7 ms·

Can someone explain why we can't give SSL certificates along with domain registration? We already trust the DNS, don't we?

chetanahuja 12y ago
No. Consider that DNS request/responses are simple, cleartext UDP packets. There's DNSSEC of course but nobody uses it (and also most security experts don't like it).
- xorcist 12y ago
  That's a bit silly, considering it was developed over a ten year process, and a lot of security professionals had a hand in its design. There are problems with it, which some people are quick to point out, and it is important to be aware of them. The fact that your DNS data is enumerable is an important change, for example. You could compare it to IPsec, which is what most VPNs use, which is comparable in security and design. They both, together with SSL, suffer from a bad case of design-by-committee, including atrocities like X509. DNSSEC did get an important thing right. You are in full control of your own keys, and your DNS provider can not impersonate you. Having an external DNS hosting provider was not common back then, but it is now, and I'm glad they got that right.
  - indymike 12y ago
    If experts take 10 years to make a product that sucks, the product still sucks.
    - xorcist 11y ago
      Absolutely. SSH also sucks. TLS sucks badly. The only protocols that doesn't are those that haven't seen real-world usage yet. That's what drives innovation.
  - EmanueleAina 11y ago
    > The fact that your DNS data is enumerable is an important change, for example. Indeed, but afaik there are methods to mitigate it (NSEC3) and more refined ones in development (NSEC4, NSEC5).
Buge 12y ago
It's because all CAs are able to sign certs for all domains. Browsers simply do not trust your average domain registrar enough to give them power over all domains. Now you might say don't trust the registrar, trust the people who run the .com (or whatever) TLD. That's getting close to what DNSSEC does, which some people say is better. But CAs weren't designed for this like DNSSEC. With the way CAs work, we would have to give the runners of .com power over all domains, which some people might not think is so bad. But it would also mean we would have to give the owners of .sucks power over all domains as well, which most people would be against.
- MichaelGG 12y ago
  Aren't name restriction extensions sorta adopted now?
- nileshtrivedi 12y ago
  Thank you. This makes sense.
xorcist 12y ago
The original idea with SSL was to give out certificates to organizations, not domain holders. The labour involved made this an expensive process and today domain validated certificates are the most common. The idea was that users should want to validate they speak with the organization McDonald's, not with mcdonalds.com which may or may not belong to them. Turns out users don't, and that the distinction gets even less important over time. Domain names is an important identifier for an organization now. You can still however see the old process at work in EV certificates, which normally carries an extra cost. If SSL had been designed for domain validation from the start, if would have looked like DNSSEC. Cryptographically verified domain assignments is a good idea, and infinitely more secure than the domain validation schemes we use today. Here at HN there are a handful who can't resist going on about NSA every time DNSSEC is mentioned, so I expect a few of those now. Please do understand the whole picture and how the complete certificate stack works before taking those statements at face value.
- nailer 11y ago
  > The original idea with SSL was to give out certificates to organizations, not domain holders. FYI that's exactly what EV SSL does now - hence the company checks, and the green bar: Eg, here's a regular certificate openssl x509 -in example.com.crt -noout -text | grep Subject Subject: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=GB/businessCategory=Private Organization/serialNumber=09378892, C=GB, ST=City of London, L=London, O=example Limited, CN=billing.example.com, DNS:billing.example.com, DNS:www.billing.example.com https://certsimple.com/blog/do-ev-ssl-certificates-have-better-encryption https://certsimple.com/blog/do-ev-ssl-certificates-have-bett...
perdunov 12y ago
A certificate given by the domain registrar makes a lot of sense to me. My registrar holds my data and indeed can certify the identity of the domain.
- nileshtrivedi 11y ago
  There's also a payment-mechanism already in place, and correspondingly users' expectations. They also know where the domain is actually hosted.

chetanahuja 12y ago

No. Consider that DNS request/responses are simple, cleartext UDP packets. There's DNSSEC of course but nobody uses it (and also most security experts don't like it).

xorcist 12y ago
That's a bit silly, considering it was developed over a ten year process, and a lot of security professionals had a hand in its design. There are problems with it, which some people are quick to point out, and it is important to be aware of them. The fact that your DNS data is enumerable is an important change, for example. You could compare it to IPsec, which is what most VPNs use, which is comparable in security and design. They both, together with SSL, suffer from a bad case of design-by-committee, including atrocities like X509. DNSSEC did get an important thing right. You are in full control of your own keys, and your DNS provider can not impersonate you. Having an external DNS hosting provider was not common back then, but it is now, and I'm glad they got that right.
- indymike 12y ago
  If experts take 10 years to make a product that sucks, the product still sucks.
  - xorcist 11y ago
    Absolutely. SSH also sucks. TLS sucks badly. The only protocols that doesn't are those that haven't seen real-world usage yet. That's what drives innovation.
- EmanueleAina 11y ago
  > The fact that your DNS data is enumerable is an important change, for example. Indeed, but afaik there are methods to mitigate it (NSEC3) and more refined ones in development (NSEC4, NSEC5).

Buge 12y ago

It's because all CAs are able to sign certs for all domains. Browsers simply do not trust your average domain registrar enough to give them power over all domains. Now you might say don't trust the registrar, trust the people who run the .com (or whatever) TLD. That's getting close to what DNSSEC does, which some people say is better. But CAs weren't designed for this like DNSSEC. With the way CAs work, we would have to give the runners of .com power over all domains, which some people might not think is so bad. But it would also mean we would have to give the owners of .sucks power over all domains as well, which most people would be against.

MichaelGG 12y ago
Aren't name restriction extensions sorta adopted now?
nileshtrivedi 12y ago
Thank you. This makes sense.

xorcist 12y ago

The original idea with SSL was to give out certificates to organizations, not domain holders. The labour involved made this an expensive process and today domain validated certificates are the most common. The idea was that users should want to validate they speak with the organization McDonald's, not with mcdonalds.com which may or may not belong to them. Turns out users don't, and that the distinction gets even less important over time. Domain names is an important identifier for an organization now. You can still however see the old process at work in EV certificates, which normally carries an extra cost. If SSL had been designed for domain validation from the start, if would have looked like DNSSEC. Cryptographically verified domain assignments is a good idea, and infinitely more secure than the domain validation schemes we use today. Here at HN there are a handful who can't resist going on about NSA every time DNSSEC is mentioned, so I expect a few of those now. Please do understand the whole picture and how the complete certificate stack works before taking those statements at face value.

nailer 11y ago
> The original idea with SSL was to give out certificates to organizations, not domain holders. FYI that's exactly what EV SSL does now - hence the company checks, and the green bar: Eg, here's a regular certificate openssl x509 -in example.com.crt -noout -text | grep Subject Subject: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=GB/businessCategory=Private Organization/serialNumber=09378892, C=GB, ST=City of London, L=London, O=example Limited, CN=billing.example.com, DNS:billing.example.com, DNS:www.billing.example.com https://certsimple.com/blog/do-ev-ssl-certificates-have-better-encryption https://certsimple.com/blog/do-ev-ssl-certificates-have-bett...

perdunov 12y ago

A certificate given by the domain registrar makes a lot of sense to me. My registrar holds my data and indeed can certify the identity of the domain.

nileshtrivedi 11y ago
There's also a payment-mechanism already in place, and correspondingly users' expectations. They also know where the domain is actually hosted.