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In the book "The Stragegy of Conflict" Thomas Schelling proposes accidental launches as a form of "randomised threats" which let you position yourself in betwee
by michaelt 12y ago
In the book "The Stragegy of Conflict" Thomas Schelling proposes accidental launches as a form of "randomised threats" which let you position yourself in between "I certainly won't launch" (not a threat) and "I certainly will launch" (not a credible threat, as not rational due to MAD)
A Washington Post article [1] describes it like so:
So you're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal -- threatening to push him off the cliff -- would doom you both?
Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win.
So in the Cuban missile crisis accidental launches, not intentional launches, are what the Russians are threatened with. And when designing a nuclear deterrent, it's actually useful if the failsafes aren't 100% reliable - if a rogue general sets your nuclear launch code to all zeros [2] and they make sure the Russians find out about it, that's actually a good thing.
[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/AR2005101101336.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10...
[2] https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/12/11/for-nearly-20-years-the-launch-code-for-us-nuclear-missiles-was-00000000/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/12/11/for-nearly-20-ye...