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>But this is yet another argument over definition or a value judgement. I have spent most of my life studying math and science, and yet reading Dostoyevsky has
by eli_gottlieb 11y ago
>But this is yet another argument over definition or a value judgement. I have spent most of my life studying math and science, and yet reading Dostoyevsky has given me much more abundant insight into my life than anything science ever taught me.
And you think there is no science of people? You think that just because our current understanding of psychology is fairly hazy, it must remain that way forever?
Or worse: do you think that there is nothing psychological about what happens when you read Dostoyevsky, nothing that a science of human beings can say about your experience, even in principle? How much are you willing to multiply "irreducibility"? Until it covers your whole worldview like a cancer?
>As to non-naturalist ethics, I see absolutely no problem with concepts that are irreducible to atoms. Neither is math, even though math was created/discovered by humans, which live in this universe and are composed of atoms.
But of course math is reducible to atoms. Or, if that seems a strong statement, math is not irreducible by default: Platonism is not the only viable philosophy of mathematics, such that taking any other position generates an immediate internal (within math) or external (with our other knowledge of the world) contradiction. Both constructivism and formalism yield neat interpretations of math as certain kinds of computations being done within human minds.
>In short, I don't think you can reduce, say, literature, to atoms and forces even though the author and the reader are composed of atoms, and the reading process involves photons hitting receptors that start a chemical reaction in the retina. Doing so will teach us nothing of value about literature.
See above regarding psychology. Since atoms and forces make up the author and reader, we can use our theories about those to zero in on correct theories about the author and the reader, thus gaining an understanding of what the reader is experiencing and how he is playing an active part in reading a book. Certainly science can teach us more about literature!
You seem to be confusing naturalism with what's been called "greedy reductionism", which is a metaphilosophical - and therefore damn near nonsensical - view, namely that only the most ontologically basic level of description actually matters. In fact, if we don't employ our more abstract, high-level concepts like "human being" and "Dostoyevsky novel" and "armchair", we completely fail to make accurate predictions about the behavior of the very much natural world around us.
As long as these higher-level, and yet closer-to-experience, concepts possess causal power - as long as they make our predictions better and our counterfactual models more accurate upon interventional testing - we must use them. Your thoughts and feelings are utterly essential components of a naturalistic explanation of the world.
They are also, ultimately, made of particles, joules, and bits.
Likewise to such mental activities as math and morality.
>A shovel is more useful than a pen for digging holes, but who says digging holes is more worthwhile than writing? Even if you think it is, you cannot prove it scientifically, because science can say nothing about values, only point at relationships between causes and outcomes.
This displays the funny post-religious misconception that values are relative to "the Universe" rather than to agents. This is incorrect.
And, presto change-o, when speaking of a specific agent, I can certainly say whether digging a hole is more worthwhile than writing, or the other way around. Again: a scientist who fails to predict that I (to take the personal example) would rather read and write than dig a hole is simply inaccurate.
>That doesn't follow. First, I don't know how science can teach us that something is "wrong". I don't know by what scientific or mathematical mechanism you can ever make the jump from the "is" to the "ought" -- at the very best science can teach us that if we seek a certain outcome, we should take a certain action, but can it tell us what outcome we should seek?
Which shows a nasty hole in your philosophical education, but regrettably an all-too-common one: you were never told ethical naturalism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/) exists.
>But it's even worse than that because there is another philosophical, unscientific mediating factor here, which is "understanding". Being able to describe the universe and understanding it are two very different things. We can know without understanding.
You seem to be just pushing words around, but may I venture to guess that you mean to differentiate between discriminative "describing" and causal-counterfactual "understanding"?
>In fact, I can even give the last statement a more mathematical facet: that a process B reduces to a more fundamental process A, does not guarantee that fully knowing A will let us predict B because of intractability.
Certainly. In fact, this is the nature of reduction: to reduce B < A implies that B happens as a specific instance of A, which often means that B occupies a tiny corner of A's parameter space, and almost always means that B's parameter space is much smaller than that of A. For example, in describing gasses, we can describe the precise velocities of every single molecule (the more-reduced theory), or we can measure the temperature of the gas as a whole (the less-reduced, higher-level theory). The intractability is often both computational and informational.
