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Excuse me, but this is yet another time at which we must differentiate between naturalist philosophy and non-naturalist. In naturalist philosophy, "ought" stat
by eli_gottlieb 11y ago
Excuse me, but this is yet another time at which we must differentiate between naturalist philosophy and non-naturalist.
In naturalist philosophy, "ought" statements eventually dissolve into a very specific class of "is" statements. One observes that the universe consists of particles, bits, and joules, and comes up with moral foundations suitable for living life as a human being who is made of particles, bits, and joules. If the universe contained a fundamentally moral component which we could exhibit and manipulate - the same way we can exhibit and manipulate particles, bits, and joules - we would consider that to be basic too. But it doesn't: so moral statements must reduce to non-moral statements.
What one does not do is precisely what is done in non-naturalist philosophy, which is to insist that "oughtness" is an ontologically primitive property of certain objects called "moral propositions", which have nothing whatsoever to do with atoms, bits, and joules, and which, despite the non-naturalistic philosopher's inability to exhibit any such thing beyond "Surely torturing puppies is wrong!", are nonetheless considered an essential component of the universe on a level with particles, bits, joules.
People have always been all too ready to insist that anything we don't fully understand, but which affects us emotionally, is an irreducible, ontologically primitive component of the fundamental nature of the universe, while anything you can actually exhibit and manipulate is mere gadgetry, used to make smartphones run but otherwise of no account. Problem is, the reverse is true: examining things we can exhibit and manipulate, naturalism, has given us more fruitful and abundant insight into the world and our lives in it than any other approach ever tried. It has taken endless seemingly-disparate phenomena and united them in a single conception of the universe that ties everything from the stars in the heavens to the beat of the human heart in grand threads of causality.
When we rely on any fixed and finite system of propositions to describe our universe: ignoramus et ignorabimus. As we learn more and more fundamentally independent propositions and unite our disparate magisteria: wir müssen wissen, wir werden wissen! And this will extend to the moral realm as well, so that when we say torturing puppies is wrong, we will know that we are describing a matter of fact.
- pron 11y ago> has given us more fruitful and abundant insight into the world and our lives in it than any other approach ever tried But this is yet another argument over definition or a value judgement. I have spent most of my life studying math and science, and yet reading Dostoyevsky has given me much more abundant insight into my life than anything science ever taught me. The point is, of course, what do "insight" and "relevance" mean? Their meaning can be entirely subjective, and is certainly not scientific. For that matter, what does "meaning" mean? There's no doubt that science has improved our lives, but so has politics (which has often been very much influenced by contemporary science). True, technology's effects are quantifiable and measurable, but being quantifiable and measurable is not the only way of assigning value. As to non-naturalist ethics, I see absolutely no problem with concepts that are irreducible to atoms. Neither is math, even though math was created/discovered by humans, which live in this universe and are composed of atoms. I think that you're misrepresenting those ideas when you're describing them as "essential components of the universe", when the universe is merely the arena where these concepts form. The fact that you can find a causal chain -- a reduction, if you will -- does not mean you can always describe the end of the chain in terms of the first link (I'll get to that again later). In short, I don't think you can reduce, say, literature, to atoms and forces even though the author and the reader are composed of atoms, and the reading process involves photons hitting receptors that start a chemical reaction in the retina. Doing so will teach us nothing of value about literature. I think that it is your position -- that only that which can be reduced to atoms -- that lacks justification. Saying that science and technology are quantifiably or "physically" useful is almost (not quite) a tautology. A shovel is more useful than a pen for digging holes, but who says digging holes is more worthwhile than writing? Even if you think it is, you cannot prove it scientifically, because science can say nothing about values, only point at relationships between causes and outcomes. > As we learn more and more fundamentally independent propositions and unite our disparate magisteria: wir müssen wissen, wir werden wissen! And this will extend to the moral realm as well, so that when we say torturing puppies is wrong, we will know that we are describing a matter of fact. That doesn't follow. First, I don't know how science can teach us that something is "wrong". I don't know by what scientific or mathematical mechanism you can ever make the jump from the "is" to the "ought" -- at the very best science can teach us that if we seek a certain outcome, we should take a certain action, but can it tell us what outcome we should seek? But it's even worse than that because there is another philosophical, unscientific mediating factor here, which is "understanding". Being able to describe the universe and understanding it are two very different things. We can know without understanding. In fact, I can even give the last statement a more mathematical facet: that a process B reduces to a more fundamental process A, does not guarantee that fully knowing A will let us predict B because of intractability. We already know that most "interesting", i.e. complex processes in the universe are intractable, so at best, they are theoretically reducible, but rarely practically so. Our understanding of particle physics can teach us little about psychology (although it may assist in building instruments to study psychology). So I disagree both with your assumption that we can know (or rather, that knowing means fully understanding or predicting), as well with the supposed consequences of knowledge.
