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Venom – A security vulnerability in virtual floppy drive code
- fulafel 12y agoFrom Q&A: "Q: How is this different from previous VM escape vulnerabilities? A: Most VM escape vulnerabilities discovered in the past were only exploitable in non-default configurations or in configurations that wouldn’t be used in secured environments. Other VM escape vulnerabilities only applied to a single virtualization platform, or didn’t directly allow for arbitrary code execution." Edit: Xen advisory: http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-133.html http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-133.html
- brohee 12y agoAmazon states that AWS is not vulnerable, no details but presumably they patched before the public disclosure. https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/XSA_Security_Advisory_CVE_2015_3456/ https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/XSA_Secur...
- sneak 12y agoWe're all equal, but some are more equal than others. This is the endgame of your so-called "responsible disclosure". Those with profit loss exposure win, and the peasants get it whenever the PR company is done making the logo and infographics.
- ihsw 12y agoIt is a necessary evil, no need for the rhetoric. Profit and PR are hardly the goal here -- community awareness and public safety are paramount. Vulnerabilities need to be obviated to the general populace at large.
- Anderkent 12y agoHow is it bad that large providers have an opportunity to patch before the vulnerability is released to the wild? Maybe next you'll insist that everyone's prevented from patching for a week after disclosure so that smaller companies that don't have the resources to react immediately are not unfairly left behind?
- sneak 12y agoI'm not insisting anything. I'm just saying that lack of immediate and full disclosure is essentially crony capitalism where there are the Big Important Companies That Must Be Protected and then there is everybody else, including small startups and private individuals. It is fundamentally unfair, and sets up a non-level playing field. (inb4 "critical infrastructure")
- res0nat0r 12y agoI think it is even simpler than that: The big companies that have thousands of customers doing millions of dollars of business on hundreds of thousands of machines need more time to patch because their is much more money / business to be lost. Not giving large companies time to patch would do more harm than good in the end. It is fundamentally unfair, and is perfectly reasonable.
- oldmanjay 12y agoWhy, might I ask, is fairness required? I'll stipulate that you're correct about said fairness although I could dispute that pretty easily
- sneak 12y agoYou seem to have twisted my "tell everyone and let the fittest survive and thrive" into some weird Harrison Bergeron thing which is the exact opposite of my point.
- sneak 12y agoTo answer your question directly, it is bad because it gives them a massive unfair advantage over their smaller competitors. It favors incumbents versus favoring efficiency.
- duaneb 12y agoAnd the alternative?
- sneak 12y agoTell the entire market the information you have and let them do with it as they will, versus telling your friends first and letting everyone else go to hell.
- fche 12y agoAs long as those friends don't misuse the information (spreading it to blackhats), what's the difference? If it's "hell" for everyone else on day N, it would be "hell" for everyone on day 0.
- cthalupa 12y agoYou do not have to be a large company to get on the Xen pre-disclosure list. http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html ---------- Public hosting providers; Large-scale organisational users of Xen; Vendors of Xen-based systems; Distributors of operating systems with Xen support. Here "provider", "vendor", and "distributor" is meant to include anyone who is making a genuine service, available to the public, whether for a fee or gratis. For projects providing a service for a fee, the rule of thumb of "genuine" is that you are offering services which people are purchasing. For gratis projects, the rule of thumb for "genuine" is measured in terms of the amount of time committed to providing the service. For instance, a software project which has 2-3 active developers, each of whom spend 3-4 hours per week doing development, is very likely to be accepted; whereas a project with a single developer who spends a few hours a month will most likey be rejected. ---------- Basically, if you provide a service to the public which uses Xen (Not restricted on size), or use Xen at large scale internally, you can get on the list. There are several small hosting providers that utilize Xen on that list. Presumably if you use Xen at small scale internally you're less worried about security vulnerabilities as it is only your employees with root access to the machines - if external users have root access, you probably fall under one of the other definitions.
- oasisbob 12y agoOr, AWS takes steps to mitigate their exposure, regardless of whether or not they receive embargoed disclosures. On the Rackspace public cloud I've been through three full-fleet reboot cycles so far. Only one of those affected AWS customers, and AWS handled it in such a way that only a portion of their fleet was affected. How could AWS do this when Rackspace and others couldn't? For one, they could stratify guest placement based on instance type and guest OS. (Which I hear they do.) Most recent XSAs have only affected PV or HVM guests, not both. If you keep PV and HVM guests separate ... AWS seems to be an example of good engineering, not an example of the perils of capitalism.
