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I don't think anyone, including Foucault -- actually, especially Foucault who viewed Enlightenment philosophers and even existentialists as essentialists -- wou
by pron 12y ago
I don't think anyone, including Foucault -- actually, especially Foucault who viewed Enlightenment philosophers and even existentialists as essentialists -- would think or want human-related literature to be an "accurate and scientific description". Anyone concerned with the "ought" does not confuse it with the "is", and therefore any scientific description of human society can only be temporary and certainly not normative. If anything, this view is even more associated with opponents of the Enlightenment than with its proponents. The only way the philosopher will be out of a job is if people confine themselves to the notion that society cannot be changed and there's nothing we can aspire to. Since the entire history of the human race empirically disproves this notion (and shows that the chance of people resigning themselves to this idea is very low), the philosopher is unlikely to lose his job. I think pretty much all philosophers warn against the naturalistic fallacy, and even scientists who believe science may assist in making value decisions do not think it can dictate values.
- steveklabnik 12y agoMore on Foucault and the Enlightenment: this essay is a classic http://foucault.info//documents/whatisenlightenment/foucault.whatisenlightenment.en.html http://foucault.info//documents/whatisenlightenment/foucault...
- eli_gottlieb 12y agoExcuse me, but this is yet another time at which we must differentiate between naturalist philosophy and non-naturalist. In naturalist philosophy, "ought" statements eventually dissolve into a very specific class of "is" statements. One observes that the universe consists of particles, bits, and joules, and comes up with moral foundations suitable for living life as a human being who is made of particles, bits, and joules. If the universe contained a fundamentally moral component which we could exhibit and manipulate - the same way we can exhibit and manipulate particles, bits, and joules - we would consider that to be basic too. But it doesn't: so moral statements must reduce to non-moral statements. What one does not do is precisely what is done in non-naturalist philosophy, which is to insist that "oughtness" is an ontologically primitive property of certain objects called "moral propositions", which have nothing whatsoever to do with atoms, bits, and joules, and which, despite the non-naturalistic philosopher's inability to exhibit any such thing beyond "Surely torturing puppies is wrong!", are nonetheless considered an essential component of the universe on a level with particles, bits, joules. People have always been all too ready to insist that anything we don't fully understand, but which affects us emotionally, is an irreducible, ontologically primitive component of the fundamental nature of the universe, while anything you can actually exhibit and manipulate is mere gadgetry, used to make smartphones run but otherwise of no account. Problem is, the reverse is true: examining things we can exhibit and manipulate, naturalism, has given us more fruitful and abundant insight into the world and our lives in it than any other approach ever tried. It has taken endless seemingly-disparate phenomena and united them in a single conception of the universe that ties everything from the stars in the heavens to the beat of the human heart in grand threads of causality. When we rely on any fixed and finite system of propositions to describe our universe: ignoramus et ignorabimus. As we learn more and more fundamentally independent propositions and unite our disparate magisteria: wir müssen wissen, wir werden wissen! And this will extend to the moral realm as well, so that when we say torturing puppies is wrong, we will know that we are describing a matter of fact.
- pron 12y ago> has given us more fruitful and abundant insight into the world and our lives in it than any other approach ever tried But this is yet another argument over definition or a value judgement. I have spent most of my life studying math and science, and yet reading Dostoyevsky has given me much more abundant insight into my life than anything science ever taught me. The point is, of course, what do "insight" and "relevance" mean? Their meaning can be entirely subjective, and is certainly not scientific. For that matter, what does "meaning" mean? There's no doubt that science has improved our lives, but so has politics (which has often been very much influenced by contemporary science). True, technology's effects are quantifiable and measurable, but being quantifiable and measurable is not the only way of assigning value. As to non-naturalist ethics, I see absolutely no problem with concepts that are irreducible to atoms. Neither is math, even though math was created/discovered by humans, which live in this universe and are composed of atoms. I think that you're misrepresenting those ideas when you're describing them as "essential components of the universe", when the universe is merely the arena where these concepts form. The fact that you can find a causal chain -- a reduction, if you will -- does not mean you can always describe the end of the chain in terms of the first link (I'll get to that again later). In short, I don't think you can reduce, say, literature, to atoms and forces even though the author and the reader are composed of atoms, and the reading process involves photons hitting receptors that start a chemical reaction in the retina. Doing so will teach us nothing of value about literature. I think that it is your position -- that only that which can be reduced to atoms -- that lacks justification. Saying that science and technology are quantifiably or "physically" useful is almost (not quite) a tautology. A shovel is more useful than a pen for digging holes, but who says digging holes is more worthwhile than writing? Even if you think it is, you cannot prove it scientifically, because science can say nothing about values, only point at relationships between causes and outcomes. > As we learn more and more fundamentally independent propositions and unite our disparate magisteria: wir müssen wissen, wir werden wissen! And this will extend to the moral realm as well, so that when we say torturing puppies is wrong, we will know that we are describing a matter of fact. That doesn't follow. First, I don't know how science can teach us that something is "wrong". I don't know by what scientific or mathematical mechanism you can ever make the jump from the "is" to the "ought" -- at the very best science can teach us that if we seek a certain outcome, we should take a certain action, but can it tell us what outcome we should seek? But it's even worse than that because there is another philosophical, unscientific mediating factor here, which is "understanding". Being able to describe the universe and understanding it are two very different things. We can know without understanding. In fact, I can even give the last statement a more mathematical facet: that a process B reduces to a more fundamental process A, does not guarantee that fully knowing A will let us predict B because of intractability. We already know that most "interesting", i.e. complex processes in the universe are intractable, so at best, they are theoretically reducible, but rarely practically so. Our understanding of particle physics can teach us little about psychology (although it may assist in building instruments to study psychology). So I disagree both with your assumption that we can know (or rather, that knowing means fully understanding or predicting), as well with the supposed consequences of knowledge.