4 ms·

You also should account for the fact that coaches are often considering more than just points, and beyond that are often just irrational. Coaches should go for

by aggie 11y ago

You also should account for the fact that coaches are often considering more than just points, and beyond that are often just irrational. Coaches should go for it on 4th-and-short more often than they do, but getting stopped on 4th down is demoralizing and makes the coach look foolish, which shifts their decision-making. Getting stopped on a 2-pt. conversion might also reflect poorly on the coach, so they are averse to calling that play even if it is statistically the right move. I find this psychological side of coaching very interesting, and sports are a great venue for examining the psychology of decision-making. A great example of outcome-bias is the sports world's reaction to the Seahawks decision to throw the ball at the goal line in last year's Super Bowl. I would argue it was the proper decision as it maximized their chances of winning the game (it allowed them time for one passing play and two running plays, as opposed to just two running plays). Unfortunately for them, a very low percentage outcome occurred (interception), and that outcome has strongly biased how the play call has been judged.

meatysnapper 11y ago
The criticism of the play is that Marshawn Lynch nearly always is able to gain yardage with heavy contact. If you have a running back that is able to do this, and do this consistently, why would not go for the run?
- deleted 11y ago
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- aggie 11y ago
  Lynch is a great power runner, but even he is not automatic to score on two attempts. If I remember right, he was actually 0/4 on the year inside the 2 yard line. If the Seahawks throw an incomplete pass on 2nd down, they have time left for two running plays. If they run on 2nd down and don't score, they only have time for one more running play. So by passing on 2nd down they get an extra play. Since it would leave them with the same 2 chances to run with Lynch, the 2nd down play can be judged in isolation: the upside is a chance at a touchdown (win the game), the downside is the risk of a turnover (lose the game). I am making these numbers up, but that is probably a 30-50% shot at a touchdown and a low single digit percentage of a turnover. Worth it. To expand on the fateful play itself, the odds of an interception on a short inside slant with a screen are very low. Browner jammed his receiver effectively which allowed Butler to sell out on jumping the route and then somehow hold on to the ball. Amazing awareness/preparation and flawless execution by the Patriots. Russell Wilson also lead Ricardo Lockette (his receiver) just a bit too much with the throw and Lockette doesn't break up Butler's interception as hard as he could have. If any one of these things doesn't happen, it's probably a touchdown or at worst an incomplete pass. It brings up another interesting question: many say Belichick was foolish for not calling a timeout to save a bit of time for a desperation drive. But you could also argue he was trying to put the pressure on Seattle and bait them into a bad play call. I think he got lucky. So really, he was the one who made the bad decision, not Carroll/Bevell/Wilson. Once again, outcome bias.
Someone 11y ago
"coaches are [...] often just irrational. Coaches should go for it on 4th-and-short more often than they do, but getting stopped on 4th down is demoralizing" If it is demoralizing enough, and the game (or the season, if being demoralized has a long enough half-life) still has plenty of time to go, that may mean the coaches are acting rational by not playing the short-term better option. Extreme example: suppose a missed two-point conversion makes your team become absolutely worthless for the rest of the game. If so, you probably shouldn't go for a 2-point conversion at 6-0 in front with 30 minutes to play, even if its success rate is 95%.

by aggie 11y ago

meatysnapper 11y ago

The criticism of the play is that Marshawn Lynch nearly always is able to gain yardage with heavy contact. If you have a running back that is able to do this, and do this consistently, why would not go for the run?

deleted 11y ago
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aggie 11y ago
Lynch is a great power runner, but even he is not automatic to score on two attempts. If I remember right, he was actually 0/4 on the year inside the 2 yard line. If the Seahawks throw an incomplete pass on 2nd down, they have time left for two running plays. If they run on 2nd down and don't score, they only have time for one more running play. So by passing on 2nd down they get an extra play. Since it would leave them with the same 2 chances to run with Lynch, the 2nd down play can be judged in isolation: the upside is a chance at a touchdown (win the game), the downside is the risk of a turnover (lose the game). I am making these numbers up, but that is probably a 30-50% shot at a touchdown and a low single digit percentage of a turnover. Worth it. To expand on the fateful play itself, the odds of an interception on a short inside slant with a screen are very low. Browner jammed his receiver effectively which allowed Butler to sell out on jumping the route and then somehow hold on to the ball. Amazing awareness/preparation and flawless execution by the Patriots. Russell Wilson also lead Ricardo Lockette (his receiver) just a bit too much with the throw and Lockette doesn't break up Butler's interception as hard as he could have. If any one of these things doesn't happen, it's probably a touchdown or at worst an incomplete pass. It brings up another interesting question: many say Belichick was foolish for not calling a timeout to save a bit of time for a desperation drive. But you could also argue he was trying to put the pressure on Seattle and bait them into a bad play call. I think he got lucky. So really, he was the one who made the bad decision, not Carroll/Bevell/Wilson. Once again, outcome bias.

Someone 11y ago

"coaches are [...] often just irrational. Coaches should go for it on 4th-and-short more often than they do, but getting stopped on 4th down is demoralizing" If it is demoralizing enough, and the game (or the season, if being demoralized has a long enough half-life) still has plenty of time to go, that may mean the coaches are acting rational by not playing the short-term better option. Extreme example: suppose a missed two-point conversion makes your team become absolutely worthless for the rest of the game. If so, you probably shouldn't go for a 2-point conversion at 6-0 in front with 30 minutes to play, even if its success rate is 95%.