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Logjam: the latest TLS vulnerability explained
- higherpurpose 11y agoNice logo.
- r1ch 11y agoA bit off topic, but I find it quite disheartening that cloudflare has regular blog posts about how great their security is and how safe you are with cloudflare, but at the same time offers customers seriously broken SSL options. 2 of the 3 options ("Universal SSL" and "Full SSL") are not "secure" by today's standards. Universal SSL leaves connections to the origin unsecured allowing for passive and active MITM attackers to intercept things. Full SSL allows an active MITM to intercept origin connections. Advertising these services as "SSL" is misleading and offers a false sense of security to visitors as they will see the nice green SSL lock and think their connection to a cloudflare-protected website is fully protected. Meanwhile their credit card information and other personal details could be travelling over the internet in plain text to the origin.
- spacefight 11y agoYes. I have said it before and I say it again: Cloudflare (and any other large CDNs) are a perfect setup for a MITM or a perfect target for a nation-state's secret service.
- sschueller 11y agoEspecially when cloudflare is governed by the laws of the US which includes the patriot act. How do we know this isn't already the case?
- sarciszewski 11y agoIf your threat model includes intelligence agencies, set up your own HTTPS with HSTS and HPKP and don't use CloudFlare. Wow, that was easy.
- tikums 11y agoSo, basically anyone providing online services to customers then? Who's threat model should not include intelligence agencies? Online pet shop?
- sarciszewski 11y agoIt comes down to personal opinion more than anything.
- jgrahamc 11y agoUniversal SSL does not imply "origin unsecured": https://blog.cloudflare.com/universal-ssl-encryption-all-the-way-to-the-origin-for-free/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/universal-ssl-encryption-all-the...
- r1ch 11y agoIt seems I meant "Flexible SSL" instead of "Universal SSL". According to the main website, flexible SSL is not secured. https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl The beta test of a Cloudflare CA for "Full SSL" is a big improvement over accepting any self-signed certificate, but I still think "Flexible SSL" should not be a thing.
- xyzzy123 11y agoIt misleads users, for a start. I get the business case (the whole point is that SSL is hard for a large class of server admins). Also it does help for e.g. users coming in via tor or un-trusted networks. But dammit, I still can't bring myself to like it.
- RpPr 11y agoNot to mention their disgraceful Tor captchas.
- jamespo 11y agoWhy do you think they have implemented these? Just to inconvenience you?
- lucb1e 11y ago(Another Tor browser user here.) Yes, it sure seems so. Half the time I visit Hacker News (which is behind Cloudflare) I have to fill in a captcha. I'm logged in with a 3k rep account and I'm not trying to do any action, I'm just trying to see the front page. That is surely suspicious enough to give me a captcha every ten minutes. Edit: to respond to both comments at once: alright Cloudflare may not recognize my HN cookie and account, but they do have two cf_* cookies, and I am merely loading the homepage. No weird URL parameters, no POST data, nothing.
- jamespo 11y agoAre you suggesting cloudflare should hook into HN to check your reputation, I'm not sure they have the engineering capacity to extend this to all sites.
- jtdowney 11y agoTo be fair, Cloudflare has no concept of how much reputation you have on HN.
- d23 11y agoDude, you're assuming that from that same exact IP address they aren't getting a ton of other traffic that isn't spamming the hell out of them or doing completely sketchy stuff. That's what happens when you share an IP address with other people -- especially those who might be criminals or have other nefarious motives for using tor.
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- haytjes 11y agoLike reported earlier it is quite easy to test if your server is (still) affected. I used http://security.uwsoftware.be/logjam http://security.uwsoftware.be/logjam since it didn't had a cache on it. That makes it possible to fix and confirm fixed. (IIUC most other tools had a cache. So when testing after fixing it was just showing that it was still vulnerable).
- theandrewbailey 11y agoI wish there were more diagrams (like the one in this article) that explains how specific HTTPS ciphersuites work and how all keys are derived and agreed upon, and not just the initial TLS handshake. I would like to learn why I need to generate an RSA key for my server when it's just using AES in the end. I want to know the steps in the black magic involved in going from an asymmetric cipher to a symmetric one.
- FiloSottile 11y ago(Author here.) Beautiful! I'm about to start a strictly technical podcast about cryptography and attacks, and I was planning to do the first episode on all the TLS Key Exchanges. I'm super-happy to see that there might be interest on this in particular :) Keep an eye on blog.filippo.io maybe, then!
- sarciszewski 11y agoWell, you've piqued my interest! :D
- oggy 11y agoBut the black magic lies exactly in the handshake. You need to generate the RSA key (or more broadly, an asymmetric key) in order for the handshake to take place. An analogy I like to use are boxes with locks. Imagine that, given a lock design, I can produce a bunch of boxes with the exact copies of the lock and keys for the lock. Symmetric crypto corresponds to everyday locks: if you have the key for the lock, you can open or close the lock as you wish. Asymmetric crypto corresponds to a special kind of lock, which comes with two keys: one kind for locking the lock (the public keys), another for unlocking (the private keys). Now if somebody wants to communicate with me securely, the choice of lock affects the key distribution significantly. If I have just symmetric locks, for each person I want to talk to, I have to create a new box with a separate lock, and make sure they are the only ones having a key for this lock. The latter I have to in person. Meaning, if I want to talk to somebody on the Internet, I first have to meet them in person (that is, out of band), before we can communicate securely. This doesn't scale well. With asymmetric crypto, however, I can just leave a bunch of open boxes and corresponding locking (public) keys lying around (the keys for the different boxes can be same or different, doesn't matter). If Assange now wants to send me a message, he writes it on a piece of paper, puts it in one of the open boxes, and locks it with the locking key. I'm the only person with the unlocking (private) key for this lock so I'm the only one who can read the message. This is just basic asymmetric crypto. Another thing Assange could do is, instead of leaving a piece of paper with the message, to leave a piece of paper with a fresh design of a symmetric lock. Now I can safely create my own symmetric box according to the design, put messages inside, lock them and leave them around for Assange to pick up. This is secure since he's created the design and he's the only one apart from me who can open such boxes. This is a 10,000 foot view of how to do the switch from asymmetric to symmetric crypto, but there are many other questions that need to be addressed to get an actual protocol. Thes include "how does Assange know this public key belongs to me" (answer: certificates and certificate authorities), "how do I know the message came from Assange" (answer: digital signatures), "what purpose does this message serve" (tagging and nonces), "what kind of designs I can produce locks for" (ciphersuite negotiation) and so on. Additionally, there's all kinds of things that can go wrong when implementing this - basically, even though we know how to check the security of a high-level design of a protocol using formal methods (the so-called "symbolic verification" tools), we don't really have a systematic way of translating these designs into actual implementations while preserving the security guarantees. Also, there are direct key-exchange protocols (such as Diffie-Hellman) which work differently than the basic idea above.
- hartator 11y agoLoved cloudflare idea and used them for several websites driving > 2M views per day, and it's great to see them post things about security, but from my experiences/benchmarks: * Inject JS via html packets rewriting * High numbers of false positives even on lowest threshold * Issues with flash resources for some users * Odd price structure (Based on number of domains not traffic) * Adsense on error/not-a-bot pages
- baby 11y agoGreat article! And shameless plug, my take on the attack which I think complement this article well: http://cryptologie.net/article/270/the-logjam-attack/ http://cryptologie.net/article/270/the-logjam-attack/