- jeswin 12y agoIt would have been reassuring if they disclosed whether they were vulnerable earlier, and if it required a patch to be installed.
- rlpb 12y agoThe vulnerability is in floppy drive emulator code. It isn't clear to me whether all users are vulnerable or only hosts that have floppy drive devices defined [in their guests] are vulnerable. If the latter, perhaps Amazon was never vulnerable anyway?
- mhayden 12y agoThe exploit affects VM's whether or not they have a floppy controller or disk attached.
- duaneb 12y agoIf I were amazon, I would have done an audit of the hyperv software and removed the floppy driver code entirely if unused for precisely this reason. This strikes me as a basic, "no-brainer" hardening step for my billion dollar(s) hosting business.
- jpgvm 12y agoThey use Xen, not Hyper-V and yes they already remove/replace large portions of Xen.
- justincormack 12y agoTheir PV domains are not affected anyway. Quite possibly they are running qemu in stub domains for HVM as well, rather than on dom0, but you may well be right about the floppy code too.
- brohee 12y agoThe disclosure states that due to another bug, even floppy less hosts were vulnerable...
- cesarb 12y agoOr perhaps they're using a custom-compiled Xen without the vulnerable floppy disk emulation.
- drzaiusapelord 12y agoI'm guessing this. Why even make floppy emulation available? It has no use cases on AWS. Floppy support only exists really for Windows driver install at install time, if you can't slipstream the driver in. They probably tore out a lot of stuff while developing the EC2 infrastructure.
- tgeek 12y agoMore likely this. AWS has at numerous talks mentioned a slightly franken-xen fork of Xen.
- jsabo 12y agoAs other people mentioned, it seems more likely that they're running a Xen fork or have some other mitigation. The redhat notes state that once the host is patched, the VMs need to be shut down for it to take effect: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-0998.html https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-0998.html
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- mariusz79 12y ago"You've been smoking something really mind altering, and I think you should share it. x86 virtualization is about basically placing another nearly full kernel, full of new bugs, on top of a nasty x86 architecture which barely has correct page protection. Then running your operating system on the other side of this brand new pile of shit." The rest of the rant is here: http://www.electricmonk.nl/log/2007/10/25/virtualization-security/ http://www.electricmonk.nl/log/2007/10/25/virtualization-sec...
- agentultra 12y agoFrom the same article: > Theo de Raadt's problem is that he views security the way cryptography experts view cyphers: as an absolute. But security isn't like math. It's not absolute. There are right and wrong ways of doing security. Not an absolute but there is a right and wrong way to "do security?" To be fair Boender is attacking the naive maxim that "virtualization is secure." It's just another layer if you isolate processes inside of virtualized run-time environments. Makes sense... it's not snake oil. However there is no need for "right" and "wrong" in these discussions. The security of any given system exists in a continuum and it will only be a matter of time before the next vulnerability is discovered. I get the sense that all we can do is limit the damage that can be done by any particular system. It seems that virtualization is just one path towards providing those limits just as chroot and other attempts have been. I'm most interested in seeing how jitsu and unikernels can turn the tables... not only can a process be wrapped in a virtualization layer but it is short lived and only runs when it is requested. It puts the onus on us to set up the summoner properly and provide safe-guards... but it's just another layer of complexity for attackers to manage.
- avsm 12y ago> I'm most interested in seeing how jitsu and unikernels can turn the tables The useful aspect about the MirageOS unikernels is that they use the pure Xen PV interface, which has almost no dependency on qemu. No floppy or block/net emulation, timers through the direct Xen shared_info page, and generally as "native" to x86 as Xen permits.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- specto 12y agoVenom... really... ugh
- jessaustin 12y agoWhere's G.I. Joe when we need him?
- rlpb 12y agoSince the vulnerability is in floppy drive emulator code, it isn't clear to me whether all deployments are vulnerable or only hosts that have floppy drive devices defined in their guests are vulnerable. Can someone please clarify?
