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Yahoo and Google are both working on end-to-end e-mail options. https://github.com/google/end-to-end https://github.com/google/end-to-end https://github.com/y
by schoen 11y ago
Yahoo and Google are both working on end-to-end e-mail options.
https://github.com/google/end-to-end https://github.com/google/end-to-end
https://github.com/yahoo/end-to-end https://github.com/yahoo/end-to-end
An even harder problem, maybe: how could we make it so communications intermediaries don't know your social graph? The most exciting idea in this direction I know of is AGL's Pond:
https://pond.imperialviolet.org/ https://pond.imperialviolet.org/
But it comes with some more severe tradeoffs than just end-to-end encrypting your e-mail, like deliberately introducing delays in sending and receiving messages in order to create ambiguity about when communication took place.
- Zigurd 11y agoThere are many ways to find one's social graph, and that train may have left the station in the 1970's or early 80's with Project Daytona, which was rumored to be built for analyzing all the call detail records that could be gathered and entered in to a database. The social graph is also an opportunity for securing key exchange through key signing and combining key exchange with real time communication that's hard to falsify and hence hard to MITM.
- throwawayaway 11y agowell imagine a decentralized facebook with absolute privacy. you don't need delays. traffic to and from "the server" is maintained at a flat rate of encrypted white noise type signal. whoever talks to whoever else through this black box is a mystery.
- schoen 11y agoThere's a tension between referring to it as decentralized and saying that it has a server. This approach is great in general, but there are some known challenges about padding and latency. One is that you have to use padding up to the maximum rate at which you want to send data, so if you want to have some service that can use 500 kB/s, you have to send and receive that much data all the time. Another is that you may have to make server transmissions nearly synchronous; you can't send extra data in a window even if you have a backlog. If you break this rule, then an attacker who can delay one user's traffic can use that power to confirm a hypothesis that two users are talking to one another. This probably means that you can use it for e-mail and IM, but probably not voice. There may also be a problem if a user is momentarily or permanently disproportionately popular and hence wants to receive more data than the standard padding rate allows. You may also have to overcome users' inclination to only use the service when they're talking to each other. If not, the time windows when particular pairs of people were active may eventually show a strong correlation, especially the times when both of them disconnected.
- throwawayaway 11y agoone: that limitation is obvious, technologies such as the following can assist https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multicast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multicast two: i don't understand how encrypted traffic that maintains a noise level and hides encrypted data in the noise can be subject to traffic analysis. third: popularity, that is a solved problem for the majority of limited bandwidth systmes, you get lag. fourth users inclination: both endpoints being comprimised to that extent is beyond the scope of most counter surveillance technology that i have ever heard of. of the criticisms only the one i labelled two seems really interesting to me, could you please elaborate? i was able to run voice comms and play computer games simultaneously on isdn and modem lines and therefore the voice bandwidth concerns i don't think are realistic
- schoen 11y agoIt's possible that it might turn out to be voice-capable, I'd like to see how the Guardian Project's work with voice over Tor has gone. But there is a notion that more latency is better for anonymity, and clearly worse for voice, and we don't even necessarily know where the sweet spot is for anonymity. And the anonymity that you get from something like Tor is already of questionable value against either a global adversary or one who's already monitoring you. To make the anonymity stronger there, we have to make the latency worse. The traffic analysis comes in where you notice correlations between increased or decreased activity on one link and a corresponding change in activity on another link. Just having noise isn't necessarily enough to spoil those correlations; after all, so much of modern statistics is about detecting very weak signals given many noisy observations. There is also research about active attackers shaping traffic flows (like delaying or blocking packets injecting additional packets). Then the notion is that the changed shape of a flow will be visible elsewhere on the network, and that's the destination. Unfortunately, this seems to work really well!
- throwawayaway 11y agoI don't think you have followed me at all. The intention is to send a noisy level of encrypted 'constant' bandwidth. The activity has the same random level of increased and decreased activity the whole time, active or inactive. How are you not getting this? endpoint0-n ---> 'server' ---> endpoint0-n where ---> is a random level of encrypted noisy signal. the endpoint does not open a connection to the other endpoint, it opens it to the 'server'. no amount of traffic analysis or packet injection is going to mess with that. the absolute best traffic analysis can do is provide a 1/n probability based on active connections to the 'server' that endpointA was talking to endpointB. > we have to make the latency worse. > there's a notion that latency is good for anonymity we have to do something because of a notion? i give up.