This merely reinforces what I said above, which is that we need the higher-level concepts to correctly understand, interpret, and predict the world. Concepts like "human being", "sunset", "profundity", "confusion", and (just for the hell of it) "love" are also utterly inescapable components of a naturalistic worldview.
It's just "irreducibility", or in other words, metaphysical handwaving and magical thinking, that aren't.
- pron 11y ago> You think that just because our current understanding of psychology is fairly hazy, it must remain that way forever? Sure but will that knowledge be so predictive as to be truly essentialist? After all, we can't provide tractably predictive models for even n-body systems for pretty small values of n, so I doubt we will for people. BTW, I believe that those answers we will be able to prove and reduce with any measure of definiteness will only tell us things we already know (or "know"). > Both constructivism and formalism yield neat interpretations of math as certain kinds of computations being done within human minds. Ah, but here I think I can convince you, and make a much more powerful point than the one regarding intractability. Consider the universal Turing machine and its approximate physical manifestations. Whether or not it is truly universal is an open question, but most assume that it is, yet they are not perturbed by the following result: our universe may contain a machine that can simulate not only this universe but any universe, i.e. there are objects that can arise within our physical universe that are more universal than our universe itself. Can the simulated universe be reduced to the atoms and forces of the one containing the machine? Most people will say no, as universal computation breaks reduction. It is more general than the mechanism implementing it, with possibly more degrees of freedom. > would rather read and write than dig a hole is simply inaccurate. But the question is a different one. I wasn't asking what you want to do or even what you will do, but what you should do. The definition of "should" can live, if you will, as a concept within the Turing machine. > This displays the funny post-religious misconception that values are relative to "the Universe" rather than to agents. This is incorrect. That does not follow from what I said at all. I didn't say the universe or "morality" necessarily dictates an answer. What I said was that the answer -- even if it is subjective, if it exists at all -- does not necessarily follow the laws that gave rise the the being asking the question. Universal computation etc. > you were never told ethical naturalism exists. Again, I think there's a disagreement on definitions. It seems like naturalist ethics seems to say "if we know how people behave, we can deduce how they'll program their Turing machines (and they will always program them in a similar way), and we can therefore say something about the programs themselves", while non-naturalist ethics simply studies the "computer science" of those programs. I think both approaches are complementary, rather than contradictory, and really discuss different things, even if they give them the same name. > B's parameter space is much smaller than that of A So what? A's entire parameter space cannot be practically determined either (even if A is well understood), and the emergent property A may well require that in order to be explained in terms of B. For example, to explain psychology in terms of particle physics, we may need to understand the interactions of, say, 1e15 bodies. Since we cannot do that, we cannot explain A in terms of B. Also, universal computation may arbitrarily increase (or reduce) degrees of freedom. > It's just "irreducibility", or in other words, metaphysical handwaving and magical thinking, that aren't. Let me make clear that I am not in any way opposed to the naturalist worldview. In fact I fully and utterly subscribe to it, just as I fully and utterly subscribe to non-naturalism. I see absolutely no contradiction between the two, just as I see no contradiction between simulating a universe with different physics in a computer that exists in ours. When I say something is irreducible, I simply mean you cannot construct a useful model for it in terms of a lower abstraction -- not that it is not an emergent property of that lower abstraction; obviously, it is (unless it's a simulation run by universal computation). --- Of course, there is one glaring bug in my appeal to universal computation, and that is the composition not of the machines but of the programmers. Since there is no free will in the universe, the programmers are then deterministic, and therefore the programs themselves. Still, even though this greatly reduces the space of possible programs (and makes the naturalist approach to studying the programs sensible) I think that few people will consider this (i.e. a deterministic programmer) a useful reduction. In any case, I think everyone will agree that the programs can be studied in isolation of the universe that created the programmers, and that doing so may be useful.