It depends on the size of the RSA key. With LogJam TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is likely weaker; with TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA the client essentially m

It depends on the size of the RSA key. With LogJam TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is likely weaker; with TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA the client essentially makes up the shared secret, encrypts it using RSA and sends it to the server [1]. That exchange simultaneously establishes the session key and authenticates the server. With DHE, the Diffie-Helman exponent math is what establishes the shared secret, and if the DH prime is broken, then the shared secret can be derived by a MITM. The public DH parameters are sent in the plain, so a MITM can just observe them. A hash of those parameters is signed using RSA, so they can't be changed, but that's not important to defeating forward secrecy. So if if the RSA key is bigger than ~1024 bits, then TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is likely weaker. [1] There is some further derivation done to get the actually session key, but that's not relevant here.