From: https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy.pdf https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy.pdf