- eli_gottlieb 11y ago>But this is yet another argument over definition or a value judgement. I have spent most of my life studying math and science, and yet reading Dostoyevsky has given me much more abundant insight into my life than anything science ever taught me. And you think there is no science of people? You think that just because our current understanding of psychology is fairly hazy, it must remain that way forever? Or worse: do you think that there is nothing psychological about what happens when you read Dostoyevsky, nothing that a science of human beings can say about your experience, even in principle? How much are you willing to multiply "irreducibility"? Until it covers your whole worldview like a cancer? >As to non-naturalist ethics, I see absolutely no problem with concepts that are irreducible to atoms. Neither is math, even though math was created/discovered by humans, which live in this universe and are composed of atoms. But of course math is reducible to atoms. Or, if that seems a strong statement, math is not irreducible by default: Platonism is not the only viable philosophy of mathematics, such that taking any other position generates an immediate internal (within math) or external (with our other knowledge of the world) contradiction. Both constructivism and formalism yield neat interpretations of math as certain kinds of computations being done within human minds. >In short, I don't think you can reduce, say, literature, to atoms and forces even though the author and the reader are composed of atoms, and the reading process involves photons hitting receptors that start a chemical reaction in the retina. Doing so will teach us nothing of value about literature. See above regarding psychology. Since atoms and forces make up the author and reader, we can use our theories about those to zero in on correct theories about the author and the reader, thus gaining an understanding of what the reader is experiencing and how he is playing an active part in reading a book. Certainly science can teach us more about literature! You seem to be confusing naturalism with what's been called "greedy reductionism", which is a metaphilosophical - and therefore damn near nonsensical - view, namely that only the most ontologically basic level of description actually matters. In fact, if we don't employ our more abstract, high-level concepts like "human being" and "Dostoyevsky novel" and "armchair", we completely fail to make accurate predictions about the behavior of the very much natural world around us. As long as these higher-level, and yet closer-to-experience, concepts possess causal power - as long as they make our predictions better and our counterfactual models more accurate upon interventional testing - we must use them. Your thoughts and feelings are utterly essential components of a naturalistic explanation of the world. They are also, ultimately, made of particles, joules, and bits. Likewise to such mental activities as math and morality. >A shovel is more useful than a pen for digging holes, but who says digging holes is more worthwhile than writing? Even if you think it is, you cannot prove it scientifically, because science can say nothing about values, only point at relationships between causes and outcomes. This displays the funny post-religious misconception that values are relative to "the Universe" rather than to agents. This is incorrect. And, presto change-o, when speaking of a specific agent, I can certainly say whether digging a hole is more worthwhile than writing, or the other way around. Again: a scientist who fails to predict that I (to take the personal example) would rather read and write than dig a hole is simply inaccurate. >That doesn't follow. First, I don't know how science can teach us that something is "wrong". I don't know by what scientific or mathematical mechanism you can ever make the jump from the "is" to the "ought" -- at the very best science can teach us that if we seek a certain outcome, we should take a certain action, but can it tell us what outcome we should seek? Which shows a nasty hole in your philosophical education, but regrettably an all-too-common one: you were never told ethical naturalism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/) exists. >But it's even worse than that because there is another philosophical, unscientific mediating factor here, which is "understanding". Being able to describe the universe and understanding it are two very different things. We can know without understanding. You seem to be just pushing words around, but may I venture to guess that you mean to differentiate between discriminative "describing" and causal-counterfactual "understanding"? >In fact, I can even give the last statement a more mathematical facet: that a process B reduces to a more fundamental process A, does not guarantee that fully knowing A will let us predict B because of intractability. Certainly. In fact, this is the nature of reduction: to reduce B < A implies that B happens as a specific instance of A, which often means that B occupies a tiny corner of A's parameter space, and almost always means that B's parameter space is much smaller than that of A. For example, in describing gasses, we can describe the precise velocities of every single molecule (the more-reduced theory), or we can measure the temperature of the gas as a whole (the less-reduced, higher-level theory). The intractability is often both computational and informational. This merely reinforces what I said above, which is that we need the higher-level concepts to correctly understand, interpret, and predict the world. Concepts like "human being", "sunset", "profundity", "confusion", and (just for the hell of it) "love" are also utterly inescapable components of a naturalistic worldview. It's just "irreducibility", or in other words, metaphysical handwaving and magical thinking, that aren't.