- corv 12y ago"For many of the affected virtualization products, a virtual floppy drive is added to new virtual machines by default. And on Xen and QEMU, even if the administrator explicitly disables the virtual floppy drive, an unrelated bug causes the vulnerable FDC code to remain active and exploitable by attackers."
- mcintyre1994 12y agoFrom the FAQ: > For many of the affected virtualization products, a virtual floppy drive is added to new virtual machines by default. And on Xen and QEMU, even if the administrator explicitly disables the virtual floppy drive, an unrelated bug causes the vulnerable FDC code to remain active and exploitable by attackers. So I guess for KVM you're safe if you don't have a virtual floppy drive, unclear whether it's KVM default though. For the others, you're still vulnerable by an unrelated bug.
- rwmj 12y agoA simpler, less breathless description from the Red Hat BZ[1] An out-of-bounds memory access flaw was found in the way QEMU's virtual Floppy Disk Controller (FDC) handled FIFO buffer access while processing certain FDC commands. A privileged guest user could use this flaw to crash the guest or, potentially, execute arbitrary code on the host with the privileges of the hosting QEMU process. If you're using RHEL, then SELinux further confines the qemu process so although you can run arbitrary code in there (which is very bad) you cannot access any files on the host filesystem except ones which qemu has open. Also libvirt runs qemu as a separate user, and further confines it with some cgroups rules. Depending on the version of RHEL, seccomp may be involved too, which limits the type of syscalls that qemu can make. Applying the qemu fix is still highly recommended of course. [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1218611 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1218611
- drzaiusapelord 12y ago>Floppy Disk Controller (FDC) Why isn't legacy junk like this disabled by default? How many people need a floppy disk controller? There's something scary about how legacy compatible a lot of FOSS projects are. It just raises the attack surface and leads to stuff like this.
- dsr_ 12y agoThe article says that even if you turned off the option, Xen and QEMU have a bug which doesn't actually do that. Arguing about defaults requires a step back to policy level, which is something for which many projects have trouble finding time and attention.
- drzaiusapelord 12y ago>The article says that even if you turned off the option, Xen and QEMU have a bug which doesn't actually do that. Incompetence on top of incompetence doesn't invalidate my argument. Minimizing your attack surface should be the norm, unfortunately here on HN it just leads to downvotes.
- gvb 12y ago[...] security vulnerability in the virtual floppy drive code [...] For many of the affected virtualization products, a virtual floppy drive is added to new virtual machines by default. That is a pretty simple mitigation. Make sure there are no (unnecessary) virtual floppy devices defined in your VMs. I checked my VMs (Ubuntu/KVM) and, as expected, none of them have a virtual floppy - they are not added by default on that platform.
- muppetman 12y agoYou didn't read much of the page :) To quote: "For many of the affected virtualization products, a virtual floppy drive is added to new virtual machines by default. And on Xen and QEMU, even if the administrator explicitly disables the virtual floppy drive, an unrelated bug causes the vulnerable FDC code to remain active and exploitable by attackers."
- bonzini 12y agoThey don't have a virtual floppy drive, but they do have a virtual floppy drive _controller_.
- orf 12y agoI don't like this trend of "marketing vulnerabilities" with a cute name and a startup-looking landing page. That entire page says nothing about the actual issue, the nice looking graphic just shows how this exploit (and really any exploit like this?) can give attackers access to things outside of a VM. Duh.
- dantillberg 12y agoIt makes sense for the ones that require mass mobilization and mass education to fix. This vulnerability isn't quite that... there are relatively fewer people managing VM infrastructure, and this only affects certain types of VMs. That said, it's really hard to market security companies in ways that represent the hard work that they do, in ways that are not all snake oil and spin. So it's hard to blame folks for trying to turn excellent security investigative work into self-promotional opportunities. (Edits: clarity and trying not to sound judgmental of the parent comment)
- dmix 12y ago> require mass mobilization and mass education to fix Except that Crowdstrike is heavily involved in 'threat intelligence' so this isn't really about patching vulnerabilities at the technical level but educating non-technical executives on threats and 'threat actors'. So corporate execs can be handed a dossier of recent events, like they were the US President evaluating their national security policy. The only problem is that threat intelligence has marginal value, as infosec changes so rapidly and is so diverse, so at the end of the day it is very much simply emotional gratification - that Crowdstrike delivers at a very high price. In terms of resource utilization, it doesn't seem like a good use of time/money to obsess over each bug as if it were an atypical event in a slow moving enviornment. But hey if it gets a few people at the top to start caring about security, maybe there is some value... I just hope it doesn't result in execs nagging the infosec team for updates on 'venom' and disrupting their work on real security measures for the company by focusing on the latest hot topic.
