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OK, then, if you insist on a point-by-point rebuttal: - CT logs will play a role. Requires CA cooperation, and therefore government cooperation because the la
by amalcon 11y ago
OK, then, if you insist on a point-by-point rebuttal:
- CT logs will play a role.
Requires CA cooperation, and therefore government cooperation because the largest CAs are owned by governments.
- Nuking egregiously bad CAs will play a role.
This can only be done for small (i.e. non government owned) CAs, or you create the perception that your browser does not work.
- The adoption of new cheap/free CAs like LetsEncrypt will play a role.
This solves a real problem, but a different problem than this.
- Certificate pinning and HPKP will play a role.
This only helps in two cases: sites I use often and widespread attacks. Widespread HTTPS MITM is detectable anyway.
- tptacek 11y agoLarge CAs, including Symantec, are already cooperating with CT. CAs will enroll in CT because if they don't, they won't be able to sell higher-value products (like the EV bar) to their users. The problems with DNSSEC seem so obvious to me, and, obviously, I have problems taking pro-DNSSEC arguments seriously. I'm curious though; you sound plenty smart. What is it about DNSSEC that you actually like?
- amalcon 11y agoOh, don't get me wrong: I actually like absolutely nothing about DNSSEC. I just don't think "It has a worse security model than HTTPS" is a true statement. I think smart people need to keep working on the authentication problem, because we clearly have not solved it yet -- including with DNSSEC.
- yuhong 11y agoYea, I have been thinking about a DNSSEC2 that would for example uses online signing for a while now, in addition to things like DNSCurve/DNSCrypt.
- idlewords 11y agoThat first case ("sites I use often") seems like a pretty big win. I want my browser crying holy murder if my bank or webmail cert suddenly changes.
- amalcon 11y agoYes it is, which is why it's a good idea. Such a good idea, in fact, that OpenSSH security in practice relies on it! It still won't stop someone who really wants to compromise you, which means that you still will need to trust CAs from time to time.