FWIW, this is a touchy subject for a lot of fans of capability-based security because the story of capabilities goes something like this: 1960s-1970s: Capabili

FWIW, this is a touchy subject for a lot of fans of capability-based security because the story of capabilities goes something like this: 1960s-1970s: Capability-based security invented, popularized, widely used, almost makes it into hardware (Intel 432). 1980s-1990s: People incorrectly redefine capabilities in various ways (e.g. as verbs rather than nouns), then declare "capability-based security doesn't work" based on these misunderstandings (see the paper I linked). Capability systems find they have trouble making headway against these misconceptions, as the difference between the misconceived version and what capabilities really are are just subtle enough to confuse anyone who isn't immersed in it. (Meanwhile, the basic ideas of capabilities live on as object-oriented programming, but aren't enforced strictly enough to be called "security".) 2000s-2010s: People start realizing that capabilities as originally defined do in fact work ridiculously well and they become re-accepted. We really don't want to go backwards again. :/