- butwhy 12y agoWhy don't you like this trend? I don't see the harm. Also, the FAQ explains a lot; including the details of how the vulnerability works.
- alricb 12y agoThe missing reset of the fifo is in one of the handlers defined at http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=hw/block/fdc.c;hb=24a5c62cfe3cbe3fb4722f79661b9900a2579316#l1918 http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=hw/block/fdc.c;hb=2... fdctrl_stop_transfer() might be one of the incriminated functions.
- thrownaway2424 12y agoI like how I had to read 100 comments on Hacker News to learn this information. Vulnerability disclosure just isn't what it used to be.
- LnxPrgr3 12y agoA shame, too, because there's a (small, admittedly) lesson buried in the fix--one that can be applied even in low-level languages. If you have a buffer with odd semantics (such as wrapping out-of-bounds addresses back into bounds), it should probably be wrapped in something that enforces that. In C++, it could be made to look like a normal buffer, except that operator[] is overloaded to wrap for you, and you can make the compiler scream at you if you try to escape that safety net--for an inline class, very likely without any performance cost over adding the wrapping computation to each access by hand. In C, your options are more limited. The safest is an opaque handle that has to be passed to an accessor function. You're more likely to take a performance hit (unless LTO fixes it for you), but in a floppy drive emulator, I doubt it matters. If the overhead does matter, a macro or static inline function still makes the access convention easier to memorize, which should make it less likely for someone to forget, and should make code that does forget more suspicious on code review.
- breakingcups 12y agoThe diff is literaly linked in the article.
- thrownaway2424 12y agoThe original site, and my comment, are from 9 days ago. The linked diff is from 7 days ago.
- rolandr 12y agoGiven the complexity of QEMU and its pace of development, there is likely an endless supply of such bugs for punching through the QEMU emulation layer. The problem is that most of the time, the QEMU process is running in dom0, giving an attacker an opportunity to hijack the hypervisor. Xen offers a more general solution for this: running QEMU in a stub domain. The main problem with that solution right now is that Xen forked QEMU such that the stub domain only supports running QEMU 0.10 or such - the up-to-date version of QEMU (known in Xen as qemu-upstream) is somewhere around 2.2, but it runs the emulation layer as a process in dom0, which exposes the system as a whole to "VENOM" and related attacks on QEMU.
- justincormack 12y agoI know there are people at Xen working on getting upstream qemu working in a stub domain. Hopefully there will be some more urgency now...
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- chriswarbo 12y agoI think this serves as a good example of minimising one's attack surface. The exploit is in the floppy disk controller, of a virtual machine, in an era when almost no physical machine includes a floppy disk drive, and those entering the field might never have seen a floppy disk other than the "File -> Save" icon; plus the exploit can be triggered even when the FDC is disabled. Certainly a sobering thought for those using large, feature-filled applications 'just in case' some feature might be needed in the future.
- TazeTSchnitzel 12y agoYeah, it's bizarre how, in 2015, virtual machines often have floppy disk and CD-ROM drives and serial and parallel ports by default.
- paulfurtado 12y agoTo be fair, serial ports are actually really important and while we frequently don't have physical serial ports anymore, tons of devices still use serial emulation because it is such a simple technology to understand and the hard parts of the protocols are done in userland rather than drivers. For managing virtual machines, it's more surprising that we give VMs VGA devices rather than just using serial: when using VGA emulation, you cannot trivially write code that reads text on the VM's screen, but if you configure the VM to use a serial console, you can trivially write a program which controls the VM. In a libvirt-managed qemu environment when the OS has its serial console enabled, you can run "virsh console MyVM" and instantly start executing commands and parsing their output. You can also have the OS write its log to serial so that if the OS crashes you can still read the full log. When all else fails, serial still works. Additionally, a virtual VGA device has an infinitely larger attack surface than a serial device. When doing unattended windows installs, a lot of people use floppy drives to store the Autounattend.xml file. Floppy disk images are the most trivial and smallest images for automation tools to create. They're additionally useful for placing a linux bootloader on to boot a linux install CD with command line parameters. Most people still use CD-ROM images to install operating systems, and it's basically required for windows. Virtual machine management software also tends to use the cd drive to install guest tools since it's the easiest way to let the guest see large files from outside the VM - nearly every OS can read CDs.
