4 ms·

You'd experience nothing unusual.

maaku 11y ago
I agree. But the further implication is that for the same reasons, if your brain is plasticised and later scanned and turned into an uploaded whole-brain emulation, you'd still be dead. Uploading is not a pathway to personal longevity, or whatever you want to call continuation-of-me-not-just-my-memories.
- JoeAltmaier 11y ago
  That's the crux of it all, isn't it? Is your self any more than your personality and memories? If so, then you'll have to resort to a soul or some such. If not, then the upload is really 'you', or a copy anyway. And who's to say a soul wouldn't attach to a copy anyway? Souls are not that well understood. Perhaps it would be fooled by the copy, or have an affinity for it, or some such. As long as we're speculating.
  - maaku 11y ago
    No, there are plenty of perfectly reasonable physical theories for the nature of consciousness that don't equate identity with memories and don't involve souls. There's no reason to resort to dualism. For example, there is the identity-is-the-instance-of-computation theory which says that it is not the information being computed (memories) that is relevant, but the computation itself.
    - JoeAltmaier 11y ago
      Agreed, the hardware/wetware is just as important as the bits being uploaded. Especially for chemical brains that store much of personality as neural wiring. But lets say that's uploaded as well, as part of the 'program' details. Then where are we? An 'instance' of this is not actionably different from any other, if it behaves exactly the same. Its arguable that they are the 'same person' in some sense.
      - maaku 11y ago
        It matters to the person who is now dead and not living on in the machine.
        JoeAltmaier 11y ago
        But they are living on! Kind of. Like you are, in that body of yours, once all the cells are replaced by new cells every decade or so. Its ok; you still sound like the same person.
        maaku 11y ago
        Another strawman. No one is claiming that identity is tied to the molecules that make up the body, even in aggregate. There's a sense in which a car remains the same car even after continuing comprehensive maintenance has replaced every single part, but that car stays different from the next car off the production line. Does that example make sense?
        JoeAltmaier 11y ago
        Come on! If its a new car, its a different car. Doesn't matter how convoluted the path to get there (replace every part or build new). Not a strawman; an example pointed right at the argument that 'a copy isn't the same thing'. Be fair.
        maaku 11y ago
        You be fair too. The instance-of-computation model of personal identity allows for cells of your brain to come and go, but as long as the whole thing is operating continuously, you remain. It is exactly analogous to my car example.
        JoeAltmaier 11y ago
        Its also exactly analogous to my build-an-entirely-new-one and program it exactly as the previous one was programmed. It has exactly the same result. If I did it without anyone looking, they would never be able to tell the difference.

maaku 11y ago

I agree. But the further implication is that for the same reasons, if your brain is plasticised and later scanned and turned into an uploaded whole-brain emulation, you'd still be dead. Uploading is not a pathway to personal longevity, or whatever you want to call continuation-of-me-not-just-my-memories.

JoeAltmaier 11y ago
That's the crux of it all, isn't it? Is your self any more than your personality and memories? If so, then you'll have to resort to a soul or some such. If not, then the upload is really 'you', or a copy anyway. And who's to say a soul wouldn't attach to a copy anyway? Souls are not that well understood. Perhaps it would be fooled by the copy, or have an affinity for it, or some such. As long as we're speculating.
- maaku 11y ago
  No, there are plenty of perfectly reasonable physical theories for the nature of consciousness that don't equate identity with memories and don't involve souls. There's no reason to resort to dualism. For example, there is the identity-is-the-instance-of-computation theory which says that it is not the information being computed (memories) that is relevant, but the computation itself.
  - JoeAltmaier 11y ago
    Agreed, the hardware/wetware is just as important as the bits being uploaded. Especially for chemical brains that store much of personality as neural wiring. But lets say that's uploaded as well, as part of the 'program' details. Then where are we? An 'instance' of this is not actionably different from any other, if it behaves exactly the same. Its arguable that they are the 'same person' in some sense.
    - maaku 11y ago
      It matters to the person who is now dead and not living on in the machine.
      - JoeAltmaier 11y ago
        But they are living on! Kind of. Like you are, in that body of yours, once all the cells are replaced by new cells every decade or so. Its ok; you still sound like the same person.
        maaku 11y ago
        Another strawman. No one is claiming that identity is tied to the molecules that make up the body, even in aggregate. There's a sense in which a car remains the same car even after continuing comprehensive maintenance has replaced every single part, but that car stays different from the next car off the production line. Does that example make sense?
        JoeAltmaier 11y ago
        Come on! If its a new car, its a different car. Doesn't matter how convoluted the path to get there (replace every part or build new). Not a strawman; an example pointed right at the argument that 'a copy isn't the same thing'. Be fair.
        maaku 11y ago
        You be fair too. The instance-of-computation model of personal identity allows for cells of your brain to come and go, but as long as the whole thing is operating continuously, you remain. It is exactly analogous to my car example.
        JoeAltmaier 11y ago
        Its also exactly analogous to my build-an-entirely-new-one and program it exactly as the previous one was programmed. It has exactly the same result. If I did it without anyone looking, they would never be able to tell the difference.