4 ms·
Did you ever get it to a practical level where you were able to retrieve a complete key on a live system in a substantially reduced time ? I retrieved enough k
by cperciva 17y ago
Did you ever get it to a practical level where you were able to retrieve a complete key on a live system in a substantially reduced time ?
I retrieved enough key bits to make the rest easily computable, yes.
How much knowledge would you have to have about the process being monitored ?
Cryptographically speaking? None. Operationally speaking, if you don't know what program is running (or more importantly, what cryptographic library is being used) it may take you a few hours of "eyeballing" the timings before you see something which looks like a modular exponentiation -- but once you find it, you should be able to extract key bits (if the cryptographic code is vulnerable, that is).
you retrieved a significant number of bits, but that leaves as guess as to how long it would take to recover the remainder
Recovering the remaining bits is just a problem of modular algebra -- computationally speaking it's trivial.
Has intel done something againt this kind of attack on the i7
I don't know. I've asked, but they don't want to talk to me.
Have you heard of this attack being used in the wild ?
Not exactly... but I've heard reports of certain government agencies suddenly getting very interested in how to defend against this sort of attack, so I suspect that some spooks are aware of this attack being used.
- jacquesm 17y agoDo you plan on verifying if this vulnerability is still present in nehalem/i7 ? What about multi-core and level 2 cache monitoring, is that also feasible or do you get too much noise ?
- cperciva 17y agoDo you plan on verifying if this vulnerability is still present in nehalem/i7 ? If I have the time and opportunity, probably. Right now I don't have an i7 processor or the time to spend on it. What about multi-core and level 2 cache monitoring, is that also feasible or do you get too much noise ? Every L2 cache I've seen so far leaks data too slowly to be useful as a cryptographic side channel (at least for attacks like mine).
- jacquesm 17y agoThanks for all your answers, if you ever get around to this and need access to an i7 let me know.
- NateLawson 17y agoAll respect to Colin, especially for his nice visualization of the cache behavior for RSA. However, I think the Tromer paper has more detail on multiple approaches to measuring cache behavior. It also pertains to AES, so you can compare side channel analysis of symmetric algorithms vs. public key. http://people.csail.mit.edu/tromer/papers/cache.pdf http://people.csail.mit.edu/tromer/papers/cache.pdf A lot of approaches can work without "eyeballing" the timings. The Aciicmez paper on BTB predictor side channels shows how you can retrieve the key in a single trace. It shows the interesting result that randomness, such as blinding, has no effect because it only helps when you're trying to compare multiple traces! (They take multiple traces, but then use a heuristic to throw out those that have too much jitter from other system behavior and then only analyze the one best trace.) http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/351 http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/351 http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/482 http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/482 http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/336 http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/336 This discussion is timely since I've written an article comparing the various side channel attack approaches for IEEE Magazine's Dec 2009 issue. It should be available online soon.