- locacorten 12y agoThere's no need for the floppy device code to be running in the VMM. Researchers have pointed this out for a long time: Eurosys 2012: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2168851 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2168851
- commentnull 12y agoCode reuse is great, unless it is Qemu?
- wmf 12y agoOr OpenSSL, or bash... If there's a solution to this problem, I don't know what it is. Trying to replace an underfunded monoculture with severely underfunded diverse implementations may not even work and may actually reduce security.
- sneak 12y agoBackronyms are lame, whether they are USA-PATRIOT or VENOM. Why does it need to be an acronym? Just name it.
- muraiki 12y agoCan someone help me understand something? If a VM has no attached floppy drive, is it still vulnerable? The site says that disabling a virtual floppy drive is not enough, but if there's no floppy drive at all is that still a problem? "For many of the affected virtualization products, a virtual floppy drive is added to new virtual machines by default. And on Xen and QEMU, even if the administrator explicitly disables the virtual floppy drive, an unrelated bug causes the vulnerable FDC code to remain active and exploitable by attackers." Edit: This comment seems to indicate that even lacking a virtual floppy drive, the floppy drive controller is still present and thus the system is vulnerable: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9539191 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9539191
- Cacti 12y agoThis is up to the VM provider. I haven't seen a list yet except that this doesn't affect VirtualBox (if no floppy is mounted, the exploit is not possible). One would expect though that there is no issue if a floppy drive is not attached, and hope that there is not a separate security hole to mount a floppy from sandboxed code (unlikely).
- ponytech 12y agoIs VirtualBox affected? It is not mentionned
- jsabo 12y agoOther articles mention virtualbox is affected: http://www.zdnet.com/article/venom-security-flaw-millions-of-virtual-machines-datacenters/ http://www.zdnet.com/article/venom-security-flaw-millions-of... Oracle, which develops VirtualBox, said in an emailed statement that the company was "aware" of the problem, and fixed the code, adding that it will release a maintenance update soon. "We will release a VirtualBox 4.3 maintenance release very soon. Apart from this, only a limited amount of users should be affected as the floppy device emulation is disabled for most of the standard virtual machine configurations," said software lead Frank Mehnert.
- fl0wenol 12y agoThe specific vulnerability and the fix: https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/e907746266721f305d67bc07...
- dogma1138 12y agoSeriously every vulnerability will have it's own cool name and a website now? Even this? Not a single vendor has classified this as even critical. Yes like all security vulnerabilities it should be taken seriously, but when every clown out there goes all heart bleed on you for every security vulnerability they find because it's the smart marketing move today you stop taking them seriously which in the end is counter productive to this whole "raising awareness" BS they are trying to do....;
- AgentME 12y agoA VM escape vulnerability is pretty serious as vulnerabilities go!
- dogma1138 12y agoI don't disagree, however with no actual exploit (in the wild or POC according to RH), no confirmation of the ability to execute code on the actual host, so yes important but doesn't really justify the whole name and landing page ordeal. Not because it's not important, but because it just desensitizes the whole impact of vulnerabilities the caliber of Heartbleed or Shellshock which did affect a large chunk of the servers and machines connected to the internet at the time. Now they claim it's bigger than heartbleed, but with no exploit, and no clear statement on what actual in use implementations are affected, Amazon already have came out saying that VENOM has never affected their implementation of Xen, if Digital Ocean and Rackspace come out with the same statement it just makes this whole "bigger than HB stance" is silly. And as far as the corporate/enterprise world goes, well VMware, CISCO, and MSFT hypervisors have a much bigger share out there and their hypervisors are not affected so again no much of a bite there.
