Based on what I've skimmed, which is admittedly not that much, I'd bet the author spends most of the book making mind projection fallacies like this one: > whi

Based on what I've skimmed, which is admittedly not that much, I'd bet the author spends most of the book making mind projection fallacies like this one: > while we can easily recognize a familiar face, we cannot describe that face precisely enough to enable someone unfamiliar with it to recognize it as easily as we do (see pp. 110–111). Thus, when we know a face, we possess a type of knowledge that cannot be expressed as methods or rules. We can readily use this knowledge, but we cannot explain how we do it. What this means is that the only way to acquire this knowledge is by allowing it to develop in our mind; we cannot acquire it by learning some facts. [...] > [...] > For a phenomenon that is a complex structure, the only exact representation is the phenomenon itself. Here the human inability to directly introspect on how we recognize faces is explained as an underlying facet of reality. A fact about faces, instead of a fact about the limitations of our mental architecture. That's why no one has ever been able to write facial recognition software that works even a little bit /s. It would be wrong for me to say the book is not worth your time, because I haven't read enough of it to make that judgement, but I can honestly say I expect it to not be worth my time. (Also I want to complain about a minor error the author keeps making again and again: stating that scientific explanations form hierarchies. This is simply wrong. The graph of we-use-X-to-explain-Y isn't a tree, it's a directed acyclic graph. For example, consider jet airplanes, chemistry, aerodynamics, and physics.)