11 ms·
The Little MAC Attack
- oldmanjay 12y ago> (!= is nerd for Not Equal.) made me laugh out loud. how many not-nerds would have made it that far?
- ekimekim 12y agoI could feasibly see a mathematician understanding all this but not being familiar with that symbol, which is mostly used in programming (math prefers a ≠ b instead of a != b).
- oldmanjay 12y agogood point, I paid more attention to the code listing than anything else so in retrospect, I hadn't really considered that.
- dakami 12y agoIt's the crazy little things that people don't understand. You can't spell tax, without syntax.
- dakami 12y agoEr, syntax without tax. ANYWAY
- sdevlin 12y ago> And yet. This is novel No. EDIT: I've been told to elaborate. This is just direct fallout from the way Merkle-Damgard hash functions work. MD hash functions look like this: function MD(C, h, M): M <- pad(M) for m in blocks(M): h <- C(h, m) return h The core of an MD hash is the compression function C, which takes an input state h and a message block m and produces a new state. When you find a collision in an MD hash function, you're really finding a collision in C. That is, some state h and some pair of message blocks m1 and m2 such that C(h, m1) = C(h, m2). Now, HMAC. HMAC is defined over a hash function, and it looks like this: function HMAC(H, k, M): k1 <- ipad ^ k k2 <- opad ^ k return H(k2 || H(k1 || M)) Where "||" is the concatenation operator. A simplified view of HMAC is that the key is used to scramble the initial state of H. This prevents the attacker from finding collisions on the inner hash function, because they don't know any interior state h. (The outer hash prevents length-extension attacks.) Which makes this article pretty silly: the whole point of HMAC is that the attacker doesn't get to know interior hash states. It pretty much goes without saying that if a) an attacker can find collisions on H for arbitrary states h and b) they know some interior state h of the HMAC, then it follows directly that they can find collisions on the HMAC. Hey, want to see some more practical "attacks" on HMAC? Here we go! In [11]: HMAC(b'\x00', b'chili dog', sha256).hexdigest() Out[11]: '3128a12ed7dd6cd4ad9d2720126698d1c0c3e2d991ddbf73ebbecd947581acd9' In [12]: HMAC(b'\x00\x00', b'chili dog', sha256).hexdigest() Out[12]: '3128a12ed7dd6cd4ad9d2720126698d1c0c3e2d991ddbf73ebbecd947581acd9' Whoaaa, what?! Again! In [17]: HMAC(sha256(b'A'*500).digest(), b'chili dog', sha256).hexdigest() Out[17]: '426b6ec9b0e6b5fae9d12924432c023e8bc3444aa3adc4c48fdc875357c54c2f' In [18]: HMAC(b'A'*500, b'chili dog', sha256).hexdigest() Out[18]: '426b6ec9b0e6b5fae9d12924432c023e8bc3444aa3adc4c48fdc875357c54c2f' Oh nooo! HMAC!
- sarciszewski 12y agoI especially like the second one, because it's less obvious even to someone used to breaking apps with null bytes. :)
- sdevlin 12y agoThe two collision examples I used both rely on the key expansion step in HMAC, which I glossed over in my explanation. If you go look up the HMAC spec, it should be pretty clear why these work.
- sarciszewski 12y agoI recall someone (maybe solardiz) commenting on this property of the HMAC spec a few months back. It's not something I would have expected.
- dakami 12y agoYeah, a message less than blocksize bytes is padded with 0's, and a message greater than blocksize bytes is hashed to blocksize bytes. It "follows" just as much as Little MAC, is about as security relevant, and is no less clever (arguably a bit more).
- tptacek 12y agoCan you be a little more specific about the cleverness you're referring to here?
- dakami 12y agoSure! HMAC keys are exactly one block long. But lets say an app wants to have a key that's two blocks long. No big deal, hash that app key and now two is one. Ah, but now let's say the attacker has control of input keys. He can provide both the two block key which HMAC will hash for him, or he can do the work himself and prehash the two into one. Now two different input keys seem to provide the same output (assuming identical messages, of course). Clever, no likely security impact.
- mckiddy 12y agoIf you know the HMAC key, why would you ever need to generate a collision? You can just reevaluate the MAC and replace the old one.
- tptacek 12y agoYup. "This almost certainly doesn’t have any security impact, but I’m happy(ish) to be proved wrong." There's a few words I'd remove from that sentence, I guess.
- sdevlin 12y agoSNARK REDACTED
- tptacek 12y agoSee this kind of snark is usually what gets 'pbsd to come out of the shadows and smack me down. Your turn this time!
- sarciszewski 12y agoI think it's because you're not wrong here. :D
- jessaustin 12y agoI think the point was that if some dumb protocol were misusing HMAC (and I'm not good enough at thinking about protocols to imagine how it might do so), it could be vulnerable to collisions generated this way.
- tptacek 12y agoThe point of the parent commenter is that a misuse of HMAC that gives attackers knowledge of the key admits much simpler attacks than this.