- DINKDINK 12y ago>Seriously every vulnerability will have it's own cool name and a website now? is your argument that awareness of this issue would have been better if there wasn't a cool name and website?
- dogma1138 12y ago
- tomc1985 12y agoGetting really tired of these slick vuln websites....
- technicalfault 12y agoI'm happy to report that we've completely patched our BigV cloud platform in four hours without needing customers to reboot http://forum.bytemark.co.uk/t/venom-new-vulnerability-affecting-bigv-and-legacy-vms-cve-2015-3456/2255/6?u=joshr http://forum.bytemark.co.uk/t/venom-new-vulnerability-affect...
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- jgome 12y ago> How do I protect myself from the VENOM vulnerability? > If you administer a system running Xen, KVM, or the native QEMU client, review and apply the latest patches developed to address this vulnerability. > If you have a vendor service or device using one of the affected hypervisors, contact the vendor’s support team to see if their staff has applied the latest VENOM patches. Or you could, you know, search for "qemu disable floppy" in google, read a bit and apply this flag to the VM: qemu -global isa-fdc.driveA= or -nodefaults to only enable the devices you want to enable... https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2013-02/msg00434.html https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2013-02/msg004...
- hackcasual 12y ago"And on Xen and QEMU, even if the administrator explicitly disables the virtual floppy drive, an unrelated bug causes the vulnerable FDC code to remain active and exploitable by attackers."
- jgome 12y agoYeah, sorry, I wrote whatever came to my mind before reading everything...
- gtirloni 12y agoNowadays security research looks like a lot of extra work. Having to do the research and also think about a logo, website design, choice of colors, pretty diagrams, a cool name, social media interaction, market research to make sure all that isn't too similar to previous bugs. Eww!
- eyeareque 12y agoSo much marketing. It's sort of hard to take these companies seriously. Couldn't you just disable the floppy device in the vm?
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- TazeTSchnitzel 12y agoIf you'd read the OP before commenting, you'd know the answer. (No.)
- donjaxon 12y agoVirtualBox is affected in a different/partial way. Summary: Patch to 4.3.28, released today. The vulnerability is not mentioned explicitly in the change log. It only shows up as one of 32 bullet points "Floppy: several fixes". The actual changes are recorded only as "2015-05-08 12:58 Changeset in vbox [55753] by vboxsync: FDC: Fixed DRIVE SPECIFICATION command". The fixed file from the QEMU project is: http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=hw/block/fdc.c;h=f72a39216347e722496797555db9f208b0c5b4b2 http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=hw/block/fdc.c;h=f7... VirtualBox's equivalent file is: https://www.virtualbox.org/browser/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/Devices/Storage/DevFdc.cpp https://www.virtualbox.org/browser/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/Devic... There were some changes related to command buffers five days ago by Frank, but they only address FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND (in a slightly different way than QEMU's developers did it). The VirtualBox source code diffs are at: https://www.virtualbox.org/changeset/55753/vbox https://www.virtualbox.org/changeset/55753/vbox Compare to the QEMU diffs at: http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=e907746266721... The vulnerability does not affect the current VirtualBox FD_CMD_READ_ID or the versions of the file going way. Maybe because it might have been forked as far back as 2003? Crowdstrike did point out that the vulnerability was present from 2004. But the vulnerability manifests in two bugs, one of which appears to affect VirtualBox and the other not.
- andrewchambers 12y agoThis is serious, but not that bad. First you need to actually get code running on the VM in the first place.
- yaniksilver 12y agoCloudways provide three cloud infrastructure providers to host applications. We asked our point of contact with Amazon AWS, Google Compute Engine and DigitalOcean and here is what they respond. DigitalOcean (DO): Being Patched. (The DO staff are busy in rolling out security updates. The patch will automatically be applied on DO servers inside Cloudways Platform.) Amazon Web Service: Officially confirmed to be Safe. Google Compute Engine: Officially confirmed to be Safe. (A Google representative informed Cloudways, “Google Cloud Platform was never vulnerable to this flaw. We do not use the vulnerable software.”) http://www.cloudways.com/blog/venom-vulnerability/ http://www.cloudways.com/blog/venom-vulnerability/