4 ms·
>so it's a very good approximation to treat a cup of water, for example, as a continuous fluid, rather than a bunch of atoms. It's a good approximation empiric
by foldr 11y ago
>so it's a very good approximation to treat a cup of water, for example, as a continuous fluid, rather than a bunch of atoms.
It's a good approximation empirically. I've said a few times now that scientific progress is indeed quite conservative in empirical terms. However, we know now that water is very unlike a continuous fluid in terms of its actual constitution.
> So "atoms are mostly empty space" is wrong, by the definition you've been trying to use, just like "matter is continuous" is wrong.
Yes I know, that's why I mentioned that QM makes things more complicated. However, it's still roughly true that atoms are mostly empty space, in the sense that they are very far from being of uniform density.
>Google "eternal inflation".
If you're referring to theories which attempt to extend eternal inflation in to the past, then these are attempted variations on steady-state theories. See e.g. this paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0111191 http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0111191 . It gives a useful overview of the history. (As to whether its specific result is correct, I make no judgment.)
>The problem you are having here is that you continue to think that we humans can get something absolutely right
I'm not sure where you're getting that from. I suppose that we can get some things absolutely right (e.g. some mathematical truths), but that's not central to anything I've said.
What puzzles me is why you're trawling through all these examples trying to show that scientists have never really been wrong about anything. Is it really your view that there has never been a period in scientific history when the scientific consensus on a given topic was simply mistaken?
- pdonis 11y ago> It's a good approximation empirically. But that's the whole point: if a theory is a good approximation empirically, then how can you say it's "flat out wrong"? Doesn't that obfuscate the very important distinction between ideas that are good approximations, but not quite right, vs. ideas that aren't even good approximations? (See below for more on this.) > Is it really your view that there has never been a period in scientific history when the scientific consensus on a given topic was simply mistaken? In the sense in which you are using the term "simply mistaken", I think there have been such views, but I think they're a lot rarer than you appear to think. (At least if we restrict ourselves to views that can be taken as "scientific" in some sense.) An example of a view which I think was indeed simply mistaken is the phlogiston theory of combustion. It was simply mistaken because it made no predictions whatsoever; it was not empirical. And when a better theory of combustion was found, there was no sense in which the phlogiston theory could be viewed as an approximation to it.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- foldr 11y ago>Doesn't that obfuscate the very important distinction between ideas that are good approximations, but not quite right, vs. ideas that aren't even good approximations? No, it just adds an additional distinction between idea that are good approximations but not quite right and ideas that are good approximations but completely wrong.
- pdonis 11y ago> ideas that are good approximations but completely wrong. Once again, if an idea is a good approximation, how can it be "completely wrong"? That seems like a contradiction.
- foldr 11y agoThere's no contradiction. It makes approximately the right predictions, but it's completely wrong as a statement of how things actually are. A very clear example of such a hypothesis would be one concerning identity. E.g., who was it who committed the murder? The hypothesis that Joe Smith did it might make lots and lots of correct predictions and yet still be completely wrong (because it was actually someone else).
- pdonis 11y ago> It makes approximately the right predictions, but it's completely wrong as a statement of how things actually are. You're assuming that we know "how things actually are". If we know that, how do we know it? If your answer is "because we have a theory that makes correct predictions", how do you know our best current theory gets everything correct? It has to be literally "everything" in order to justify your statement that we know "how things actually are"; anything less than perfection from our current theories does not justify your claim. It should be obvious that we do not know that our current theories are perfectly correct. All we really know is that they get more predictions correct than our previous theories. But that still leaves room for our best current theories to make incorrect predictions--we just don't know which ones they are (yet). And if they make any incorrect predictions, then there could be some other theory that makes more correct predictions, but models "how things actually are" very differently from our current theories. After all, that has already happened, when we came up with our best current theories. If it happened once, it can happen again. And if it happens again, then all your claims about "how things actually are" are, by your own definition, wrong.