4 ms·

Wat. How is this security theater? It's providing an actual, useful service for those who choose to use it. If the majority of people choose not to, then the f

Wat. How is this security theater? It's providing an actual, useful service for those who choose to use it. If the majority of people choose not to, then the fault would lie primarily on the end user, not on Facebook.

mike_hearn 11y ago
Indeed. It's not theater - this really is more secure than before. It's just got painful usability. However that is not Facebook's fault: the security community has failed to produce any end-to-end encrypted email product that is easy to use. The good news is: a) This continues the momentum that the big Valley companies are creating around strong crypto b) This will motivate people to build better replacements for PGP, because now they know that they might actually receive encrypted emails if they can get sweis and others at Facebook on board. S/MIME would have been slightly better, IMO, but I understand why they didn't do it that way - Yahoo and Google are working on OpenPGP browser extensions, and "copy/paste your key" is easier than "upload your certificate". We badly need a modern, fresh take on email end-to-end crypto.
cinquemb 11y ago
If people trust other mail providers, which most do in general, why would they use this? Maybe facebook has some numbers on how many users distrust other major mail providers to the extent to use this, while also trusting facebook. At least to me, that sounds ridiculous. Because along the measures of distrustfulness of who allows information to propagate to third parties (some third parties more privileged than others…), I don't particularly see any major mail provider above and beyond any other major players… Considering that most people wont even know what GPG/PGP are, this seems like an exercise in "Don't trust others, but trust me" and the user is supposed to go like "Welp, ok!"? Haha.
- mynameisvlad 11y ago
  No, it's more an exercise in "Don't trust anyone else, trust this proven, well-known (in the tech world) encryption" which is markedly different than "Don't trust others, trust me". PGP doesn't give you confidence in the source, nor should it. It just gives you confidence on the transmission. Now if we could get the public more aware of it, then that'd be great. :) In any case, this isn't security theater. There's nothing theatrical about this. This is a real security benefit that has newly been added. Lots of things can be said about PGP in general, sure, but the ability to encrypt the messages from Facebook so that only you can read them is an actual security benefit. The entire concept of "security theater" is something that looks like it increases security but does nothing. By sheer fact that encrypting communications increases security, it can't be security theater.
  - cinquemb 11y ago
    "…ability to encrypt the messages from Facebook so that only you can read them is an actual security benefit." Except it isn't really "only you", its whoever else has access to the key or keys facebook uses to encrypt such messages and if one distrusts other mail providers that they use to such degree, but trusts facebook, I'd really start question what threat model they are contriving…
    - dragonwriter 11y ago
      > Except it isn't really "only you", its whoever else has access to the key or keys facebook uses to encrypt such messages… No, you are giving FB the public key, and keeping the private key. So anyone with the (public) key you give Facebook could send you messages that you can decrypt with the private key (which is why FB also lets you publish the key on your profile page), but could not read the messages sent by someone else with the same key. Only you -- or someone else with the private key that you don't give to Facebook -- can read the messages. Of course, if someone breaks PGP so that they can use one half of the key pair to recover the other half, they could read the message just by knowing the key you share with Facebook ... but that that is intractable is the whole foundation of public key cryptography.
      - cinquemb 11y ago
        So setting side the intractable nature of the key issue, there is also the issue of who has access to the plaintext… if you trust facebook with the plaintext are you also trusting that plaintext is not available to other parties?
        mynameisvlad 11y ago
        Sure, but that plaintext would have been available to not only the same, but more parties pre-encryption. Because anyone in between Facebook and your mail provider, your mail provider, and anyone in between your mail provider and you would all be susceptible to some form of interception. Now, it's limited to just those on Facebook's side. And that would be covered by a Privacy Policy and potentially the Terms of Service. Also, how is it "intractable" exactly? If you keep your key safe, you keep your key safe. If you give your private key to anyone and everyone, then it's on you if someone else reads your stuff. There's nothing inherently intractable about this. Either you're good with informational security or you aren't. Facebook has absolutely nothing to do with it.

mike_hearn 11y ago

Indeed. It's not theater - this really is more secure than before. It's just got painful usability. However that is not Facebook's fault: the security community has failed to produce any end-to-end encrypted email product that is easy to use. The good news is: a) This continues the momentum that the big Valley companies are creating around strong crypto b) This will motivate people to build better replacements for PGP, because now they know that they might actually receive encrypted emails if they can get sweis and others at Facebook on board. S/MIME would have been slightly better, IMO, but I understand why they didn't do it that way - Yahoo and Google are working on OpenPGP browser extensions, and "copy/paste your key" is easier than "upload your certificate". We badly need a modern, fresh take on email end-to-end crypto.

cinquemb 11y ago

If people trust other mail providers, which most do in general, why would they use this? Maybe facebook has some numbers on how many users distrust other major mail providers to the extent to use this, while also trusting facebook. At least to me, that sounds ridiculous. Because along the measures of distrustfulness of who allows information to propagate to third parties (some third parties more privileged than others…), I don't particularly see any major mail provider above and beyond any other major players… Considering that most people wont even know what GPG/PGP are, this seems like an exercise in "Don't trust others, but trust me" and the user is supposed to go like "Welp, ok!"? Haha.

mynameisvlad 11y ago
No, it's more an exercise in "Don't trust anyone else, trust this proven, well-known (in the tech world) encryption" which is markedly different than "Don't trust others, trust me". PGP doesn't give you confidence in the source, nor should it. It just gives you confidence on the transmission. Now if we could get the public more aware of it, then that'd be great. :) In any case, this isn't security theater. There's nothing theatrical about this. This is a real security benefit that has newly been added. Lots of things can be said about PGP in general, sure, but the ability to encrypt the messages from Facebook so that only you can read them is an actual security benefit. The entire concept of "security theater" is something that looks like it increases security but does nothing. By sheer fact that encrypting communications increases security, it can't be security theater.
- cinquemb 11y ago
  "…ability to encrypt the messages from Facebook so that only you can read them is an actual security benefit." Except it isn't really "only you", its whoever else has access to the key or keys facebook uses to encrypt such messages and if one distrusts other mail providers that they use to such degree, but trusts facebook, I'd really start question what threat model they are contriving…
  - dragonwriter 11y ago
    > Except it isn't really "only you", its whoever else has access to the key or keys facebook uses to encrypt such messages… No, you are giving FB the public key, and keeping the private key. So anyone with the (public) key you give Facebook could send you messages that you can decrypt with the private key (which is why FB also lets you publish the key on your profile page), but could not read the messages sent by someone else with the same key. Only you -- or someone else with the private key that you don't give to Facebook -- can read the messages. Of course, if someone breaks PGP so that they can use one half of the key pair to recover the other half, they could read the message just by knowing the key you share with Facebook ... but that that is intractable is the whole foundation of public key cryptography.
    - cinquemb 11y ago
      So setting side the intractable nature of the key issue, there is also the issue of who has access to the plaintext… if you trust facebook with the plaintext are you also trusting that plaintext is not available to other parties?
      - mynameisvlad 11y ago
        Sure, but that plaintext would have been available to not only the same, but more parties pre-encryption. Because anyone in between Facebook and your mail provider, your mail provider, and anyone in between your mail provider and you would all be susceptible to some form of interception. Now, it's limited to just those on Facebook's side. And that would be covered by a Privacy Policy and potentially the Terms of Service. Also, how is it "intractable" exactly? If you keep your key safe, you keep your key safe. If you give your private key to anyone and everyone, then it's on you if someone else reads your stuff. There's nothing inherently intractable about this. Either you're good with informational security or you aren't. Facebook has absolutely nothing to do with it.