38 ms·
The checksums we have from the IA are md5sums, which are not ideal, so a preimage attack is possible, but AFAICS you could only use it if you're generating the
by joeyh 11y ago
The checksums we have from the IA are md5sums, which are not ideal, so a preimage attack is possible, but AFAICS you could only use it if you're generating the original file that is stored in the IA, and are planning to replace that with a colliding version in the future. Otherwise, we can detect falsified files.
There are some potential attacks of putting false information into the git-annex repositories, that we use for tracking which clients are storing which files. We'll eventually need post-receive hooks to validate that pushes only change information about the client making the push. For now, if someone attempts this attack, we can revert their malicious changes after the fact.
- gojomo 11y ago...if you're generating the original file... Maybe for the time being, with published attacks. But MD5's strength against attacks has been sufficiently dubious since early 1996 – before the founding of the Internet Archive – that experts have recommended against using it in new applications. By 2009, the CMU Software Engineering Institute (responsible for CERT security notices) wrote: Software developers, Certification Authorities, website owners, and users should avoid using the MD5 algorithm in any capacity. As previous research has demonstrated, it should be considered cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use. So they're worse than 'not ideal'. They're dangerously obsolete for the purpose of content-authenticity, and any reliance upon them (under hand-wavy conditions) serves to block the migration to available hashes that would actually work. If you're making the backup to be sent through a wormhole to 1999, use MD5. If you're creating the backup for trust and availability through to end-of-year 2015, or 2025, or 2115, ditch MD5 ASAP. [1] http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068